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Abstract 
Global discourses on trilateral development cooperation (TDC) have overlooked the 
experiences of beneficiary countries and focused on the concerns of development 
cooperation providers. This is a significant gap given that TDC is increasingly being 
promoted as a modality that supports country ownership, equality between Northern 
and Southern partners, and efforts to achieve the 2030 agenda for Sustainable 
Development. In response, this study draws on the case of Zambia to examine how the 
politics of partnership affect a beneficiary country’s experience with exercising 
ownership and leadership of TDC projects. It employs an institutional ethnography 
based on key stakeholder interviews and archival analysis, to capture the beneficiary 
perspective of country ownership and partnerships. It also engages with postcolonial 
perspectives on development cooperation to gain insight into how power and agency 
operate in the production and dissemination of development knowledge.  
The study finds that Zambian approaches to country ownership in TDC differ from 
definitions in global policy frameworks and reflect institutionalised responses to the 
experiences of colonial governance and donor dominance. This demonstrates the 
significance of a more nuanced understanding of beneficiary agency and the historical 
context of partnerships. The study also demonstrates that TDC is intertwined with the 
geopolitical and commercial interests of partner countries, although the dominant 
policy narratives prefer to concentrate on the technical aspects of project management. 
It also illustrates the diverse ways in which Zambian stakeholders navigate these 
challenges and concludes that a beneficiary country can achieve real and observable 
development outcomes from TDC, despite the politics of partnership. However, it 
argues that Zambia’s ability to ensure the sustainability of development outcomes are 
constrained by internal dynamics, rather than the underlying ambitions or power 
inequalities with its development cooperation providers. The findings contribute fresh 
insight into debates on the changing geographies of global development and emerging 
literature on the politics of knowledge production in South-South/trilateral 
cooperation research.  
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1  
Introduction 
International development cooperation was a topic of intense academic and public 
discussion a decade ago. At the time, extensive campaigns to ‘make poverty history’ 
in Africa had stirred the international community into action, but also intensified 
debates on beneficiary agency and the power of representation (Whitfield 2009; 
Harrison 2010). There were also growing demands for aid to come to an end, as the 
rapid rise in volumes of economic cooperation from ‘emerging’ Southern powers 
began to substantiate arguments that trade and not aid was more desirable (Moyo 2009; 
Carmody 2011). In recent years, the global political economy has undergone 
numerous changes, which have seen development cooperation fade into the 
background of scholarly debates. First, several developing countries have experienced 
significant poverty reduction, economic growth and reduced their overall aid 
dependence (Fosu 2017). Second, budgetary pressure after the 2008-9 global financial 
crisis forced most members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development- Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) to reassess the 
scope of their development programmes and their list of priority countries (Cammack 
2012). In addition, most Northern development cooperation providers have begun to 
concentrate their aid allocations in emerging economies that are deemed vital trade 
partners or fragile countries that are considered security risks as sources of terrorism 
or illegal immigration. The focus of international development policy has also shifted, 
more broadly, from poverty reduction to private sector-led economic growth.  
These changes have stimulated various development cooperation providers, including 
the United Kingdom, to explore opportunities to shift future responsibility for the 
financing/delivery of aid to the private sector (Mawdsley 2015; McVeigh 2018). 
Subsequently, some observers have begun to question whether we are witnessing the 
death of ‘development’ as an ideology and a goal (Hickel 2014; Brooks 2017). In spite 
of these changes, development cooperation has remained an important mechanism for 
addressing poverty, inequality, conflict and environmental degradation in low and 
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middle-income countries. Many Northern countries have recognised that is in their 
national interest to address these problems in the global South since they result in 
negative consequences, such as climate change, that are felt across the global divide 
(e.g. Danida 2017). This thesis is primarily concerned with trilateral development 
cooperation (TDC), a relatively new modality in which a Southern development 
cooperation provider and a Northern development cooperation provider (that is, an 
OECD-DAC member and/or a multilateral institution) work together to support a 
Southern beneficiary partner. 1   
Diverse countries have participated in TDC projects, but the United Nations (UN) and 
OECD have consolidated their role as brokers of development knowledge by 
establishing multiple platforms to enhance knowledge and use of South-
South/trilateral development cooperation. For example, the OECD-DAC established 
the Global Partnership Initiative on Effective Triangular Cooperation in November 
2016 to strengthen the use of TDC amongst its members (OECD 2017). The UN also 
organised the 2nd High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation in March 
2019, almost forty years after the first forum produced the Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among development 
countries (BAPA). Significantly, the 2019 conference (also referred to as BAPA+40) 
hailed TDC as a ‘win-win’ modality that could assist beneficiary countries to achieve 
priorities in their national development plans and global targets in the 2030 agenda for 
Sustainable Development (UN 2019). However, despite its growing importance and 
predictions that it may eclipse bilateral cooperation to become the preferred modality 
of international development cooperation in the future, TDC has not attracted 
significant critical analysis outside of policy circles.  
The majority of the existing policy literature focuses instead on the technical aspects 
of implementing a TDC project, such as administration and coordination amongst the 
different partners (e.g. Fordelone 2009; Kato 2012; OECD 2017; UNDP 2017a). 
                                                 
1 The definition of the global North-global South and Northern cooperation provider-Southern 
cooperation provider employed in this thesis is explained on page 23. 
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These policy texts construct TDC as a progressive modality that supports country 
ownership and equality between all partners. However, as McEwan and Mawdsley 
(2012, p.1187) first pointed out, a nuanced and critical analysis of TDC has to take 
into account the political nature of development cooperation and the uneven power 
relations between the different actors enrolled within it. This is especially important 
given that previous studies have illustrated the diverse ways in which Northern and 
Southern countries have used bilateral cooperation to advance their diplomatic and 
commercial interests, set policy agendas, and to socialize the beneficiaries of their 
development cooperation into adopting their norms and value systems (e.g. Sogge 
2002; Lancaster 2007; Farias 2018; Power 2019).  
Analyses of TDCs role in the changing geographies of power and development is 
slowly emerging in international relations and development studies (McEwan and 
Mawdsley 2012; Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; Fingermann 2015; Lengfelder 2016; 
Zhang 2017). However, most of these studies have not applied critical theory to 
understand the practice of TDC, although studies such as Zhang (2017) and Abdenur 
and Da Fonseca (2013) have attempted to theorise the underlying motives that are 
influencing development cooperation providers to engage in TDC.2 In addition, the 
current debates are mostly focussed on the providers of development cooperation 
while very little is known or understood about the experiences of beneficiary countries. 
This is a significant gap, given that the international community has recognised 
country ownership as a core principle of effective development cooperation, based on 
the assumption that beneficiary leadership over the design and implementation of a 
development intervention increases its responsiveness to local needs and result in 
observable changes that stand the test of time (OECD 2011). 
The knowledge gaps identified above are partially a result of there being only a limited 
amount of information on country cases collected and made available by the main 
institutions involved in the implementation of TDC (Lengfelder 2016; UN 2019). 
Consequently, this thesis aims to address these gaps through an empirically based 
                                                 
2 The literature reviewed for this research is limited to English language publications. 
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analysis of how the politics of partnership affects and determines a beneficiary 
country’s experience with exercising ownership and leadership of TDC. It will 
specifically engage with postcolonial critiques on power, agency and knowledge 
production, in order to examine country ownership of TDC projects in Zambia. As the 
discussion in Chapter Two will demonstrate, postcolonial perspectives offer rich 
insight into the roots of the unequal power relations that characterise North-South 
cooperation and continue to challenge the notion that beneficiary countries can easily 
exercise ‘ownership’ of development interventions (e.g. Baaz 2005). Postcolonial 
approaches have enabled studies such as Six (2009) to demonstrate that developing 
countries collectively challenge understandings of development cooperation in the 
global North through their emphasis on anti-colonialism and non-interference in 
South-South cooperation (SSC). Postcolonial theories can also cast light on how 
power inequalities disenfranchise marginalised groups in South-South relations 
(Davies and Boehmer 2019). This makes postcolonialism a constructive theoretical 
framework for problematizing the complex nature of a South-South-North trilateral 
development partnership, as well as ongoing claims that TDC can enhance 
development effectiveness.  
 
From Competition to Collaboration in Policy Spaces 
The origins of TDC lie in the 1978 UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries where members states agreed to support the Buenos Aires Plan 
of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation amongst 
development countries (widely known as BAPA). Ekoko and Benn (2002) note that 
the commitment to BAPA was based on the recognition that Southern expertise was 
at times more relevant and cost-effective in countries with similar histories and 
development challenges than that provided by Northern partners. Thereafter, 
developing countries established several networks regionally and within the United 
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Nations system, to promote South-South technical cooperation.3 Some Northern 
cooperation providers, such as Japan, also developed technical training programmes 
to facilitate South-South knowledge exchanges (Kato 2012). Subsequently, trilateral 
development cooperation (TDC) emerged in the 1990s as a modality through which 
Northern partners could formally support the transfer and adaptation of knowledge on 
innovative policies, programmes or technologies that have proved successful in one 
Southern country to the context of another country facing similar challenges, e.g. 
poverty reduction, food security, social protection, disaster management and conflict 
resolution (Ekoko and Benn 2002).  
Contemporary TDC is still generally centred on technical cooperation and lays 
emphasis on developing the beneficiary’s capacity to generate its own development 
solutions (UNOSSC 2018). The term ‘triangular’, which refers to partnerships 
involving three actors, is often used in place of trilateral in policy documents, but in 
practice, TDC initiatives can involve multiple beneficiaries or development 
cooperation providers and in some cases, all partners may come from the same 
geographic region. As Figure 1 illustrates, the Southern cooperation provider is often 
referred to as the ‘pivotal’ partner because the trilateral exchange is anchored in 
transferring it technology or technical knowledge to the beneficiary partner. The 
Northern cooperation provider often plays the role of the ‘facilitator’ through its 
provision of either financial resources and/or technical support to the partnership, 
based on its best practice in project management and aid delivery (Fordelone 2009). 
However, this thesis will demonstrate that the development cooperation providers 
indirectly gain soft power influence and market access in the beneficiary country.  
At present, the main stakeholders in TDC tend to be government institutions but 
research institutions, civil society organisations and the private sector are often 
included in the project implementation process (OECD 2017). Japan, Germany and 
Norway are the top OECD-DAC members engaging in trilateral cooperation; the 
                                                 
3 This includes the Group of 77 (G77) and the Special Unit for Technical cooperation amongst 
developing countries (TCDC) which is now known as the UN Office for South-South Cooperation 
(UNOSSC) and operates under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
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United Nations (UN) organisations are the leading multilateral partners; and most 
beneficiaries are low-income or middle-income countries from Latin America, the 
Caribbean, Africa, Asia-Pacific and Central Asia (ibid). TDC is unique for enabling 
Southern countries which do not have sufficient financial/administrative resources to 
dedicate towards development cooperation activities, to transfer their technical 
knowledge to other countries. In so doing, TDC has given these countries access to 
some of the benefits associated with being a development cooperation provider (such 
as diplomatic prestige and influence). For this reason, the OECD has praised TDC for 
being a modality that transcends the divide between countries from the global North 
that have traditionally been development cooperation providers and those from the 
global South that have been beneficiary partners (OECD 2017, p.8). The UN 
Secretary-General has also hailed TDC as a modality that “offers opportunities to 
explore synergies and complementarities between diverse actors and to strengthen the 
ownership of all partners” (UN 2018, p.5). 
 
 Figure 1: The dynamics of trilateral development cooperation 
 
(Source: Author) 
Northern partner 
(Technical/financial 
support) 
Southern partner  
(Pivotal source of 
knowledge/technology) 
Beneficiary partner  
Soft power influence 
Market access 
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Ideally, it is envisaged that each partner in a TDC initiative should play an active role 
in the design, implementation and evaluation of the project, but the beneficiary partner 
should have ownership over the whole process in order for the intervention to be 
effective (that is, for it to generate observable and sustainable development outcomes). 
However, it has been repeatedly observed that many TDC projects struggle from low 
levels of beneficiary country ownership (Fordelone 2009; UNDP 2017a). Most policy-
oriented studies tend to attribute the beneficiary’s failure to take up ownership to 
corruption or institutional capacity weaknesses in planning and coordination. These 
technical and managerial challenges are significant but there is also a political 
dimension to aid and development found in bilateral relations that also challenges 
efforts to achieve beneficiary country ownership and inclusive partnerships in TDC as 
the next section highlights. 
 
The Politics of Partnership 
The recent interest in TDC is part of the wider transformation that the international 
development landscape has undergone since China, India and Brazil emerged between 
2000 and 2010 as the most prominent development cooperation providers outside of 
the OECD-DAC. Each country has a distinct approach to aid delivery. However, they 
distinguished themselves by officially stating that their development activities could 
not be understood through the official development assistance model (ODA) followed 
by DAC members, but rather as a part of South-South Cooperation (SSC)4 (Park 
2011). As the discussion in Chapter Two will show, SSC has historically involved a 
combination of political, economic and development cooperation between developing 
countries and laid emphasis on the principles of non-interference in the affairs of other 
countries and mutually beneficial relations. Hence China, India, and Brazil did not 
                                                 
4 Most Southern development cooperation providers tend to focus on technical cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance. Wealthier countries such as China and India also provide finances 
(loans/grants), resources-for-infrastructure exchanges and military assistance. 
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attach policy and transparency conditions to their development programmes and they 
also made increased trade and investments an integral part of their SSC. Most 
beneficiary governments from Africa and the Asia-Pacific region embraced the 
plurality in modalities (i.e. grants, loans, technical cooperation, military assistance, 
trade and investments) and relative autonomy offered by their Southern partners (see 
Cheru and Obi 2010; Power et al. 2012; Hameiri 2015). However, the rest of the 
international community began to speculate on their motives and the implications of 
their approach to development cooperation, which differed starkly from DAC’s 
framework, with the harshest critics presenting them as ‘predatory’ and harmful to the 
prospects for sustainable development in the poorest countries (e.g. Naim 2007).  
Attempts were made to convince the ‘rising powers’ to adopt the aid effectiveness 
reforms that came out of the 2005 Paris High-Level Forum (Manning 2006). China, 
India and Brazil rejected these efforts and argued that the aid effectiveness agenda was 
based on the need to reform practices found in North-South cooperation. They also 
emphasised their activities were less concerned with aid and more of “an act of 
solidarity based on common struggles” aimed at achieving mutual benefits with other 
developing countries, which enabled them to construct their relations with beneficiary 
partners as ‘horizontal’ and ‘respectful’ (Mawdsley 2012). As will be seen in Chapter 
Two, this discourse can be traced to South-South solidarity movements that emerged 
in the 1950s and the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference. Their approach to development 
cooperation heightened long-standing criticisms of the hierarchal nature of North-
South relations and created competitive pressure for the OECD-DAC. Northern 
countries attempted to persuade China, India and Brazil to agree on a universal 
framework to govern international development cooperation, but these efforts were 
rejected out of concern that they “might obscure particularities of SSC and impose 
rules that developing countries are not ready to adopt” (Sidiropoulos et al. 2015).  
A shift from competition to cooperation began to emerge at the 2011 Busan High-
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness where Northern cooperation providers 
acknowledged the different but complementary nature of SSC. The Busan 
Deceleration also emphasised the need for more collaborative efforts so as to ensure 
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that the effectiveness of all forms of development cooperation provided to beneficiary 
countries is maximized (see OECD 2011). During this period, several countries from 
the global South such as South Africa, Thailand, Malaysia, Colombia, and Indonesia, 
either established or expanded their development cooperation programmes and 
showed a willingness to collaborate with OECD-DAC members in the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) that emerged from 
Busan. However, China, India and Brazil opted to develop alternative networks to 
evaluate and improve the delivery of their development cooperation activities, such as 
the network of Southern Think Tanks (see Sidiropoulos et al. 2015).  
In the midst of all these changes, numerous development scholars and policymakers 
have repeatedly stressed that the focus of debates should not be on how developing 
countries are ‘victims’ of competing interests or on whose approach to development 
cooperation is appropriate. Instead, the debates should be about how all sides can 
contribute to improving the capacity for beneficiaries to take charge of their own 
development and to become self-reliant (see Der  Spiegel 2010; Glennie 2016). This 
is an important argument given that the economies of most low-income countries have 
improved considerably over the last decade, thereby diminishing their need for 
development finance and shifting their development priorities to improving the 
capacity of their institutional and human resources (GPEDC 2016; Fosu 2017). It is 
against this background that trilateral development cooperation (TDC) has 
increasingly been explored for its potential to optimise the strengths of Northern and 
Southern cooperation providers towards capacity development and mutual learning in 
partner countries (OECD 2017).  
There is also growing interest in exploring how Northern cooperation providers can 
utilise TDC to access opportunities in and exercise influence over current and former 
beneficiaries of their bilateral cooperation, and how Southern cooperation providers 
can potentially use TDC as a strategic instrument to expand their soft power influence. 
Lengfelder’s (2016) study of Germany’s motivations for engaging in TDC has found 
that it is seeking to develop strategic trade partnerships, to test policy solutions for 
challenges such as migration and climate change and, to co-opt SSC providers into 
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adopting OECD-DAC standards for effective development cooperation. The tutelage 
objective is shared by other Northern cooperation providers and has been a source of 
tension with Southern cooperation providers, particularly China, India and Brazil. 
These Southern cooperation providers perceive it as an indirect method for Northern 
cooperation providers to reassert their power over the global development architecture 
in the post-global financial crisis-era, in which their authority is questioned 
(Sidiropoulos et al. 2015). In the past, African beneficiary governments were equally 
hesitant to participate in TDC, due to concerns that their Southern partners would be 
coaxed into adopting Northern cooperation providers preference for strict 
transparency and accountability conditions (The Guardian 2010). There was also 
concern that the harmonisation of Northern and Southern development cooperation 
would diminish the beneficiary country’s ability to play different development 
partners off against each other. However, in recent years prominent Southern 
development cooperation providers and beneficiary countries have become more open 
to engaging in TDC projects with multilateral organisations from the UN system and 
some OECD-DAC members (see UNOSSC 2018).  
It is not clear from existing literature how these TDC partnerships are negotiating 
differences over transparency and accountability conditions, or if the SSC principle of 
non-interference in the affairs of other countries is instead being upheld in TDC. As 
the discussion in Chapter Two will show, the principle of non-interference, the 
discourse of horizontality and ‘the imaginary of similarities’ in South-South relations 
(based on geography, socio-political history and development experiences) has been 
key to cementing the legitimacy and power that prominent Southern cooperation 
providers hold as the new ‘authorities’ on development knowledge (Rhee 2011). 
However, as Hurrell (2006) points out, being a great power is closely related to notions 
of legitimacy and authority. It is for this reason, Abdenur and Da Fonseca (2013) 
suggest that Northern partners, who have widely been criticised for being paternalistic, 
are trying to re-establish their legitimacy as development cooperation providers 
through TDC. There is also evidence that Southern cooperation providers have opened 
up to collaborating in TDC with OECD countries in order to reform their development 
practices and their global reputation. For example, Chinese officials have openly 
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stated that they want to expand their involvement in TDC to learn from Northern 
expertise on the management and delivery of development cooperation, and to 
reposition China as “a responsible development actor” (Han 2017; Zhang 2017).  
Northern cooperation providers have also become more open to learning from the 
policy experiences of some of their Southern partners in what is referred to as South-
North cooperation. For example, Brazil has shared unique policy experiences from the 
management of its national healthcare system with health officials from the United 
Kingdom (Constantine and Shankland 2017). Northern cooperation providers have 
also moved away from simply critiquing or trying to co-opt Southern partners into 
adopting their best practice to actually following some of their practices, such as the 
explicit merging of development cooperation with national interests (see Mawdsley 
2018). These developments have substantiated arguments in past studies that have 
suggested that Northern and Southern cooperation providers appear to be more 
motivated by what they can get from each other in TDC partnerships (whether this is 
knowledge, commercial opportunities, prestige or legitimacy) rather than the 
beneficiary country’s ownership and ensuring that a project’s outcomes are effective 
in the long-term (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012; Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013). 
Several studies have even observed that the majority of TDC initiatives are usually 
developed from memoranda of understanding (MoU) between Northern and Southern 
cooperation providers, and beneficiaries are often only included in the process of 
designing the project plan and its implementation (e.g. Kato 2012; Stahl 2012; OECD 
2017).  
The problem with a TDC project that is driven by the plans of the development 
cooperation provider and not the demands of the beneficiary country, is that it can 
diminish feelings of ownership in the beneficiary country since the development 
cooperation provider essentially owns the project’s overall objective. An additional 
risk is that a TDC project may facilitate the transfer of Southern knowledge that is not 
always suitable for adaptation in beneficiary countries (for example, see research on 
the transfer of Brazilian agricultural techniques to African countries in Cabral et al. 
2016). Furthermore, the discourse of horizontality in SSC tends to mask the reality 
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that there are unequal power relations between Southern countries and that these 
differences can present diverse challenges on the implementation of development 
projects. For example, Marcondes and Mawdsley (2017) point out that the Brazilian 
government threatened to cease technical cooperation to El Salvador after the latter 
refused to recognise a change in leadership following the impeachment of President 
Dilma Rousseff in 2016.  
The experiences and perceptions of beneficiary countries have not been addressed in 
most policy and academic research on TDC. However, it is important to recognise that 
they are not passive partners and that they must also have strategic motives driving 
their participation in TDC with partner countries. Research on African development 
has shown that beneficiary governments sometimes secure bilateral cooperation for 
development projects that could otherwise be funded using domestic resources, in 
order to strategically free up domestic resources for use in economic/social sectors that 
do no attract donor support or for any other purposes (Whitfield 2009; Carmody and 
Kragelund 2016). In addition, factors such as a change in political leadership, 
conflicting stakeholder interests and power inequalities within the beneficiary country 
have also been found to have an impact on beneficiary ownership of bilateral 
development interventions and their outcomes (Nordtveit 2009). In the light of the 
complex politics of partnership discussed above, this thesis is concerned with 
examining how power inequalities, political changes, conflicting stakeholder interests 
and ideologies on what constitutes effective partnerships affect beneficiary ownership 
of TDC. 
 
Research Objectives 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, TDC is a relatively new and under-
researched modality. The majority of existing literature on TDC is policy-oriented and 
lacks critical conceptualisation of the complex politics and power relations inherent in 
a South-South-North development partnership. In addition, very little is known or 
understood about the experiences of beneficiary countries from the available literature. 
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In response to these knowledge gaps, the primary objective of this study is to carry out 
an empirical case study of a beneficiary country’s experience with exercising 
ownership and leadership of a TDC project. The second objective of this thesis is to 
develop a theoretically informed critique of how the politics of partnership affects 
beneficiary country ownership in TDC. It specifically draws on postcolonial 
perspectives on development due to their emphasis on and commitment to recovering 
the voices of ‘the subaltern’ or actors who are marginalised in global discourses, such 
as beneficiary countries. A postcolonial lens creates space for this study to theorise 
from the experiences of the diverse stakeholders in the beneficiary country and to open 
up to alternative explanations that they may have on development cooperation 
activities. It also enables this study to demonstrate the machinations of power within 
TDC, how this relates to the production and dissemination of development knowledge, 
and the significance of a more nuanced understanding of beneficiary country agency. 
Zambia makes an interesting case study because it is an example of a lower middle-
income country whose political terrain has been relatively stable since its 
independence in 1964, but whose development landscape has been constrained by an 
inability to overcome its colonial legacy of a mono-economy (almost entirely 
dependent on copper export earnings) and weaknesses in its institutional and human 
resource capacity. Zambia has historically accepted development cooperation from 
diverse Northern and Southern partners to address these challenges, but research has 
shown that the government has occasionally experienced difficulty with negotiating 
and asserting its preferences in aid negotiations (Saasa and Carlsson 1996; Fraser 
2009; Prizzon 2013). Most of the development cooperation that the country receives 
is provided on a bilateral basis, however, TDC operating under the framework of 
South-South cooperation has recently become a part of the local development 
landscape. This thesis will specifically focus on two case studies: the Japan-Zambia-
Malaysia Triangle of Hope investment promotion project (2006–12) and the China-
Zambia-UNDP-Denmark renewable energy technology transfer project (2014–9).  
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Research Questions 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate whether TDC has the ability to result in 
effective and sustainable development outcomes for beneficiary countries, in spite of 
the complex politics of partnership. Drawing on the case studies in Zambia, the 
research questions derived to deliver this aim are as follows: 
1. What is the nature of partnerships developed through TDC? 
2. To what extent does the politics of partnership support or undermine 
beneficiary ownership in trilateral development projects? 
3. What are the consequences for development effectiveness in Zambia? 
4. What lessons might be learned for TDC more broadly? 
Through its findings, the thesis aims to inform debates on contemporary South-South 
cooperation and its influence on the changing geographies of power and development 
(Mawdsley 2012; Carmody 2013; Rosser and Tubilewicz 2016; Power 2019). It also 
aims to contribute to debates on the norms that should guide international development 
cooperation (Chandy and Kharas 2011; Sidiropoulos et al. 2015). The insights gained 
on development effectiveness from this research are also of relevance to international 
development scholars, practitioners and multilateral forums that negotiate, manage or 
monitor development cooperation activities.  
  
North-South: Definition and Terminology 
The use of the terms ‘global North’ or ‘global South’ to categorise countries is as much 
of a problematic over-generalisation as the ‘First World’ or ‘Third World’ 
classification given that the countries in each geographic region have different levels 
of economic wealth, political influence, poverty and inequality. However, the terms 
‘developed country’ and ‘developing country’ are used where appropriate in this 
thesis, not to indicate a hierarchy, but to distinguish between relatively 
industrialised/wealthy countries and countries with higher levels of poverty. The 
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North-South distinction and terms such as ‘development cooperation provider’ or 
‘partner’ are also employed due to their acceptance in contemporary policy circles and 
academic literature. For the purpose of this study, the term ‘Northern partner’ should 
be understood as referring to the traditional members of the OECD-DAC (from 
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) as well as 
multilateral institutions from the United Nations system, World Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The definition of the global South and the 
countries that can be described as a ‘Southern partner’ is far more complicated and 
can be contested as studies such as Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley (2019) have shown. 
However, this thesis employs the term Southern partner to refer to countries from 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Within this diverse grouping, it is 
acknowledged that South Korea, Chile and other high-income countries have either 
joined the OECD-DAC in recent years or signalled that they wish to become members. 
  
Thesis Outline 
This thesis comprises a total of seven chapters. Chapter Two outlines the conceptual 
framework and the historical importance of country ownership in international 
development cooperation. It draws on postcolonial perspectives on power, agency and 
knowledge production to cast light on the political nature of development cooperation, 
the significance of non-conditionality and self-reliance in post-colonial countries, and 
the rationale for concentrating on the beneficiary country’s agency and perspective on 
TDC.  It also problematizes the notion that TDC promotes ‘equality’ between partners 
by exploring how knowledge transfers enable hegemonic Northern and Southern 
development cooperation providers to define the space for a beneficiary country to 
control its development trajectory. Chapter Three sets out the rationale for case study 
selection, the methodological approach and the data collection methods of this study. 
It provides an overview of how an institutional ethnography (IE) based on key 
stakeholder interviews and archival analysis was employed to collect and analyse data 
on country ownership of TDC. My positionality as a ‘Southern’ researcher is also 
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discussed in addition to the difficulties involved in researching country ownership of 
TDC where the main stakeholders are critical government institutions such as finance, 
trade, energy and foreign affairs. The chapter also highlights the limitations and ethical 
challenges this imposed on data collection, how these were navigated and the wider 
implications for research into South-South/trilateral development cooperation.  
Chapter Four situates the ToH and RETT project case studies within the history of 
national planning and donor relations in Zambia in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of beneficiary agency and the nature of partnerships in TDC. It 
demonstrates that Zambian approaches to country ownership in TDC differ from the 
dominant definitions in global policy frameworks and reflect institutionalised 
responses to the country’s experiences of colonial governance and donor dominance 
during a period of aid dependency in the 1980s and 1990s. It also demonstrates how 
notions that Zambia can use South-South/trilateral development cooperation to 
address its persistent skilled labour shortages and achieve self-reliance, are influenced 
by ideas from the dependency and modernisation schools of thought. Chapter Five 
examines the extent to which the politics of partnership supports or undermines 
beneficiary country ownership of TDC. It demonstrates the diverse ways in which 
Zambian stakeholders manage the political and commercial interests that underlie 
TDC at the global, national, and institutional scale. Chapter Six examines how 
Zambian stakeholders negotiate the power its development cooperation providers have 
to introduce external development interventions through TDC. It also explores how 
domestic political and bureaucratic challenges constrain the retention of development 
knowledge, the sustainability of development outcomes from TDC projects, and the 
wider implications for development effectiveness in Zambia. The chapter also 
supports this study’s commitment to amplifying marginalised voices in global 
discourses by highlighting beneficiary partner suggestions on how institutions can 
navigate and enhance TDC partnerships. 
Chapter Seven reviews and synthesizes the overall research findings on how country 
ownership and sustainable development outcomes in TDC are affected by the complex 
politics of partnership.  It examines the wider implications of the research findings on 
26 
 
 
debates concerning the changing geographies of global power and development, offers 
policy recommendations for improving development effectiveness, and directions for 
future conceptual and methodological studies on South-South/trilateral development 
cooperation. 
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2 
Country ownership: Power, Knowledge and Self-
reliance in Development 
The concept of country ownership is widely associated with the aid effectiveness 
debates leading up to the 2005 Paris High-level Forum, where it was defined as a 
situation in which “partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions” (OECD 
2005). This chapter sets out to establish the historical importance of country ownership 
in international development cooperation by exploring some of the ways that post-
colonial countries have either consented to externally driven interventions to spur 
economic growth or contested them to protect their sovereignty through mechanisms 
such as South-South cooperation. It also aims to show how a postcolonial approach 
might be brought to bear on the analysis of beneficiary country ownership of trilateral 
development cooperation (TDC) and outlines the conceptual framework informing the 
research. This is not an easy task given as McEwan (2019, p.99) points out, 
postcolonial and development studies have not always engaged with each other due to 
“differences in disciplinary traditions, politics, wariness of motives and the language 
and concepts used to articulate core issues.” Despite this, the chapter argues that these 
divergences also offer opportunities to explore alternative understandings of 
development. Postcolonial approaches have enabled researchers to understand how 
the structural inequality that colonialism created in the global political economy 
shapes contemporary power relations, how the dominance of Northern knowledge 
frameworks has silenced alternative development knowledge from the global South, 
the acts of resistance to this dominance and the benefits of recovering marginalised 
voices. This chapter draws on these postcolonial perspectives on development in order 
to problematize the TDC partnership process and underscore the rationale for making 
the beneficiary country the focal point of this thesis, as opposed to the current trend in 
academic and policy research where the views and concerns of development 
cooperation providers are given precedence. 
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The chapter demonstrates that development cooperation is political in nature through 
first discussing how South-South cooperation (SSC) emerged in the 20th century as a 
response to concerns that Northern countries were concealing geopolitical motivations 
behind their technical cooperation and competing theories on industrial modernity. In 
this sense, South-South technical cooperation was originally conceptualized as a 
modality for developing countries to successively achieve economic growth, self-
reliance and total control over their development trajectory. The chapter proceeds to 
argue that this conception of technical cooperation amongst developing countries is 
being challenged in contemporary South-South/trilateral cooperation through the 
reproduction of mimicry, trusteeship and assumptions about who is the knower-learner 
in development, which are practices that have historically been a part of North-South 
cooperation. It also examines the implications of these practices on country ownership 
and considers the role of TDC in the domestication of development knowledge (that 
is innovative policies, programmes and technologies) from influential Southern 
countries and global frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. Finally, the chapter explores debates about African agency to gain 
insight into how beneficiary countries are responding to the changing geographies of 
power and development. Through this discussion, it argues that the ongoing changes 
require postcolonial scholars to extend core arguments concerning the relationship 
between power and knowledge production, beyond their focus on the dominance of 
Northern cooperation providers to the rise of Southern ‘authorities’ on development 
knowledge. 
 
South-South cooperation for economic development and self-
reliance 
The origins of international development cooperation are often associated with the 
success of the United States in facilitating the economic recovery and expansion of 
war-torn European countries after the end of World War II through the Marshall Plan. 
As Farias (2018) points out, the success of the Marshall Plan generated the widespread 
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belief that a combination of high rates of financial investments and technical assistance 
could quickly generate economic growth, and as a result, post-colonial governments 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America began to appeal for similar forms of economic 
assistance. In what is considered a foundational doctrine of North-South cooperation, 
in 1949 US President Harry S. Truman made a commitment in the Point Four program 
to alleviate poverty in these countries which he labelled as ‘underdeveloped’ through 
transfers of finances, technology and technical know-how (Paterson 1972). The United 
Nations (UN) and the World Bank expanded their mandate from post-war 
reconstruction to promoting development in the global South; the United States, its 
European allies and Japan also established bilateral aid agencies to facilitate this 
support; and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was established 
in 1961 to coordinate their development cooperation activities. Through these 
processes, the terms ‘development’ and ‘development cooperation’ became the normal 
concepts to describe the diverse challenges found in the global South, and the means 
for rich countries to introduce technical solutions for enhancing progress and 
improved well-being in the poorest countries (Rist 2002; Farias 2018). 
Initially, technical cooperation (or technical assistance as it was widely referred to) 
was the focus of most bilateral development cooperation programmes and mostly 
involved training programmes to ensure the transfer of skills or technologies to the 
beneficiary country and the placement of Northern technical experts in institutions 
where local capacity was lacking (Ekoko and Benn 2002). Early forms of technical 
cooperation were motivated by altruistic reasons such as promoting literacy, 
immunisation against infectious diseases or encouraging environmentally-friendly 
agricultural practices. Lancaster (2007, p.29) argues that countries such as the United 
Kingdom and France also used technical cooperation to support a smooth transition to 
post-colonial governments so that they could disconnect from their former colonies 
with as little damage as possible to their international reputation. However, as the Cold 
War began to intensify in the 1960s, technical cooperation evolved into a political tool 
for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to expand 
their soft power influence and disseminate their competing philosophies on economic 
development. This was in spite of an agreement in a 1948 UN General Assembly 
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resolution that technical cooperation “shall not be used as a means of economic and 
political interference in the affairs of another country” (Farias 2018, p.55). As Power 
(2019) explains, intellectuals such as Walt Rostow helped the US government to 
establish aid programmes that promoted the notion that beneficiary countries could 
transform in a linear fashion, from having traditional agricultural-based societies to 
modern industrialised societies. The theories developed under what is known as the 
modernisation school of thought promoted a capitalist vision of development that laid 
emphasis on urbanisation, technological advancement, and the import-export of 
consumer goods and services through the free market, whereas the Soviet socialist 
model of industrial modernity promoted state-led central planning, market controls 
and collective agriculture.  
The modernisation school of thought has faced extensive criticism in postcolonial 
studies for encouraging the global South to mimic the historical trajectory of Western 
countries in order to become ‘developed’, similar to how colonial education embedded 
the notion that colonial subjects had to mimic European cultural practices in order to 
be considered ‘civilised’ (Fanon 1986; Bhabha 2004). The categorisation of numerous 
countries as ‘least developed’ in World Bank and UN reports based on economic 
measures such as gross national income (GNI) has also been criticised for discounting 
what individual countries considered as progress or well-being and for erasing the 
significance of any economic activity that they engaged in outside the global capitalist 
economic framework (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995). However, modernisation was 
such an influential ideology that political and intellectual elites in the global South 
actively pursued diverse strategies aimed at achieving Western-style modernity in an 
effort to distance themselves from the notion of being ‘underdeveloped’ (see Mudimbe 
1988; Shrestha 1995). Within this context, technical experts from the ‘developed’ 
global North were perceived as possessing the secrets to industrial modernity and were 
thus highly sought after by developing countries. Developing countries also began to 
explore the potential for South-South exchanges to facilitate economic growth when, 
as Paterson (1972) points out, it became clear that a large percentage of Northern 
technical cooperation was being used to advance the geopolitical and economic 
interests of donors rather than to enhance their development. Subsequently, the 
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political leaders of developing countries agreed at keystone events, such as the 1955 
Bandung Asia-Africa conference, to strengthen their political and economic ties in 
order to address the socio-economic inequalities that had come out of the colonial era 
and to assert their sovereignty in global governance structures (Haq 1980).  
This form of solidarity which became known as South-South cooperation (SSC) went 
beyond the Northern approach of development cooperation by explicitly integrating 
political, economic and development cooperation activities. Political cooperation was 
aimed at fostering transnational anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-racist solidarity 
movements, but became centred on the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, 
which was a space for countries to navigate the ideological tension between the United 
States and the Soviet Union (see Prashad 2008). Economic cooperation involved the 
promotion of intra-South trade and investments, and also the coordinated campaign to 
demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to govern international trade 
through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Haq 
1980). Countries such as China, Kuwait, Libya, India, Brazil and Nigeria also 
provided other developing countries with concessional loans for large infrastructure 
development projects, although the purpose of this financial assistance was less about 
economic solidarity and more about strategically building diplomatic support to 
resolve regional conflicts (Lancaster 2007). Then, in the 1970s, technical cooperation 
amongst developing countries (TCDC) became the focal point of SSC and the main 
modality for achieving its broader goals. As discussed in Chapter One, TCDC was 
largely advanced in UN forums and specifically through the financial support of 
agencies such as the Group of 77 (G77) and the UN Special Unit for Technical 
Cooperation Amongst Developing Countries (now known as UNOSSC). The interest 
in TCDC was to a large extent a reflection of the prioritisation of education, science 
and technological advancements in both the Western capitalist and socialist economic 
models that had influenced development thinking (Rist 2002). In addition, TCDC was 
also aimed at encouraging developing countries to generate internal solutions, as an 
act of resistance against the tendency for Western approaches to encourage mimicry 
and universalism in their dissemination of development knowledge and technology, 
with little regard for contextual differences (Matthews 1987). Most post-colonial 
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countries were also looking to diversify their sources of technical cooperation in order 
to end their dependence on expensive Northern expertise, which was considered a 
form of neo-colonialism (Boye and Mennasemay 1988), and to tackle the human and 
institutional capacity gaps in their bureaucracies and industries that led to this 
dependency. 
This line of thinking on capacity development and self-reliance was heavily influenced 
by the dependency school of thought which emerged as a critique to modernisation 
theory in the late 1960s. Dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Walter 
Rodney and Samir Amin generally argued that underdevelopment in the global South 
was not a result of these countries merely lagging behind on a linear path to industrial 
modernity as it is alleged in modernisation theories, but rather a result of the 
exploitative relationship between the global North and global South, which they 
described as a core-periphery bond. Dependency theorists contended that periphery 
countries were incorporated into the global capitalist economic system as sources of 
minerals, agricultural commodities, and labour during the colonial era; and as a result, 
they relied on the core for manufactured goods, technologies, specialist skills and 
services. They also argued that the dominant core was not committed to addressing 
this inequality because it still disproportionately benefitted from this economic order 
and its longstanding political and intellectual linkages with the subordinate periphery. 
Theorists such as Samir Amin argued that each developing country, therefore, has to 
‘delink’ from the core and rely on South-South cooperation (SSC) and other internally 
driven solutions in order to foster economic growth and self-reliance (Amin 1990). As 
Rist (2002, p.135) points out, proponents of dependency theory generally assumed that 
self-reliance would reduce the challenges developing countries experienced from not 
having full control over their economies, promote horizontal solidarity, end the core-
periphery dynamic and transform the periphery into a multitude of ‘centres’ dependent 
on no one. 
Despite the popularity of these assumptions of self-reliance, early observers such as 
Mahbub ul Haq were quick to question if SSC was just another passing fad or a new 
trend, mirroring long-term realities: 
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Is this [SSC] just a by-product of the current disillusionment with the North? 
Is it merely a romantic notion, based on an ‘idealised’ South that does not 
exist? Or is there far more to it? Does it finally represent an effort by the South 
to delink (however partially) their economic growth from the North and to get 
organised for collective bargaining in international forums? Are we witnessing 
here a fundamental break from the patterns of past development and a serious 
search for alternative development styles? (ul Haq 1980, p.139) 
ul Haq acknowledged that outright rejection of foreign goods, technology or value 
systems could not support self-reliance and instead suggested that developing 
countries should undergo a process of ‘intellectual liberation’ that would enable them 
to accept external values that align with local needs and avoid problems of engaging 
in ‘slavish imitation’ (ul Haq 1980, p.149). He also went on to argue that developing 
countries were reliant on networks provided by Northern-based organisations to 
promote SSC and that this would continue to act as a hindrance to their long-term 
ability to achieve their goals, unless they organised and financed most activities 
themselves. This was a reasonable warning given most developing countries had 
begun to struggle after the 1970s oil crisis, which triggered fluctuations in the global 
price of commodities and a global economic recession , but it is not clear what efforts, 
if any, were made by developing countries to transform SSC into a self-financed 
mechanism.  
As Farias (2018, p.87) notes, South-South economic and political cooperation began 
to decline from the mid-1980s as the priorities of most developing countries shifted 
from striving for economic self-reliance to securing economic stabilization loans from 
Northern financial institutions, whose economies fared much better during the global 
recession. The end of the Cold War also made delinking from the global North 
undesirable as more countries embraced the new drive for economic globalization in 
the 1990s and shifted their development strategies from a socialist state-led model to 
the Washington Consensus neoliberal free-market based approach. Small flows of 
South-South technical cooperation kept ‘the spirit of Bandung’ alive during this 
period, but there is very little scholarly literature to provide critical analysis of the 
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activities that took place. According to Ekoko and Benn (2002), numerous regional 
organisations and networks within the United Nations systems were established to 
promote capacity development and the exchange of policy experiences in areas such 
as trade, food security, disaster preparedness and public health management. Trilateral 
development cooperation (TDC) emerged subsequently as a complementary modality 
through which Northern donors could formally support the South-South technical 
cooperation. For example, Japan began to facilitate Asia-Africa exchanges after the 1st 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993. 
Therefore, although the birth of SSC lies in political processes concerning 
decolonisation and the Cold War, the origins of TDC lie in efforts to strengthen the 
use of Southern knowledge during a decade in which Northern institutions, practices 
and policies dominated the global development architecture. As discussed in the next 
section, this makes country ownership of TDC a concept ripe for analysis through a 
postcolonial lens. 
 
Power and knowledge in development cooperation 
Critics of aid have pointed out how aid dependency constrains the space for 
sovereignty or autonomy, especially in how it created space for donor paternalism and 
interference in the national planning of beneficiary countries when many countries 
were facing economic turmoil in the 1980s and 1990s (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1998; 
Brautigam and Botchwey 1999; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). However, 
postcolonial scholars have also illustrated the ways in which donor paternalism in the 
production and dissemination of development knowledge reproduces practices from 
colonial governance that infantilised colonised peoples (e.g. Slater and Bell 2002; 
Mercer et al. 2003; Baaz 2005; Noxolo 2006). Three critiques from these debates are 
relevant for understanding country ownership and the nature of partnerships in 
contemporary TDC. First, Northern donors led by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank reproduced the colonial tradition of encouraging developing 
countries to mimic Western modernity by tying their financial assistance to the 
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Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which consisted of a set of neoliberal 
economic reforms that had already been implemented in developed economies. 
Second, the discourse in development continued to promote the notion that the global 
North is the ‘knower’ and the global South is the ‘learner’ in development. Third, 
donor agencies replicated the colonial practice of ‘trusteeship’, which Cowen and 
Shenton (1996, p.x) define as “the intent which is expressed, by one source of agency, 
to develop the capacities of another,” through their extensive interference in the 
national development planning of their beneficiary countries. 
Postcolonial theory has enabled researchers to bring to light the continuities and 
discontinuities in North-South relations from colonial times to the present day. One of 
its key contributions to the study of international development has been to demonstrate 
how knowledge is a form of power, which gives actors that are perceived to possess 
knowledge on how modernity can be achieved significant authority to define and 
influence the trajectory of those actors that are in the position of receiving their 
knowledge (McEwan 2019). Specific attention has been drawn to how the extensive 
knowledge production systems in the global North have strengthened its authority to 
diagnose and theorise which technical interventions (that is policies, programmes or 
projects) will stimulate development in beneficiary countries (Crush 1995). 
Postcolonial critiques of development have drawn on Edward Said’s (1978) 
Orientalism to explore how these practices are rooted in colonial discourses that 
constructed the Western Self as ‘enlightened’ and the bearer of knowledge on how 
modernity could be achieved, and Other societies as child-like and thus in need of 
tutelage. As McEwan (2019, p.153) points out, this practice of ‘othering’ in colonial 
discourse legitimised colonial intervention and cemented divisions between the West 
and the rest of the world: 
Parts of the world were discursively produced as the West’s inferior other, 
which in turn constructed and reinforced the self-image of the West as superior. 
The two were discursively locked together as each other’s opposite – the Other 
was irrational, sensual, backward, feminized and despotic; the West was 
rational, progressive, dynamic, masculine and democratic. 
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Postcolonial scholars have shown that development discourses have been key to 
reinforcing these notions in post-colonial times by attributing underdevelopment to 
the deficiencies in the socio-cultural and political context of global South, while 
solutions are seen as emerging from practices found in global North. During the era of 
SAP, reports from the World Bank were especially powerful in constructing 
underdevelopment in the global South as being a result of poor state capacity to engage 
in effective policymaking, hence rationalising its rolling back (see World Bank 1989a; 
World Bank 1989b). These reports often presented Northern policies, which favoured 
the rule of free markets and economic globalisation, as the solutions to economic 
growth and poverty reduction. These views contrasted sharply to those previously 
discussed of dependency theory, which viewed underdevelopment as a product of the 
structural issues rooted in the integration of developing countries into the global 
capitalist economy as commodity exporters during the colonial era, and that persisted 
in the present largely because of Cold War geopolitics.  
Dominant discourses in development also promoted the notion that neoliberal 
prescriptions were universal and the assumption that ‘what is best for the West is best 
for everyone else’. This naturally generated criticism for failing to recognise the 
heterogeneity of developing countries, and the importance of taking into account 
differences in their socio-economic and political contexts. However, Simon (2005) 
argues that homogenisation was the explicit goal of Northern aid and investment 
programmes, based on Orientalist assumptions that the ‘culture’ of developing 
countries was an obstacle to development to be overcome through aid and investment 
programmes. The reduction of economic challenges in developing countries to 
deficiencies in the local culture instead of deficiencies in Western models of 
modernity, was especially prominent in discourses on African development. As 
Andreasson (2005, p.975) points out, the notion that an inability to properly harness 
Western notions of law, free market and good governance was intrinsic to African 
culture was especially powerful in justifying the need for African countries to adopt 
externally generated development solutions. Echoing events that occurred during 
decolonisation, many developing countries internalised these views and opened 
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themselves up to Northern technical cooperation in order to facilitate neoliberal and 
democratic reforms.  
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999, p.36) note that Northern technical experts dominated 
bureaucratic agencies in beneficiary countries and in some cases they excluded local 
civil servants from the design, monitoring and evaluation of development 
programmes. Northern donor agencies also tended to ‘ask’ what were the main 
development challenges and ‘answer’ the questions themselves, by channelling 
financial aid to sectors they believed could facilitate sustainable development 
(Lancaster 2007). Some countries, such as Zambia, attempted to resist policies that did 
not align with their local context and pursue internal solutions. However, Northern 
donors harmonised their activities to enable the withdrawal and release of financial 
assistance through which to coerce beneficiary countries to adhere to SAP reforms or 
additional values such as democracy, human rights protection, judicial reform and 
environmental conservation (Whitfield 2009). It is important to recognise that these 
actions essentially took ‘ownership’ of development away from the governments of 
beneficiary countries and gradually weakened their institutional and human resources 
capacity to engage in strategic planning. However, as Crewe and Harrison’s (1998, 
p.76) ethnography of the aid industry in South Asia and Africa found, when 
beneficiaries made arguments for greater ownership of development programmes, 
Northern technical experts would reject these ideas with belittling remarks such as 
‘they are not ready to take charge yet’, ‘they couldn’t organise a picnic let alone a 
development project’ or suggest that they lacked the capacity to manage project funds.  
The concept of ‘trusteeship’ is useful for understanding how this paternalistic 
approach to North-South development cooperation is also rooted in colonial 
governance. Cowen and Shenton (1996) trace the origins of trusteeship to a set of 
remedies that Enlightenment philosophers came up with to manage the disorder that 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism created in European societies. For example, 
arguments were made for the responsibility for land, labour and capital resources to 
be placed in the hands of trustees who had the ‘capacity’ to manage them in the 
interests of society as a whole, such as bankers to manage capital, instead of allowing 
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these resources to be managed by ‘idle and isolated individuals’ (Cowen and Shenton 
1996, p.28). This sense of trusteeship was later reproduced by colonial administrations 
and missionaries in their quest to help colonised peoples to become modern and 
civilised, based on Orientalist assumptions that they were child-like, inexperienced 
and therefore, in need of constant supervision (Mercer et al. 2003). As Power (2019, 
p.27) points out, administrations were also motivated by a desire to maximise the 
economic benefits accrued from their colonies in the late stages of colonialism. For 
example, the British government administered grants for sanitation, education, 
housing and infrastructure to its colonies in the 1930s, to improve living standards for 
its subjects and also produce a more pacified, efficient and healthier labour force. 
Then, as progress became attached to the notion of ‘development’ after decolonisation, 
politicians, donor agencies, non-governmental organisations and all sorts of technical 
experts involved in international development continued to subtly embody a sense of 
trusteeship, not with the objective of dominating the beneficiaries of their development 
programmes, but to direct and enhance their capacity to attain progress or modernity 
(Li 2007).  
The legitimacy of this Northern trusteeship and knowledge frameworks was not 
effectively challenged for several decades (even with the initial emergence of SSC at 
Bandung) until overwhelming evidence began to emerge in the mid-1990s that SAPs 
had exacerbated the economic problems in many African countries (for examples, see 
Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). However, as Li’s (2007, p.282) study of World Bank 
projects in Indonesia found, trustees tend to look for new ways to reassert the authority 
of their knowledge when development programmes face critical scrutiny, when 
expertise is challenged, and when the boundary dividing technical experts and their 
beneficiaries is crossed. For Northern donors, this strategy involved the introduction 
of the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and ‘country ownership.’ This was in response to 
criticisms that their relationship with beneficiary countries was paternalistic and their 
interference in the national planning of beneficiaries countries through policy 
conditionalities had failed to stimulate economic growth because they did not 
understand local needs and context (Crewe and Harrison 1998). Subsequently, country 
ownership became the focal point of the aid effectiveness agenda, with emphasis on 
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putting the beneficiaries in control of shaping and assessing development interventions 
so as to increase their responsiveness to local needs and realities (World Bank 1995). 
As part of efforts to support country ownership, Northern donors allowed their 
beneficiary partners to increase the role of the state in development planning. In the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness Northern donors also committed 
themselves to “respecting beneficiary country leadership and helping to strengthen 
their capacity to exercise it”5 (OECD 2005).  
In spite of these commitments, conflicting approaches to country ownership emerged 
in development practice. For example, Fraser and Whitfield (2009) found that 
developing countries equated ownership with control over the policymaking process 
and outcomes, but the World Bank, IMF and bilateral agencies interpreted it as a 
commitment to agreed policy reforms and thus continued to use the release and 
withdrawal of development cooperation to influence beneficiaries on matters such as 
good governance. This validated arguments that the talk of partnerships in the aid 
effectiveness agenda could not alter the reality that “the relationship between donors 
and beneficiaries is inherently unequal and at times coercive” (Crewe and Harrison 
1998, p.74). It also led critics such as Samir Amin to argue that the practices in North-
South cooperation were still ‘neo-colonial’ and that developing countries should 
intensify their commitment to South-South cooperation in order to counter the power 
of Northern agencies (Amin 2009). Amin was of the view that policy conditionalities 
and the harmonisation of donor programmes continued to reinforce the power that 
Northern agencies had to ensure that beneficiary countries aligned their policymaking 
to the Washington Consensus (Amin 2009, p.61).  
                                                 
5 The other aid effectiveness commitments in the PD are: alignment- donors will align support to 
beneficiary strategies and institutions; harmonisation- donors co-ordinate their activities, simplify and 
share information; managing for results- partners focus on achieving results and use information to 
improve decision-making; and mutual accountability- partners are accountable for development 
results. The international community has continued to promote the implementation of these principles 
post-2015 in the GPEDC as a part of efforts to ensure that all forms of development cooperation are 
effective, with renewed emphasis on country ownership, inclusive partnerships, and the need to obtain 
observable and sustainable results. 
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In recent years, some proponents of the decolonization of knowledge production have 
used the concept of the ‘coloniality of power’ to describe the authority the World 
Bank, IMF and other Northern institutions have had to instruct policymaking in 
developing countries (Mignolo 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). It is important to 
distinguish that coloniality and colonialism are two different concepts. As Maldonado-
Torres (2007, p.243) points out: 
Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty 
of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such 
a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of 
power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, 
intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict 
limits of colonial administrations. Thus coloniality survives colonialism. It is 
maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural 
patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, 
and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern 
subjects, we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.  
In development partnerships, coloniality can be seen in studies such as Baaz’s (2005) 
ethnography on Nordic development projects in Tanzania, which found that Northern 
technical experts continued to approach development projects as if they were a vehicle 
for galvanising the passive lazy Other into becoming like the rational hardworking 
Self, and could not imagine that they had anything to learn from beneficiary partners. 
In knowledge production, coloniality can also be seen in how researchers have 
observed that the discourse in development texts has continued to reinforce notions 
that the global North is endowed with the intellectual and technical resources needed 
to achieve development (Goldman 2005; Narayanaswamy 2013). This is in spite of 
calls for the ‘provincialization’ of Northern development frameworks and 
longstanding arguments about the need to recognise that people in the global South 
are capable of articulating their own development needs and generating relevant 
solutions (Escobar 1995; Briggs and Sharp 2004).  
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In a reflection on his experience of working on World Bank literacy projects in 
Senegal, Bjorn Nordtveit (2009) argues that many development practitioners and 
academics have normalised these knowledge hierarchies by using indicators from 
Northern knowledge frameworks to assess how much technical interventions (such as 
primary education or adult literacy programmes) have ‘cured’ or modernised the 
‘backward’ beneficiaries. He argues that development practitioners seldom question 
the ideologies underpinning these interventions, the discourse constructing their vision 
of development, how this vision may differ from those of the beneficiary, and the 
power structures governing this relationship (Nordtveit 2009, p.xvi). These knowledge 
hierarchies were extensively embedded in development thinking and practice to the 
extent that observers such as Goldman (2005, p.vii) argued that it was “hard to imagine 
the world except through the lens of World Bank-style development models.” 
However, the strength of the ‘coloniality of power’ slowly began to disintegrate when 
sustained economic growth propelled China, India, and Brazil’s to expand their 
volumes of economic and development cooperation between 2000 and 2010, 
signalling the resurgence of SSC and offering developing countries alternative models 
of industrial modernity (Mawdsley 2012).  
 
Non-interference and non-conditionality in development 
cooperation 
Central to the concept of country ownership is the notion that the beneficiary country 
should have the freedom to articulate its vision of development and that partner 
countries should only introduce development interventions that align with the 
beneficiary’s vision (OECD 2005). As discussed in Chapter One, over the last decade 
this vision for many developing countries has returned to increasing their national 
income and source of development finances from trade and investment, with the 
overall goal of attaining self-reliance and control of their development trajectory. It is 
for this reason that many developing countries initially embraced, without much 
reservation, the plurality of modalities and non-conditionality offered by China, India, 
and Brazil because it aligned with their plans. The lack of policy conditionalities in 
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their development cooperation was due to the SSC principle of non-interference in the 
affairs of other countries, which originated at 1955 Bandung conference. Many 
beneficiary governments praised the reinvigorated SSC for expanding their space to 
take ownership of development and on occasion, several governments opted to take 
up loans from their influential Southern partners instead of the stringent loans offered 
by Northern donors such as the IMF6 (Power et al. 2012; Dornan and Brant 2014). 
The influence of the most powerful Southern cooperation providers was further 
expanded through their membership of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) grouping and their establishment of multilateral institutions such as the 
New Development Bank (NDB), at a time when many Northern economies were 
facing decline following the 2008–9 global financial crisis. These developments led 
scholars such as Mignolo (2012) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019) to hail the rise of the 
BRICS as a counter-hegemonic challenge to the dominance of the global North that 
continues “the Bandung spirit of decolonization.”  
Mignolo (2012) argues that the rise of the BRICS has created an opportunity for the 
global South to delink from the ‘coloniality of power’ that established Western 
capitalism, industrial modernity and democratic governance as the appropriate way of 
knowing and living between 1500 and 2000, by building alternative frameworks that 
supersede it. Mignolo uses the term ‘dewesternization’ to describe this process that 
the BRICS have triggered in the realm of knowledge production. In a further 
exploration of these ideas, Mignolo (2018, p.99) uses the metaphor of a puppeteer to 
depict the Northern governments and institutions that have the power to influence 
‘what is enunciated’ and the language in which it is maintained; and puppets to 
represent ‘the content of the conversation’ as well as the designs the puppeteer creates 
to captivate its audience. Mignolo does not idealize the BRICS and notes that they are 
mainly advancing dewesternization in order to wrangle control of the contents of the 
conversation. Mignolo (2018, p.103) also notes that dewesternization does not imply 
that the BRICS have completely rejected Western forms such as capitalism. Instead, 
                                                 
6 This is in spite of the fact that development projects are often tied to the procurement of resources 
from Southern partners. 
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the BRICS have appropriated Western forms, used them to develop their economies 
and to acquire the wealth, military strength and soft power influence necessary to 
disrupt the Western-dominated world order. Mignolo (2018, p.105) acknowledges that 
dewesternization creates the space for decolonization and decoloniality, which is a 
process advocated by diverse social actors (including academics, journalists, activists 
and artists) in order to delink or alter the predominately Western principles and 
assumptions that have so far determined the production and dissemination of 
knowledge. However, Mignolo goes on to contend that some Northern governments 
and institutions are employing discourses that vilify and construct the BRICS as 
dangerous with the aim of re-establishing the legitimacy of Western knowledge 
systems to other countries, and thus where knowledge is articulated. He specifically, 
cites speeches from Barack Obama touting a ‘New American Century’ and Donald 
Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ rhetoric, as examples of how the United States 
is leading Northern governments towards ‘rewesternizing’ political and economic 
spaces.7 
The efforts to rewesternize the ways of knowing and living can also be applied to the 
debates concerning the appropriate method for delivering development cooperation. 
These debates initially began as evidence emerged indicating that non-conditionality 
and non-interference in SSC enabled some beneficiary governments to secure 
financial assistance for ‘prestige’ projects such as sports stadiums with no obvious 
developmental benefits to their countries (Manning 2006; Woods 2008; Chandy and 
Kharas 2011; Sidiropoulos et al. 2015). However, a strong ‘good donor’ versus ‘bad 
donor’ binary also emerged in the initial texts published on ‘the rise of the South’ in 
Northern academic and policy circles, especially those analysing the activities of 
China, India and Brazil. The Northern Self was often characterised as the good donor 
for adhering to the OECD-DAC standards which were presented as ‘traditional’ and 
universal, while the Southern Others were presented as the new ‘rogue’ donors who 
posed a great risk to ‘vulnerable’ developing countries (Naim 2007 is an example of 
                                                 
7 For example, see Obama, B. (2012) “Remarks at the Air Force Academy Commencement,” 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, 23 May 2012, available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2012/05/23/remarks-president-air-force-academy-commencement 
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the most extreme critic). Moderate analysts such as Mawdsley (2012) and Park (2011) 
were able to point out that Southern cooperation providers were just as concerned with 
aid effectiveness as the rest of the international community, but operationalised the 
principles in a manner that matched their own history of state-led development. With 
regards to country ownership, Park (2011, p.53) points out, that Southern development 
cooperation providers equated country ownership with the idea that development 
interventions should be demand-driven by senior government officials from the 
beneficiary country. This in contrast to what he describes as the managerial approach 
favoured by Northern cooperation providers where development programmes and 
transparency/accountability monitoring frameworks are devised from priorities 
outlined in the beneficiary country’s national development plans. The international 
community eventually agreed on a compromise on these different understandings of 
country ownership and debates about SSC in the 2011 Busan Declaration on Effective 
Development Cooperation. It was emphasised that “we now all form an integral part 
of a new and more inclusive development agenda, in which Southern actors participate 
based on common goals, shared principles and differential commitments” (OECD 
2011).  
In spite of commitments at Busan, some Northern discourses have continued to 
characterise concessional loans, trade and investments from influential Southern 
countries as predatory or deficient. This includes recent analysis of the concessional 
loans provided under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which some observers have 
equated to a 21st century version of the Marshall Plan, but others have labelled as 
tantamount to colonialism8 (e.g. Bolton 2018; Kleven 2019). Of course, Southern 
cooperation providers are not a monolithic group. As Mawdsley (2017) notes, 
academic and policy circles have extended their gaze to the development cooperation 
activities of a ‘second-tier’ of Southern partners that includes South Korea, South 
Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
However, it is interesting to note that Northern discourses on the activities of some 
                                                 
8 The Chinese government adopted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 as a strategy to expand 
infrastructure development and its investments in countries across the Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin 
America, see https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative 
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these second-tier countries that employ SSC principles such as non-interference or 
mutually beneficial relations, but also participate in OECD-DAC forums or reporting 
processes, have not been as critical. For example, the OECD’s review of South 
Korea’s development cooperation has described it as ‘exemplary’ and ‘innovative’ 
(OECD 2018). This contradiction points to how language is central to power, both 
through ‘the act of naming,’ which enables one culture or group to make another seem 
deficient or inferior, and ‘the act of leaving unnamed’ which enables it to construct its 
practices as superior (Schech and Haggis 2000).  
It also points to how Homi Bhabha’s views on the ‘ambivalence’ in colonial discourse 
are also relevant to the debates on the governance of international development 
cooperation. In The Location of Culture Bhabha argues that the dominant power’s 
desire for mimicry is aimed at producing a “reformed recognisable other that is almost 
the same, but not quite” (Bhabha 2004, p.122). He goes on to state that mimicry in 
colonial discourse must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference... in 
order for the dominant power to gain authority, but this difference simultaneously acts 
as a sign of the resistance of the colonised to this power. In the same vein, the minor 
differences in how second-tier Southern countries deliver development cooperation, 
such as their observance of non-interference, acts both as a form of resistance to 
Northern hegemony and a way for them to stand out from traditional members of the 
OECD-DAC. This deviance also creates grounds for Northern countries to justify the 
need for their continued trusteeship of the global development architecture in a post-
global financial crisis world, where as Sidiropoulos et al. (2015) point out, the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of Northern development solutions are increasingly 
questioned. However, in the midst of the contested development landscape discussed 
above, South-South technical cooperation has received wide support and acceptance 
from the international development community. As the next section shows, this is 
largely a result of the long-held assumptions that similarities in geography, culture and 
political histories make Southern development knowledge (policies, programmes and 
technologies) suitable for replication in developing countries (Rhee 2011). 
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Whose vision? South-South knowledge transfers and global 
policy trends 
Postcolonial approaches emphasise the importance of acknowledging that there are 
diverse perspectives on what are the most important development needs or problems 
and the type of intervention that can be employed to address these needs (McEwan 
2019). What is significant is that when compared to critical analyses of Northern 
technical cooperation, ongoing analyses of South-South technical cooperation are not 
adequately addressing concerns about the heterogeneity of the global South and the 
appropriateness of technology and knowledge transfers. Instead the promotion of what 
Shankland and Goncalves (2016) describe as the ‘imaginary of similarities’ between 
developing countries is supporting the universalisation of policy solutions and 
technologies that may not be suitable for beneficiary countries, in the same manner, 
that Western development models have done in the past. The prominence of discourses 
on ‘horizontality’ and ‘plurality’ in SSC have also reinforced the legitimacy of 
Southern development knowledge and promoted the notion that developing countries 
are equal and that every country, even the most fragile and low-income country, has 
unique development experiences or policy successes that it can share with others 
(Chaturvedi 2018).  
Development knowledge from middle-income countries is considered particularly 
valuable, given that these countries have been able to industrialise and improve human 
development while still grappling with the serious challenges found in other 
developing countries, such as bureaucratic inefficiencies, problematic infrastructure 
and large-scale poverty (Farias 2018, p.83). However, some Southern development 
cooperation providers have shown that they are specifically using the imaginary of 
similarities to promote development models that remain their domestic policy 
priorities. For example, Chinese and Brazilian technical cooperation in agriculture to 
African countries is focused primarily on the replication of agribusiness models and 
technologies that fuelled their own domestic development, but these have been found 
to be unsuitable for adaptation to African contexts and/or do not fit into the 
beneficiaries’ idea of what agricultural development should look like (Scoones et al. 
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2016). This suggests that postcolonial critiques of the desire of the dominant power 
for mimicry, is also becoming evident in the actions of these Southern cooperation 
providers and has potential to constrain the ability of beneficiary countries to have 
total control of their development trajectory.  
Recent studies (e.g. Chichava et al. 2013; Cabral et al. 2016; Taela 2017) have also 
shown that assumptions that SSC is more respectful and encourages mutual learning 
between partners are not entirely accurate, given that some Southern technical experts 
have also been found to exhibit elements of trusteeship and reproduce the modern-
backwards/knower-learner framework that has been pervasive in the North-South 
relations. In their study of agricultural projects in Mozambique, Chichava et al. (2013, 
p.24) observed that Chinese and Brazilian narratives on technical cooperation in 
agriculture tended to be self-affirming and suggested they had plenty to teach but little 
to learn from their Mozambican partners. Although it was noted that they happily 
acknowledged learning from Japanese and American partners in the past. It is not clear 
if racialization played a role in how these technical experts perceived their 
Mozambican partners, given that studies such as those by Wilson (2012) and Pailey 
(2019) have shown that racism is embedded in development cooperation. However, 
the presence of such knowledge hierarchies in SSC suggests that possession of 
development knowledge is a strong causative factor of donor paternalism in 
development partnerships, even in cases where the donor and beneficiary country do 
not share a direct colonial history. In spite of the challenges posed by these issues to 
country ownership, the international community (especially Northern cooperation 
providers) has continued to scale-up efforts to facilitate the transfer of Southern 
development knowledge and technologies through trilateral development cooperation 
(TDC). It is necessary, therefore, to scrutinise the flow of knowledge and power 
relations in TDC projects in order to fully understand the experiences of beneficiary 
countries. 
 
48 
 
 
Problematizing ownership in TDC 
The international development community is constructing TDC as a form of 
development cooperation that supports inclusive beneficiary country-owned 
interventions (i.e. projects, programmes and policies) and equality between all 
partners. For example, paragraph 28 in the 2019 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (also 
known as BAPA+40) describes TDC as a modality that builds partnerships and trust 
between all partners and combines diverse resources and capacities under the 
ownership of the requesting developing country to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).9 It also states that the inclusive and diverse nature of 
TDC supports partnerships where each partner can contribute according to its own 
capacities and means, and calls for member states to increase their use of TDC in order 
to support the mobilization of additional resources, knowledge and expertise under the 
leadership of the beneficiary country (UN 2019). It is not clear from studies to date 
whether TDC partnerships are in reality affording beneficiary countries greater 
ownership of development interventions. However, Southern development 
cooperation providers appear to have opened up to employing this discourse on 
inclusive, country-owned and country-led TDC partnerships, which is rooted in the 
OECD-led development effectiveness agenda that emerged from Busan, in order to 
signal that they are not rogue predators and can act in accordance with international 
best practice (Fingermann 2015; Zhang 2017).  
This discourse is enabling Northern partners to position TDC as a response to past 
debates on the paternalism in their bilateral cooperation and to re-establish their 
legitimacy as development partners following questions on the effectiveness of their 
development solutions. TDC is also enabling Northern countries to sensitize Southern 
development cooperation providers on OECD-DAC best practice as was suggested by 
early policy studies (e.g. Fordelone 2009; Ashoff 2010), and in so doing, continue 
their role as trustees of the global development architecture. Overall, it could even be 
argued that the promotion of TDC is another strategy to which Northern governments 
                                                 
9 The BAPA+40 document is the outcome of the 2nd High-level UN Conference on South-South 
Cooperation. 
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and institutions are increasingly turning to in order to manage the dewesternization of 
international development, by influencing what forms of development knowledge 
flow South to South and which Southern countries are the sources of development 
knowledge. At present, the most active and sought after pivotal partners have been 
emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Colombia, Chile, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia (OECD 2017; UNDP 2017a). Mexico and Turkey 
have also mobilised the discourse of SSC in their foreign relations with developing 
countries and become pivotal partners in TDC, even though both countries have not 
traditionally been involved in SSC (Mawdsley 2018). This problematizes geographical 
imaginations of which countries constitute ‘the global South.’ Nevertheless, what is 
significant is that the majority of TDC initiatives implemented in African countries 
involve the flow of knowledge and technologies from pivotal countries in Asia and 
Latin America to African beneficiaries but not the other way round, although there 
have been some cases of South-South/trilateral cooperation projects involving inter-
Africa exchanges (see UNDP 2017a; UNOSSC 2018).  
The one-sided movement of knowledge indicates that Africa is being treated as the 
site for development interventions but not as a source of development knowledge, and 
suggests that South-South/trilateral cooperation is not ‘transcending divides’ by 
allowing diverse countries to share their development experiences, as it has been 
claimed in policy literatures (e.g. OECD 2017). It also suggests that TDC is not 
promoting valuable technologies and development knowledge that are generated from 
African countries, but is perpetuating the continent’s history of being dominated by 
external ideas. The marginalisation of African voices undermines their agency and 
contributes to their ‘subalternity’ in international development. This use of the term 
subaltern in this research is not related to the study of how the agency of marginalised 
groups (such as women and peasants) in the global South has been undermined by 
colonial powers and local elites, through their exclusion from dominant debates (see 
Spivak 1988). It is based on the military definition of the term which refers to someone 
of a lower status, but focuses on relations at the scale of the state. It specifically draws 
on Joanne Sharp’s interpretation of ‘the subaltern in geopolitics’ which emphasises 
that the subaltern is not ‘the other’ that is outside the ranks and fighting with dominant 
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states, but rather a state at a lower rank in the hierarchy of global power (Sharp 2013, 
p.22). Sharp argues that Northern discourses on international relations tend to focus 
on the narratives and concerns of dominant states which has led the universalisation 
of their values and silenced alternative views. However, through a discussion of 
former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere’s vision on Pan-Africanism and the Non-
Aligned Movement, Sharp (2013) demonstrates how a deeper understanding of the 
numerous ways in which global politics is made and remade can be obtained when the 
perspectives of subaltern states are heard and treated as important. For example, 
Nyerere encouraged African leaders to use nationalism to build internal unity and 
minimise the opportunities for richer countries to stoke division and manipulate the 
domestic political and economic terrains of African countries to align with their 
geopolitics: 
There is only one way in which Africa can stay outside irrelevant world 
conflicts and in which she can hope to deal with oppressing economic and 
social problems which now beset her people. The present boundaries must lose 
their significance and become merely a demarcation of administrative areas 
within a larger unit. This is an urgent and difficult matter; it becomes more 
difficult every day as the existing nation states fight tribalism by building 
nationalism. But there is, for the time being, the saving grace of an emotional 
unity, born during the independence struggle, and the universal recognition of 
the need for its development in political and economic terms (Nyerere 1967 
cited in Sharp 2013, p.24). 
 
Nationalism is often perceived as a strategy that promotes a country’s self-interest to 
the detriment of the interests of other countries. However, Nyerere’s Pan-African 
views underscore how there are often alternative ways of understanding concepts such 
as nationalism and explanations for why a country may adopt an ideology considered 
radical or problematic in other countries. It also highlights the importance of including 
subaltern voices in global discourses and aligns with this study’s objective of giving 
precedence to the beneficiary country perspective of the politics of partnership in 
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TDC. However, the space for subaltern voices to be heard in international 
development has often been constrained by the considerable influence Northern 
cooperation providers, especially the World Bank, have had over policymaking and 
visions of what development should look like. If, as previously stated, Northern 
cooperation providers continue to select a few emerging Southern powers as pivotal 
partners in TDC and African countries as the beneficiary partners, then it would be 
logical to question if the transfer and mimicry of development experiences encouraged 
in TDC is any different from past development cooperation modalities. Specifically, 
is it any different from the Northern development cooperation that promoted 
modernisation theory based on the historical trajectory of a few Western countries? 
This thesis engages with this question by suggesting that postcolonial arguments about 
provincializing European knowledge frameworks need to be extended and heeded in 
South-South/trilateral cooperation.  
Policy experiences from Chinese, Brazilian or Malaysian development trajectories 
cannot easily be replicated in other countries and current attempts to universalise them 
through TDC should be closely scrutinised. These influential Southern countries have 
started to codify, standardise and evaluate their development cooperation activities 
through forums such as the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) in order to 
enhance the legitimacy of claims that SSC has many benefits. However, as 
Constantine and Shankland (2017) observe, most of these BRICS-led policy spaces 
do not always include representatives from beneficiary countries and are mainly aimed 
at advancing their geopolitical influence. Therefore, scholarship on the decolonization 
of knowledge production has to move beyond a focus on the hegemonic nature of 
Western knowledge systems and to interrogate the ways in which wealthy/influential 
Southern countries are suppressing knowledge that falls outside the frameworks that 
they are currently in the process of establishing or that opposes their interests. This is 
especially important given, as Mignolo (2012) points out, dewesternization should 
support decolonization and the creation of a pluriversal world where different political, 
economic and epistemic traditions are respected and co-exist, rather than a world 
where a single option dominates.  
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Nevertheless, it is unlikely that concentrated efforts will be made to ensure that the 
voices of beneficiary countries are effectively heard in policy circles, particularly 
those from Africa, given that Southern development knowledge and technologies are 
increasingly being commodified to generate diverse benefits for facilitating and 
pivotal partners in TDC. TDC is transforming into a vehicle for Southern countries 
that do not have sufficient finances/technical expertise to dedicate to development 
cooperation (such as Malaysia) to transfer their development knowledge and 
potentially influence the development trajectory of beneficiary countries. It is enabling 
wealthy Southern partners (such as China) to increase their soft power and build their 
image as responsible global actors. The commodification of Southern knowledge has 
also created an opportunity for Northern countries to act as intermediaries in this 
knowledge transfer process and “to maintain their foothold over the global 
development architecture” (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley 
2012). 
Policy literatures from the United Nations (UN) have also drawn on the perception 
that SSC is a modality that favours beneficiary country ownership in order to promote 
TDC as a vehicle for transferring and domesticating global policy frameworks. For 
example, TDC is seen as an important means for making progress on meeting the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN 2018; UNOSSC 2018), in the same way 
that that SSC was hailed as a key mechanism to support the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) a decade ago (UN 2009). This is problematic 
since the UN, through such global frameworks, is exerting influence over what 
constitute the most pressing development needs in beneficiary countries. The SDGs 
also contradict the idea of country ownership by ignoring local contexts and, as 
McEwan (2019, p.230) points out, they also promote a ‘cookie-cutter’ approach to 
policymaking that risks perpetuating discourses of African failure by setting an 
unattainable timeline and targets. Observers such as Brooks (2017, p.203) have also 
argued that the SDGs only offer developing countries a limited number of solutions to 
complex challenges such as climate change, which do not adequately address the 
political and economic conditions found in African countries.  
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Moreover, despite growing resistance to the neoliberal drive for private sector 
development (PSD), UN and OECD-led policy spaces are using TDC to explicitly 
enhance private sector involvement in development (GPEDC 2016; UN 2019). 
Nevertheless, in a sign that learning is starting to flow from South to North, OECD-
DAC members have also begun to mimic the Southern approach of using development 
interventions to secure mutually beneficial trade and investments. As Mawdsley 
(2018) points out, this change is still in line with the broader ideational shift in global 
policymaking over the last 30 years, which has seen economic growth replace poverty 
reduction and human development, as the central analytic concept and goal of 
development. It is not surprising, then, that Shankland and Gonclaves (2016) found 
that the World Bank texts heralding the potential for an ‘African green revolution’ 
through the replication of Brazil’s technology-driven agribusiness model, were 
influential in getting Mozambican policymakers to buy into the notion that more 
private sector involvement would fuel agricultural development. One of the outcomes 
of this process was the signing of an agreement between Mozambique, Brazil and 
Japan for the controversial TDC project known as ProSavana. The overall objective 
of ProSavana was to replicate the innovative policies Brazil employed in the 
agricultural development of its tropical savannahs. However, its implementation has 
been impeded for several years due to intense opposition from civil society 
organisations and small-scale farmers, who argue that the project’s promotion of a 
large-scale agribusiness model would damage the local ecosystem and the livelihoods 
of small-scale farmers (Parenti and Liberti 2018).  
The contestation of the ProSavana project is an important example of how the political 
elite’s visions of what can be considered progress in a country do not always 
correspond with the aspirations of the whole population and indicates just how 
complicated it is to assess whose voice defines beneficiary country ownership of 
development. In order to serve as mitigating measures against such problems, policy 
literatures have emphasised that TDC should be ‘inclusive’ and ‘multi-stakeholder 
partnerships’ by involving civil society organisations, research institutions and the 
private sector as beneficiary partners in TDC projects (OECD 2017; UNDP 2017a). 
In spite of increasing arguments for inclusive multi-stakeholder partnerships, 
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however, government ownership of development interventions remains a prominent 
theme in policy literature and the implementation of most South-South/trilateral 
cooperation projects. This is problematic given that there are limitations to ownership 
in countries with authoritarian governments or in cases where a government may agree 
on a project’s objectives without being concerned about having leadership over the 
design and implementation, yet still consider this ownership (Buiter 2007).  
The United Nations Economic and Social Council has stressed that leadership in TDC 
is shown by beneficiary governments when they define the priorities and needs of their 
country, but ‘true’ ownership is when other stakeholders such as parliament and civil 
society are included in the decision-making (UN-ECOSOC 2008). However, the 
presence of diverse interests and power inequalities between stakeholders within the 
beneficiary country can also constrain attempts to achieve true ownership and positive 
development outcomes that stand the test time (Buiter 2007; Biekart and Fowler 
2018). This highlights the importance of examining which actors in the beneficiary 
country voiced the need for a development intervention and with whose vision of 
development it aligns with. This will enable a deeper understanding of how power 
inequalities within the beneficiary country and in its relationship with development 
cooperation providers affect country ownership and the development effectiveness of 
TDC projects. This thesis examines these power inequalities against the wider debates 
on African agency because various studies have stated that the Zambian government 
has at times found it difficult in negotiating and asserting its preferences to its 
cooperating partners since the Structural Adjustment era (Saasa and Carlsson 1996; 
Fraser 2009; Prizzon 2013). However, there is also a need to explore how Zambia is 
responding to the diverse challenges concerning the flow of knowledge and power 
relations as a beneficiary country in TDC. 
 
African Agency 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, prominent development texts during the era of 
Structural Adjustment in the 1980s and 1990, attributed underdevelopment in African 
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countries to weak institutional and human resources capacity in their governments 
(World Bank 1989a; World Bank 1989b). Stereotypes about the inadequacy of African 
culture, such as an inability to independently deliver results or manage time, were also 
prominent in Northern discourses and influenced top-down approaches to delivering 
development cooperation to beneficiary countries (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Baaz 
2005). However, agency, which Taylor (2015, p.28) defines as “the capacity of 
individual agents to direct their structurally formed capabilities in ways that are 
imaginative and inventive for personal or communal advancement,” has always been 
a part of African countries engagement in development cooperation. As Mkandawire 
and Soludo (1999, p.26) point out, bureaucrats in some African countries used 
strategies such as lack of non-implementation of donor programmes to express 
dissatisfaction with Northern discourses that ‘vilified’ them and tarnished their post-
colonial image as actors capable of guiding their countries towards industrial 
modernity. Noxolo (2006, p.261) argues that some aid-dependent governments used 
non-implementation of donor-funded development interventions to reinforce their 
autonomy and ownership of the local development landscape as their independent 
agency became hidden behind the disciplinary power of Northern donors to demand 
compliance to their policy conditions. In addition, Whitfield (2009) observed that 
some beneficiary governments responded to the disciplinary power of policy 
conditions by implementing the main reforms that donors demanded and overlooked 
others, in order to ensure the continued flow of development cooperation and the 
efficient functioning of their country’s economy.  
The current debates on the resurgence of SSC have generally examined the African 
continent as a space in which the growing geopolitical influence of the emerging 
powers can be observed. As mentioned earlier, Northern governments often refer to 
China’s economic activities in the global South, and particularly in African countries, 
as a new form of colonialism (e.g. Bolton 2018). This is ironic considering that 
Chinese FDI in Europe, Australia, and North America exceed those to Africa, but are 
labelled as “strategic competition” (AEI 2019; BBC 2019). These debates on ‘Chinese 
colonialism’ have supported the persistent characterisation of African countries as 
economic reservoirs, objects of study and sites in need of intervention (McEwan 2019, 
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p.187). However, as Said (1993) points out, the imperial encounter has never involved 
an ‘active’ colonial power subjugating a ‘supine’ or inert other, rather where there is 
power there has always been some form of active resistance and agency. In the same 
way, African countries are not passively observing the risks and opportunities the 
emerging powers have created in the global development architecture, but they have 
demonstrated that they are using their presence to resist domination and protect their 
right to self-determination. For example, Mohan and Lampert (2012) and Kragelund 
(2014) have shown that the proliferation in the number of available development 
partners in the 2000s, when many African countries experienced a reduction in aid 
dependence, helped to expand the space for bureaucrats to explicitly articulate their 
needs and opinions to their partners. The governments of beneficiary countries such 
as Angola have even played their Northern and Southern development partners against 
each other in order to secure their own interests (Corkin 2013; Carmody and 
Kragelund 2016). The African Union has also actively sought to use South-South 
technical cooperation to support capacity development and technological 
advancement, as the notion that intellectual independence is the main way the 
continent can attain self-sufficiency has re-entered policy discussions over the last 
decade (AU 2011; UNECA 2019).  
African countries have particularly shown interest in learning about East Asian models 
of industrial modernity and replicating the policy experiences of countries such as 
China, South Korea, India and Malaysia. Japan’s development trajectory, which laid 
emphasis on state-led industrialisation, infrastructure development, and investments 
in education and skills developments, is the blueprint of many of these Asian countries 
replicated through the support of Japanese technical cooperation (Kato 2012). Japan 
has also been crucial in facilitating the transfer of policy experiences from its former 
Asian beneficiaries to African countries, first by supporting South-South exchanges 
through what it described as third-country training programmes, and more recently 
through trilateral development cooperation (Kato 2012). Japan’s approach to country 
ownership, which focuses on only supporting projects officially requested and 
partially financed by beneficiary partners, has gained the favour of some African 
governments for enabling them to attain economic growth through what Japan 
57 
 
 
describes as their own efforts at ‘self-help’ (Sawamura 2004). As Burghart (2017) 
points out, Japan’s approach to ownership is similar to those of China and South 
Korea, in spite of it being a traditional Northern donor. However, observers have 
argued that the underlying goal behind this technical cooperation has been to 
consolidate East Asian models of economic development as the preferred alternatives 
for developing countries to follow, instead of the Washington Consensus model (Osei-
Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie 2010; Raposo 2017). This has once again made technical 
cooperation an important soft power tool through which competing Eastern and 
Western development partners can battle for influence over policymaking in African 
countries, which is resonant of the Cold War tactics employed by the Soviet Union 
and Western countries. These developments have subsequently revived scholarly 
interest in some strands of dependency theory and questions concerning whether 
Africa’s increasing engagement in SSC is shifting the ‘core’ from the global North to 
influential Asian countries such as China (Agbebi and Virtanen 2017; Carmody 2017).  
In all these debates, as Sharp (2013) reminds us, it is still important to recognise the 
voice and agency of African countries as the geopolitical subaltern. The African 
continent is at the centre of the most pressing global issues, hence there is need to 
theorise from events unfolding on the continent (Mbembe 2016). Despite this, research 
in international relations and development studies have tended to analyse its place 
solely with regards to the policy and security concerns of powerful states (Abrahamsen 
2017). The continent has been treated as a space for extraction of raw data and the 
application of Western epistemologies, rather than as a site for “the generation of ideas 
and theoretical insights that have widespread and general relevance for the world” 
(Abrahamsen 2017, p.129). As Abdenur (2019, p.35) points out, this critique is not 
limited to research produced in Northern institutions, but also applies to scholarship 
from developing countries that uncritically employs Western-centred theories. 
Echoing similar concerns when reflecting on the importance of decolonizing 
knowledge production, Achille Mbembe emphasises that theorising from the continent 
entails putting Africa at the centre of things and building understanding from the 
perspective of African countries, rather than treating experiences in the continent as 
an appendix of other countries or as being rooted in their epistemic traditions (Mbembe 
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2016, p.35). It is generally agreed that this critique is not meant to imply that Western 
categories and concepts should be discarded, but rather as Chakrabarty (2008) argues, 
it should be acknowledged that even critical theories such as Marxism cannot 
adequately explain all experiences and events in the global South. Postcolonial 
theories are also rooted in Western epistemic traditions and hence can only partially 
explain issues of African agency or TDC activities. However, their commitment to 
recovering the voices of the marginalised, or the ‘subaltern in geopolitics,’ creates 
space for this study to open up to alternative explanations and to theorise from the 
experiences and knowledge of beneficiary countries. 
In applying this idea of alternative explanations of beneficiary agency, this study 
contends that ongoing debates about Africa’s progressive shift from ‘dependency’ on 
Northern partners to Southern partners are also overlooking the extent to which 
mutuality influences international development and gives African countries significant 
geopolitical power. As Hurrell (2006) points out, a country does not only gain power 
from its recognition from other great powers but is also dependent on ‘weaker’ states 
accepting and recognising of its authority. The power and influence that Southern 
development cooperation providers have acquired in global development architecture 
has been dependent on ‘less developed’ countries actually seeking their knowledge 
and resources. This is similar to how the status in global governance structures 
traditionally wielded by Northern countries such as the United Kingdom has been 
dependent on the existence of countries in the global South that are either less 
developed or somehow in need of its trusteeship (Noxolo 2006, p.263).  
At present, the majority of countries classified as ‘developing’ are located in Africa, 
which positions the continent with significant power to decide which development 
cooperation providers are influential. China’s role as the most significant provider of 
SSC cannot be solely attributed to its possession of technology or know-how on 
industrial modernity, it is also dependent on African countries seeking its development 
cooperation, which lays emphasis on state-led industrialisation, agricultural and 
infrastructure development (see Power et al. 2012). This is in contrast to South Korea’s 
marginal soft power influence in Africa, in spite of substantial financial commitments 
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to development cooperation activities aimed at promoting its own development 
experiences, particularly its approach to green growth (Kim and Gray 2016). This 
indicates that African countries also have the power to decide whose knowledge 
influences their development trajectory, and ‘what is’ or ‘what is not’ development 
knowledge through their selection of development partner.  
African governments have not fully exploited the unexpected ways in which the rise 
of their ‘non-interfering’ Southern partners has expanded their space to exercise 
agency and determine national policymaking into, what Agbebi and Virtanen (2017) 
describe as, “clear strategies that promote the welfare of their citizens and facilitate 
development in crucial economic sectors.” Of course, there is always a risk of 
reproducing the stereotypes about the inadequacy of African beneficiaries with such 
an argument. However, this thesis chooses to understand this contradiction in agency 
through Adem's (2011, p.511) interpretation of Ali Mazrui’s ‘triple heritage’ approach 
to acknowledging Africa: as a victim humiliated by slavery and colonialism, a victor 
with countless historic achievements, but also a villain for its high levels of post-
colonial violence and economic mismanagement.10 Drawing on these ideas on the 
complexity of agency within Africa enables this research to critically examine 
beneficiary ownership, which may involve praising the Zambian government and 
other local stakeholders for their positive actions and holding them to account for their 
failures, as would be done to any other development partner. If this research was to do 
otherwise then it would fall into the trap of perpetuating the ‘narrative of predation’ 
(Power 2019, p.11), specifically that of a vulnerable African country being exploited 
by its powerful and calculating development cooperation providers. This would 
indirectly erase the agency of the beneficiary country and fail to capture the true nature 
of TDC partnerships.   
                                                 
10 Throughout his career Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui explored how the development of African countries 
has been influenced by African traditions, religion (particularly Islam and Christianity) and the 
intervention of Western countries. Most notable is his ground-breaking 1986 BBC documentary The 
Africans: A Triple Heritage.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that post-colonial developing countries conceptualised South-
South technical cooperation as a mechanism through which they could foster capacity 
development, accelerate industrial modernity and assert the importance of their 
sovereignty in global governance structures. It was imagined that this process would 
enable them to de-link from their economic dependence and the coloniality of power 
that has historically enabled Northern agencies to influence their development 
trajectory. Northern countries have increasingly promoted TDC as a modality that 
supports country ownership and equality between all partners, partially as a response 
to past debates on the paternalism of their bilateral cooperation and effectiveness of 
their development solutions. These actions are part of Northern efforts to manage the 
dewesternization of international development that has been accelerated by the rise of 
alternative models of industrial modernity from middle-income Southern countries 
and approaches to delivering development cooperation promoted in SSC such as non-
conditionality. However, this chapter has also shown that Southern ‘development 
authorities’ such as China, India and Brazil are reproducing familiar practices of 
mimicry, trusteeship and Orientalist assumptions about who is modern-backwards or 
the knower-learner in development cooperation, which have been embedded in the 
production and dissemination of knowledge in development knowledge since colonial 
times. These practices have the potential to constrain the extra space for country 
ownership and autonomy that the observance of non-conditionality in SSC, creates for 
beneficiary countries. 
If we return to Mahbub ul Haq’s argument, set out at the beginning of this chapter, on 
how the overall goals of SSC can only be achieved if most activities do not rely on 
Northern networks, then it is also logical to question if developing countries will be 
able to maintain ‘the Bandung spirit of decolonization’ in a landscape where TDC 
involving both Northern and emerging Southern hegemonies appears to be the future 
of international development cooperation. As this chapter has pointed out, ongoing 
TDC is facilitating knowledge transfers from influential Southern countries from Asia 
and Latin America, while African countries are mostly being treated as the sites for 
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development interventions. This has the potential to work against the SSC objective 
of achieving self-reliance by ending the core-periphery opposition in global 
governance and transforming the periphery into a multitude of ‘centres’ that are not 
dependent on another entity (Rist 2002, p.135). Therefore, postcolonial critiques of 
development cooperation might help to expand our understanding of the relationship 
between power and knowledge in development by moving beyond a focus on the 
dominance of the global North to include the ways Southern hegemonies are also 
defining the space for beneficiary countries to control their development process. 
Drawing on postcolonial ideas, this chapter also cast light on how the power of a 
development cooperation provider is always met with the agency of the beneficiary 
country. As a result, it should not be assumed that beneficiary countries are passively 
observing these changes or being acted upon, but rather they themselves are active. 
However, important questions still need to be considered, given that TDC can be used 
as a vehicle for the domestication of policy experiences and technologies from 
influential Southern countries and/or global frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, without consideration for the singularity of a country’s 
development needs or experiences. It is important to ask if beneficiary countries like 
Zambia are uncritically accepting Southern development knowledge and global policy 
narratives on development in TDC projects or if they are only adapting practices that 
align with local development priorities and context. There is also a need to examine if 
there are conflicting views on the policy solutions/technologies transferred between 
the government and other local stakeholders such as civil society, academics and the 
private sector. Before proceeding to address these questions, the next chapter discusses 
the methodological approach employed to address the overall objective of this 
research. It explains the rationale for selecting Zambia as the case study, the definition 
of country ownership employed in the data collection process, and the ethical concerns 
involved in researching how the politics of partnership affect beneficiary country 
ownership of TDC.  
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3 
Researching TDC: An Institutional Ethnographic 
Approach  
This chapter moves on from the previous discussion on the conceptual framing of this 
thesis to discuss its empirical basis, its methodological approach and the data 
collection methods. It first sets out the rationale for case study selection and then 
provides an overview of how an institutional ethnography, based on key stakeholder 
interviews and archival analysis, was employed to collect and analyse data on country 
ownership of trilateral development cooperation (TDC). This chapter also sheds light 
on the importance of trust in elite interviewing and the difficulties involved in 
researching country ownership of TDC projects where the main stakeholders are 
government institutions, through a discussion of the challenges I encountered with 
informant recruitment. It also explores three unexpected methodological findings that 
I came across during fieldwork. First, several informants asked me to write up a brief 
report on my findings because they had very little knowledge of past projects and the 
general trends in South-South/trilateral cooperation in Zambia. This repeated request 
not only highlighted the empirical novelty of the research but also led me to reflect on 
the importance of reciprocity in the researcher-informant relationship. Second, some 
informants challenged geographical imaginations of the global North-global South 
binary and demonstrated that they viewed the discourse on South-South/trilateral 
cooperation employed in policy spaces and development texts as an ‘imaginary,’ while 
the technical aspects of project management are viewed as the ‘reality’ of development 
cooperation. This pushed me to reflect on postcolonial debates concerning the 
challenges involved in speaking on behalf of ‘the researched’ and the question of 
whose perspective is driving research on contemporary South-South relations. Third, 
I went into the field naively assuming that I was simply researching the partnership 
process and the outcomes of two TDC projects, but overtime time it became clear that 
my research was uncovering the domestic and international political concerns of 
partner countries, and for that reason, some of my informants assumed that I was 
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attempting to breach their national security. The limitations this imposed on the data 
collection, how these were navigated and the wider implications for research into TDC 
partnerships are discussed subsequently. 
 
Case study selection 
It is important for this chapter to address the rationale for selecting Zambia as a case 
study, since as Curtis et al. (2000, p.1002) argue, “there are ethical and theoretical 
implications arising from the choices which are made to include particular cases and 
to exclude others.” This thesis is built on recommendations from my Master’s 
dissertation which compared Chinese and Brazilian development assistance to African 
countries, and subsequent research on South-South cooperation (SSC) and the aid 
effectiveness agenda in southern Africa (Kamwengo 2017). These studies suggested 
the need for more empirically-based TDC research in order to assess the potential for 
competing for Northern and Southern countries to collaborate and improve the 
effectiveness of their development cooperation to beneficiary countries. These studies 
also emphasised the importance of acknowledging beneficiary agency in this process. 
Zambia was selected as the case study to gain a detailed understanding of beneficiary 
country experiences in TDC for this research due to my familiarity with its socio-
economic and political context as a national of the country. Zambia has also gained 
prominence in recent debates on the changing geographies of power as one of the most 
visible sites of the ‘new scramble for Africa’ involving the BRICS, from which the re-
engineering of Northern development cooperation after the 2008–9 global financial 
crisis can be seen, and new perspectives on African agency are being theorised (e.g. 
Carmody 2013; Prizzon 2013; Kragelund 2014; Sautman 2015).  
Zambia has historically received development cooperation from diverse Northern and 
Southern partners since its independence in 1964. However, the government 
acknowledges that technical cooperation has been one of the most important 
modalities it has received from its partners because it has enhanced “the skills, 
knowledge, technical competence and productive aptitudes of its population towards 
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achieving sustainable socio-economic development” (MoF 2012, p.8). Technical 
cooperation has traditionally been received on a bilateral basis, but some of Zambia’s 
Northern and Southern partners have recently begun to support capacity development 
and technology transfer through TDC projects operating under the framework of 
South-South Cooperation. A scoping search conducted through informal discussions 
with development practitioners and a review of online literature revealed that it is 
difficult to provide a comprehensive list of TDC projects that have been implemented 
in Zambia. The main reason for this is that the government considers development 
cooperation a part of its diplomatic relations, hence the details of most development 
projects are usually classified as confidential. Press releases announcing development 
cooperation agreements occasionally appear in the news media but detailed 
information beyond such announcements are usually not made public. For example, a 
trilateral cooperation agreement on food security and nutrition between Zambia, Brazil 
and the World Food Programme (WFP) was announced during Brazilian President 
Lula da Silva’s official visit in 2010, but there are no reports available to establish 
whether this agreement materialised into a project (see Lusaka Times 2010).  
In addition, the government does not know the full extent of development projects that 
have been implemented in the country itself, due to the fragmented management of 
development cooperation, repeated restructuring and poor communication between its 
different agencies (MoFNP 2011a). At present, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of National Development Planning, which is a sister institution that was 
established in 2016, have overall responsibility for negotiating and coordinating all 
development cooperation. However, the President, cabinet ministers and bureaucrats 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have traditionally tended to interfere in this 
process by independently negotiating for development projects without consultation 
(MoFNP 2011a). In spite of the above limitations, two important case studies emerged 
from the scoping search on TDC projects in Zambia. The first is the Triangle of Hope 
(ToH) project which is an initiative that facilitated the transfer of Malaysia’s 
experiences in attracting foreign direct investment to Zambia, with the support of 
Japan from 2006 to 2012. The second is a project that supported renewable energy 
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technology transfer from China to Zambia, with the support of Denmark and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) from 2014 to 2019.  
The primary reason both projects were selected is that detailed information on their 
background, main objectives and expected outcomes are available from Zambian 
newspaper articles and development cooperation reports from partner countries. 
Information on the China-Zambia renewable energy technology transfer (hereafter 
referred to as RETT) project is available through a project plan published online by 
UNDP and reports from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UNDP 2014; Danida 
2014b). Similarly, extensive details on the ToH project are available in publications 
from the Japanese and Malaysian partners that supported the project (e.g. Jegathesan 
and Ono 2008; JICA 2012; Shimoda 2012; JICA 2017). These texts outline the key 
objectives, activities and expected outcomes of both projects from the viewpoint of 
the development cooperation providers, but do not give insight into Zambia’s views 
and experiences as the beneficiary country. In order to address this gap, this research 
used a qualitative research design, specifically an institutional ethnography (IE), to 
collect more information on each project and to answer its research questions: 
1. What is the nature of partnerships developed through TDC?  
2. To what extent does the politics of partnership support or undermine 
beneficiary ownership in trilateral development projects?  
3. What are the consequences for development effectiveness in Zambia?  
4. What lessons might be learned for TDC more broadly? 
 
A multiple case design rather than a single case study was employed since the findings 
from multiple cases are usually more compelling and tend to enhance the 
generalizability of a qualitative study’s practical and theoretical arguments (Yin 2009; 
Seale 2012). The approach of studying both the ToH project and the RETT project 
was also adopted so that this research can identify: (i) changes that may have occurred 
in the practice of partnership and country ownership over a period of almost 13 years; 
(ii) and any differences between TDC projects where an OECD-DAC member is the 
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facilitating partner (Japan in the ToH project) and where a multilateral institution is 
the lead facilitator (UNDP in the RETT project). 
 
Methodology 
Most empirically grounded studies on trilateral development cooperation are policy-
based and an outcome of large-scale survey research (e.g. OECD 2017; UNDP 2017a). 
This is a weakness since, as Gardner and Lewis (2015, p.169) have argued, the rigid 
structure of surveys-based methods tends to dilute the role that power, politics and 
inequality bring to bear on development interventions. A number of the studies 
discussed in Chapter Two employed ethnographic methods, particularly an 
institutional ethnography, to open up new perspectives on how these processes 
influence the ways in which development interventions and discourses are produced, 
institutionalised and disseminated (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Baaz 2005; Goldman 
2005; Li 2007). An institutional ethnography (IE) uses methods such as interviews, 
participant observation and document analysis to investigate how the texts and work 
practices of institutions influence everyday experiences (Walby 2013). Social 
anthropologists have used ethnographic methods to study how policymaking in 
colonial governance and development cooperation has shaped the world for many 
years (see Shore et al. 2011; Gardner and Lewis 2015). However, the term 
‘institutional ethnography’ was coined by sociologist Dorothy Smith in her feminist 
critique of how the representation and silencing of women’s issues in sociological 
texts primarily written by men influences the relations that rule society and how people 
generally perceive these relations (Smith 1987).  
Different branches of social science have since adopted IE to gain insight into the 
differences between ‘what people say they do’ in texts and ‘what they actually do’ in 
practice (Herbert 2000, p.552). Specific attention has been directed to studying how 
institutional texts tend to promote concepts or categories that represent an institution’s 
objectives rather than the actual practices of its members and the real-life experiences 
of the beneficiaries of its interventions; attention has also been directed at examining 
67 
 
 
the implications of these actions on other social relations involving governments, 
international organisations, the private sector and communities in the global South 
(Escobar 1995, p.109). From this perspective, I choose to employ an IE to bring to 
light potential differences between how TDC is presented in policy spaces as a 
modality that supports ‘country ownership’ and ‘sustainable development’ outcomes 
and the actual practices of the institutions involved in its implementation. It was not 
aimed at studying a specific institution involved in the ToH or RETT projects but to 
gain insight into how people involved in the management of each project interacted 
with one another, how these interactions were institutionalised in their respective 
organisations, and how their actions and project activities affect external spaces.  
The main data collection methods employed were key stakeholder interviews and 
archival study. I also kept a fieldwork diary where I recorded my observations of my 
informants during interviews and key themes that emerged from our conversations. 
However, it was not possible to ‘spend time on the inside’ to observe the daily 
activities of a key stakeholder institution due to the temporality of both the ToH project 
and the RETT project. The ToH project concluded in 2012 and the RETT project was 
in the final phase of its life cycle at the time data collection for this research 
commenced in August 2017. In spite of this limitation, Billo and Mountz (2015, p.210) 
emphasise that IEs can rely on the discourse analysis of texts and recollections of 
people from within and beyond institutional spaces in cases where participant 
observation is not feasible, which is the approach adopted in this study. The aim of 
collecting data from these different sources was to support triangulation and increase 
the validity of the overall research findings. This is important given that some of the 
information required for this research is politically sensitive and opinions expressed 
in key stakeholder interviews may have been influenced by factors such as institutional 
policy.  
The data collection and data analysis processes operated concurrently. Data analysis 
involves two data dialogues: the primary data dialogue takes places between the 
researcher and the interviewee or person observed, and the secondary data dialogue is 
between the researcher and the interview transcript, archival material and/or the field 
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notes (Walby 2013). Different approaches can be used to make sense of these data 
dialogues. However, I manually coded the interview transcripts according to the pre-
determined themes to evaluate country ownership seen in Table 1, that is, demand-
driven, multiple stakeholders, partnership and beneficiary leadership. The data 
obtained from interview transcripts were then triangulated with that obtained from 
archival material (specifically newspapers and policy reports) and notes on the 
informal aspects of the research encounter logged in my fieldwork diary. This led to 
some themes being dropped or re-categorised from what Walby (2013, p.145) 
describes as a ‘master theme’ to a ‘sub-theme’ as new concepts emerged in the data 
analysis process and enabled the production of conceptual arguments.  
 
Table 1: Evaluating country ownership 
Principle Indicator 
Demand-driven 
 Partner(s) who identified the development need or initiated the 
project. 
 The proportion of project design based on the preferences of 
the Zambian government (GRZ) compared to that of 
development cooperation providers. 
Multiple 
stakeholders 
 The extent to which non-state actors participate in project 
planning and implementation. 
Partnership 
 The presence of common understanding on the partnership 
model, country ownership and project goals. 
 The extent to which competition and/or cooperation shapes 
relations between partners. 
Beneficiary 
leadership 
 
 
 
 
 Government strategy for managing TDC and negotiating 
differences with development cooperation providers or local 
stakeholders. 
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More specifically, this research process entailed asking key stakeholders about their 
interactions with one another and project activities (thereby addressing research 
question 1); and gaining insight into the ways institutional actors, policies or 
underlying interests either support or undermine the realisation of country ownership 
in TDC (research question 2). Triangulation of information from these interview 
transcripts with the literature collected on the two projects was carried out 
subsequently, to establish Zambia’s ability to obtain effective and sustainable 
development outcomes from each project in spite of these politics of partnership 
(research questions 3 and 4). The research process also involved taking note of the 
details that informants were not willing to discuss in order to gain insight into sensitive 
areas of institutional and country policy (research question 4). Overall, this approach 
to developing a detailed IE enabled this study to map out the social relations that shape 
Zambia’s experience as the beneficiary partner in the ToH and RETT projects and to 
uncover their linkage to the larger processes of power and politics transforming the 
local and international development landscape.  
This methodology was also underpinned by a commitment to Chilisa’s (2012) call for 
studies informed by postcolonial theory to privilege their research informants’ ways 
of knowing and understanding into the collection and analysis of data, so as to avoid 
justifying and perpetuating institutionalised ideas about the ‘deficiencies’ of people 
from the global South that are not accurate. It also speaks to Smith (2012) and Briggs 
and Sharp’s (2004) contention that the experiences of Southern people are often 
researched in Northern-based institutions without actually opening up to their theories 
and explanations when, from a postcolonial perspective, they should be the ‘central 
terrain.’ As the discussion in Chapter Two has shown, this shortcoming is common in 
research examining activities taking place in an African context. Academic research 
on international relations has often used Africa as a place “to reproduce and confirm 
the superiority of Western knowledge, epistemologies and methodologies” 
(Abrahamsen 2017, p.126). This research extends these arguments to include the 
marginalisation of African perspectives on debates about effective development 
cooperation and the changing geographies of power. An institutional ethnography was 
therefore deemed a suitable approach to access the voices of the ‘subaltern in 
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geopolitics,’ but this research also recognises that are multiple stakeholders in each 
project and diverse viewpoints on ownership within the beneficiary country. This 
approach draws on an interpretive paradigm that recognises that there are multiple 
socially constructed realities and as a result, “statements on what is true or false should 
be understood as being culturally/historically bound and context-dependent, although 
some may have universal application” (Chilisa 2012, p.33).  
This approach required that this research includes its Zambian informants’ theories 
and explanations concerning TDC and country ownership as legitimate and centrally 
important forms of knowledge in the data collection and analysis process. As a result, 
the semi-structured interview guide included the question: what does/did country 
ownership mean to you in this project, although a framework to define country 
ownership and guide the data collection was developed before commencing 
fieldwork.11 This framework mainly comprises indicators found in global policy texts 
such as the Busan Declaration on Effective Development Cooperation and the NeST 
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for South-South cooperation (OECD 2011; 
NeST Africa 2017). As set out in Table 1, it concentrates on identifying if a 
development intervention was driven by beneficiary demand, leadership and 
consultative multi-stakeholder partnerships. However, informant theories on 
development partnerships and definitions of ownership such as “getting what we 
want” were incorporated into the collection of data from archival sources and the 
analysis of the overall research findings. This was done not only to support epistemic 
diversity, but to also avoid any predetermined definitions turning into “straitjackets 
that could limit the ability for this research to capture the ways that social relations 
function, differ and change” (Abrahamsen 2017, p.133). The analysis of archival 
materials also helped to cast light on how informant statements on concepts such as 
‘self-reliance’ are significant for understanding country ownership and the linkage to 
theories on dependency and modernity. The perspectives of the development 
cooperation providers in each project were also sought, and included in this study, in 
order to increase the validity of the research findings and to ensure a balanced 
                                                 
11 See Appendix for interview template. 
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understanding of the partnership processes, project activities and lessons that can be 
learnt for improving the effectiveness of TDC. However, my intention in centring my 
Zambian informant’s ways of knowing into the analysis of how the politics of 
partnership affects country ownership is to disrupt the dominant donor-driven 
narratives and expand the pluriversal ways of understanding South-South/trilateral 
development cooperation. 
 
Fieldwork Overview 
The first phase of fieldwork took place between August and September 2017 and was 
carried out in Lusaka, Zambia where most of the institutions and actors involved in 
the ToH and RETT projects are situated. The pilot study was aimed at determining my 
ability to secure access to the institutions and informants associated with both projects, 
and conducting a literature review in libraries such as the University of Zambia library 
in order to obtain publications on development cooperation by local researchers not 
easily accessible internationally. The second phase of fieldwork was conducted from 
January to March 2018 and was focussed on archival study and obtaining interviews 
with key stakeholders in the ToH project and RETT project, or officials with 
knowledge on related issues such as the renewable energy sector or the government’s 
management of development cooperation. The final phase of data collection was 
conducted between August and December 2018 through email and Skype 
communication with key stakeholders from the RETT project global steering 
committee located in Beijing, China. 
Key stakeholder interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were held with a total of 14 key stakeholders from the ToH 
and RETT projects12. Most of these informants were recruited directly through email 
                                                 
12 See the Appendix for the full list of Primary Sources and a summary of each interviewee’s project 
role, their institutional affiliation, and the date/duration of each interview. 
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or telephone communication, but I was also able to use snowball sampling by asking 
each informant for recommendations on other project stakeholders who could be 
interviewed. On average it took 2 to 4 weeks from my first contact with an informant 
to the actual date of the interview. All of the interviews were conducted at the offices 
of my informants, with the exception of two that took place in a coffee shop. This 
resulted in some conversations being rushed or occasionally paused when an 
informant had to attend to their official responsibilities. For example, one of my 
informants was in the middle of finalising a USAID funding proposal and he kept 
running back and forth between the board room where our interview was taking place 
and his colleague’s office. Another informant had to leave a departmental meeting that 
had run well over time to speak with me. Fortunately, most of the informants were 
genuinely interested in speaking to me and stated that they thought my research had 
important policy implications. I made the choice to not audio record any interview 
after the first few informants stated that they preferred for me to take down notes in 
my field book. This forced me to take note of additional details such as an informant’s 
reactions to my questions and other aspects of the interview process after the end of 
each interview and to transcribe the whole interview within a few hours of its 
completion.  
The first set of interviews were conducted during the pilot study phase. Interviewees 
included the RETT Project Manager, UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person, and two 
members of the RETT solar energy centre of excellence project management unit 
(PMU). The RETT Project Manager and the UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person had 
a strong interest in sharing information on renewable energy and their thoughts on 
South-South/trilateral cooperation during our discussions. They also encouraged me 
to go to the University of Zambia (UNZA) to view the solar energy centre of 
excellence at the Department of Physics, which was under construction at the time. 
However, they also attempted to discourage me from interviewing the members of 
centre’s PMU and other participating institutions, stating that they would not have as 
much knowledge about the overall project activities and the partnership process, given 
the RETT projects complicated management structure (as seen in Figure 2). In order 
to confirm if this was true, I decided to contact the solar energy centre of excellence 
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Project Manager for an interview, but he was not in Lusaka and instead directed two 
members of his PMU team to meet with me. I found that his team members Mr C and 
Mr D had a keen interest in discussing the more technical aspects of the establishment 
of the solar energy centre of excellence but not the partnership process. For instance, 
when I asked them how the project started they suggested that I should talk to their 
project manager (Interview members of solar energy centre excellence PMU, 25 
September 2017). This was not very surprising given, as Delaney (2007) points out, 
institutional elites tend to interpret interview requests as a request to interview them 
as a spokesperson for their organisation rather than as an individual with knowledge 
on a particular issue and they tend to fear the repercussions of making damaging 
statements. 
During the second phase of fieldwork from January and March 2018, I was able to 
expand my knowledge of the RETT through interviews with the Project Manager of 
the solar energy centre of excellence, a member of Ministry of Energy’s RETT project 
management unit, and Mr F who is a Biofuels Specialist who was involved in the early 
stages of the project. I was able to get valuable information on country ownership from 
my conversations with all of these informants, but they generally evaded any questions 
on the partnership process and directed me to speak to the RETT Project Manager or 
the UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person. However, the RETT Project Manager did not 
respond to emails and text messages asking for a follow-up interview, while the UNDP 
Zambia Project Focal Person kept responding “I’ll get back to you” but to no avail. 
This was surprising given that both informants had previously shown enthusiasm 
during my pilot study and agreed to participate in another interview. I did not have an 
opportunity to interview members of the small hydro power centre of excellence at 
Kafue Gorge because its construction had not yet begun at the time I was conducting 
fieldwork, a factor which informants told me was the main reason the RETT’s 
expected completion date was shifted from August 2018 to late 2019.  
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Figure 2: RETT project management structure 
 
(Source: Author) 
 
Interviewees on the Triangle of Hope project included: the ToH Project Coordinator, 
a member of the Banking and Finance taskforce, a member of the Health sector 
taskforce, and a representative from Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
However, the ToH project’s status as a completed project made it very difficult for me 
to recruit informants from its main participating institutions such as the Ministry of 
Commerce Trade and Industry (MCTI), Zambia Development Agency (ZDA), and the 
Zambia Chamber of Commerce Trade and Industry (ZACCI). I found that many of the 
bureaucrats that participated in the ToH project, had either retired or transferred to 
other institutions and current staff had little knowledge on the project. One potential 
informant on the ToH Banking and Finance taskforce declined an interview because 
he had worked on several projects in his career and could not remember specific details 
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on the ToH. When I told him that only JICA reports on the ToH were available, he 
responded by saying that he was looking forward to reading any publications that I 
produced from my thesis so that he could remember what had happened from the 
Zambian perspective. These challenges with interviewee’s partial memory were also 
encountered by JICA during its ex-post evaluation of the ToH project in 2016: 
When we were doing the ex-post evaluation we found that no one at MCTI 
could answer questions on the ToH project. The people at Cabinet Office told 
us that they would not be able to provide answers for most of the survey 
questions. Most of the people working there told us that they had heard that 
there was once a project called the Triangle of Hope but they didn’t know 
anything about it…Do you know that these institutions don’t even have [post-
implementation] documents reporting on what they did in this project? 
(Interview with Mr H, JICA Programme Officer, 5 February 2018) 
Mr H also described his frustration with some high-level bureaucrats who refused to 
be interviewed on their role in the Triangle of Hope because they were retired and felt 
they were under no obligation to answer his questions. He also described the 
challenges he had in getting access to the Lusaka South multi-facility economic zone 
(MFEZ), which was one of the main outputs from the ToH project, to take a 
photograph for JICA’s report. My conversation with the JICA Programme Officer not 
only corroborated my findings on how difficult it is to secure access to policy elites in 
Zambia but it also clarified a number of details on the ToH project outcomes. This 
drew my attention to the importance of triangulating some of the statements made by 
Zambian stakeholders in the RETT project through interviews with their Danish and 
Chinese partners. Subsequently, after completing initial data analysis, I spent August 
to December 2018 seeking interviews with representatives from the UNDP China 
country office, Royal Danish Embassy in Beijing and the Administrative Centre for 
China’s Agenda 21 (ACCA21).13 However, I was only able to secure an interview 
                                                 
13 ACCA21 is the unit under China’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) responsible for 
organising and implementing RETT project activities. 
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with the RETT Programme Manager at UNDP China and a representative from the 
Danish Embassy. I also interviewed a policy analyst from the UN Office for South-
South Cooperation (UNOSSC) headquarters in New York to get a general 
understanding of how African countries are engaging with South-South/trilateral 
cooperation and to situate my findings within this wider context.  
 
Figure 3: ToH project management structure 
 
(Source: Shimoda 2012; Interview with ToH Project Coordinator, 17 January 2018) 
 
There are several other people who could have potentially served as informants on the 
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the confidentiality of interviews and the anonymization of informant identities in my 
thesis. Some individuals were willing to act as ‘facilitators’ of my research. As Haug 
(2019, p.158) notes, research facilitators are distinct because they do not require 
monetary payment like brokers or translators, and they cannot be described as 
gatekeepers because they do not have direct influence over access to research 
informants. My research facilitators helped me to ‘get in’ the different research sites 
by suggesting and providing contact details of people from whom I could seek 
interviews on the ToH and RETT projects, or they shared documents related to the 
case study. These facilitators also helped me to ‘get on’ with my research by engaging 
in informal discussions on my research topic and providing suggestions on thematic 
areas I should explore. Even though I benefitted from this valuable assistance, the 
overall informant recruitment process was not easy and underscored just how difficult 
it is to study the activities of policymaking institutions and international organisations. 
 
Archival study 
The archive offers researchers a rich source of information on “the historical 
antecedents of current development practice vital to understanding why things are 
done the way they are today and how they might be done in the future” (Jennings 2006, 
p.243). This is because development interventions do not occur in isolation but often 
emerge in response to a particular development need or trends in development 
thinking. For this reason, archival study was adopted as an additional research method 
for collecting information on the ToH and RETT projects, filling gaps in informant 
memory, and triangulating statements made in key stakeholder interviews. The main 
archival materials consulted were newspapers, national development plans and policy 
reports. The main source of these materials was the National Archives of Zambia 
(NAZ) in Lusaka, which I was able to gain access to by paying a 1-year membership 
fee. Thereafter, on each visit I simply had to complete a request form with the names 
and dates of the newspapers I wanted to consult and a librarian would return with the 
newspapers, which were leather-bound together into a book covering a 3 to 4 month 
time period. Seale (2012) argues that archival research needs to be systemic, but it is 
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also time-consuming, which is why my analysis in the NAZ was limited to two 
newspapers, namely, The Times of Zambia and The Post. The reason for selecting 
these two papers was to capture the government point of view from the state-controlled 
Times of Zambia and an alternative view from The Post, which was the country’s 
leading privately-owned newspaper until its closure in 2016. Most newspapers from 
2013-2018 are digitised and accessible from online archives including AllAfrica.com, 
as a result, newspapers from this time period were excluded from my research at NAZ.  
The study of newspaper archives may seem an odd choice when researching TDC in 
other countries, but they are an important source of information in the Zambian 
context. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the Zambian government does not 
publish detailed reports on the development cooperation it receives from foreign 
countries. However, as seen in Figure 4, senior government officials often use the 
press to announce the signing of development cooperation agreements and 
occasionally provide updates on the progress made on individual projects. This led me 
to systemically examine newspapers from January 2005 to December 2012 for stories 
linked to the ToH project and newspapers from January 2014 to 2018 for stories on 
the RETT project. This analysis was primarily guided by the indicators on country 
ownership in Table 1, but also incorporated important themes that emerged from key 
stakeholder interviews and my discussions with research facilitators over the course 
of fieldwork. These themes which are discussed in subsequent chapters include: the 
role of the state in development; the civil service’s efficiency to engage in strategic 
planning; the decline of the government’s relationship with its Northern partners; and 
the strengthening of China-Zambia relations. The review of news articles also enabled 
me to get a sense of the government’s vision of private sector development, trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and renewable energies, which are the main focal 
points of the ToH and RETT project. It also enabled insight into how the long-term 
sustainability of project outcomes was affected by domestic political changes.  
The archive also served as an important source of key government documents such as 
The First National Development Plan 1966-70 from which I was able to critically 
understand the historical context of agency, development planning and the role of 
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development cooperation in Zambia’s development landscape. My research 
informants and research facilitators also emerged as a contemporary archival source 
by providing me with copies of government documents such as the Zambia Aid Policy 
and Strategy 2005 and Development Cooperation Report 2010. As the discussion in 
Chapter Four shows, the analysis of these policy reports and national development 
plans helped me to identify the dominant discourse concerning development in 
Zambia (including the role of trade/FDI and renewable energy) and to contextualise 
the ToH and RETT project activities within this discourse. It also allowed me to map 
how the government’s space to determine policymaking has been affected by the 
country’s economic stability, level of aid dependence and its relations with its 
Northern and Southern development partners. 
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Figure 4: News article illustrating how the signing of an agreement on the Triangle of Hope 
was announced in the government-owned daily the Times of Zambia on 28 June 2006. 
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Ethical considerations: Reputations at stake, political interests 
at play 
This research was subject to ethical approval procedures in the Department of 
Geography at Durham University. It was also guided by the RGS-IBG Development 
Geographies Research Group’s Ethical Guidelines for conducting research in 
developing countries, specifically with regards to the principles of consent, 
confidentiality, risks, reciprocity and responsibility (DARG 2009). In order to ensure 
that informed consent is obtained for an interview, I first shared the objectives of the 
research with an interviewee and then sought verbal consent to proceed with the 
interview. Permission was also sought to either record the contents of the interview 
with a digital recorder and/or in my notebook. Elite interviews are of a sensitive nature. 
As a result, each interviewee was assured that the contents of our conversation were 
confidential and their identity would be anonymised in this thesis and other 
publications that may result from the research. The option of stopping the interview 
or not answering questions that made them feel uncomfortable was also provided. 
Some informants insisted that they did not want their identities anonymised, however, 
I have used codes (such as Mr A, B and C) instead of names to protect all informants 
from reprisals or unforeseen risks arising from statements made on institutional 
practices or government policy. Finally, there are significant economic inequalities 
between the UK and Zambia, as a result, I had to take care to not make unrealistic 
promises on research outcomes when trying to gain access or encourage cooperation 
from potential informants/institutions. This includes, for example, when the solar 
energy centre of excellence Project Manager gave me a tour of the construction site 
and asked me to help facilitate potential partnership opportunities with British research 
institutions or businesses in the renewable energy sector. 
In the process of trying to secure key stakeholder interviews on the ToH project, I also 
found, as Keikelame (2018) argues, that it is important for a researcher to have critical 
awareness of the socio-cultural and political context of their field site and its potential 
impact on the positionality of research informants. My efforts to find informants on 
the ToH project at Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) can illustrate this point. I first 
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visited ZDA’s offices in August 2016 (just before commencing my PhD research) to 
inquire if they had publications on the ToH project. The receptionist I found on that 
occasion was friendly and told me that ZDA had not published any reports on the ToH 
project, but she went on to quickly call a senior colleague who had worked on the 
project. I had a brief chat with this person and they both assured me that I could easily 
get an interview for my PhD research once I returned to Zambia for fieldwork. As a 
result, I went to ZDA in September 2017 naively assuming that my ability to gain 
access would be just as smooth and was surprised to find it was not: 
When I visited the ZDA offices to inquire if there was anyone I could talk to 
about the ToH project, the front desk receptionist refused to connect me to 
anyone. She insisted in a raised voice that although she did not know what the 
ToH project was even about, every government project was an issue of national 
security and therefore no one could speak to me unless I put in a written request 
to from the Managing Director. She also emphasised that it could take up to 12 
months for the Managing Director to respond to my letter so it was not 
guaranteed that I would obtain his permission. (Entry in fieldwork diary, 22 
September 2017) 
 
Initially, I dismissed this encounter and concluded that the receptionist’s suggestion 
that my research had implications on Zambia’s national security to be an extreme 
reaction. I was fortunate enough to find a research facilitator with a relative who had 
worked at ZDA for many years and successfully connected me to a former colleague 
Mr E, who had worked on the ToH project as the Project Coordinator. Mr E told my 
research facilitator that he was willing to speak to me but this did not secure an easy 
interview. When I called Mr E to formally ask for an interview he asked how I had 
acquired his contact details and why I wanted to interview him of all the people at 
ZDA that had worked on the ToH project. He told me that he had recently left his 
senior management position at the agency and did not like talking about his work, but 
that he would give me approximately 30 minutes within which to meet him for an 
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interview at a coffee shop. When we eventually met he questioned: (i) if my Durham 
University business card was real or made-up; (ii) if I was truly was resident in the 
United Kingdom for a PhD or if I lived in Lusaka; (iii) and how I knew his former 
colleague who had helped me to get his contact details. At this point, I realised that 
Mr E was insinuating that I was possibly a state security agent using the identity of a 
researcher to cover up a hidden agenda.14 These challenges are not unique to my study, 
Ching Kwan Lee encountered similar difficulties while researching Chinese 
construction and mining investments in Zambia, due to her dual identity as a citizen 
of Hong Kong and the United States. Lee (2018, p.182) notes that in spite of providing 
her university webpage and publications as evidence that she was a sociology 
professor, some Zambian officials suspected that she was a spy for the Chinese 
government, or a private corporation, and refused to speak with her. 
Luckily, in my case, Mr E did consent to the interview and, once he was satisfied with 
my answers, he gave the green light, “okay ask me first your question.” Before 
proceeding I asked for permission to record our conversation and reiterated that the 
contents of the interview would be kept strictly confidential and his identity would be 
anonymised if quoted in any publications. However, he quickly responded: “No, no, 
and no. I don’t want to find out later on that you are sharing our conversation on 
WhatsApp or Facebook and then I start to have problems. Just take down notes in your 
book.”15 I followed his instructions but he still carefully observed what I wrote down 
in the notebook, at one point he even leaned over to flip the pages and doodle in the 
notebook when explaining the ToH project management structure. These actions 
established what he perceived to be the power relations, with me as the researcher in 
the subordinate position and him as the bearer of knowledge in the dominant position. 
                                                 
14 Zambia was a one-party state from 1972 to 1991. Since this era of governance, there has been a 
widely held belief that officials from the intelligence service often pose as normal professionals or 
even as students in order to collect information and monitor public dissent. 
15 In 2014, a cabinet minister had a private conversation on domestic politics secretly recorded and 
shared widely on social media platforms. Several prominent figures have found themselves in similar 
situations since then. For more, see Ndhlovu, G. (2014) 'Leaked Recordings of Zambian Ministers’ 
Conversations Raise Privacy Concerns', Advox Global Voices, 26 October 2014, available: 
https://advox.globalvoices.org/2014/10/26/leaked-recordings-of-zambian-ministers-conversations-
raise-privacy-concerns/ [accessed 1 June 2018]. 
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However, I observed that he was generally on edge throughout our conversation and 
alert to anyone eavesdropping. He also exhibited anxiety whenever I took down notes 
on ToH project outcomes that were not controversial at the time the project was 
implemented, but are politically sensitive issues in the present-day context. This 
includes, for example, plans for the expansion of the air cargo hub at the Lusaka 
International Airport which has been financed by loans from China Exim Bank and is 
alleged to have undergone several delays due to financial mismanagement (see Lusaka 
Times 2019). His visible discomfort forced me to memorise, but avoid writing down, 
certain points until after the interview was complete. 
Similar forms of anxiety were displayed by my other informants whenever I wrote 
down statements that they made that touched on government policy, were critical of 
the senior government leadership or critical of China-Zambia relations in the case of 
the RETT project. This is in spite of reassurances about the confidentiality of our 
conversations and the anonymization of identities. These challenges reflect the wider 
difficulty involved in interviewing institutional elites, particularly those linked to what 
Kuus (2013, p.129) refers to as a country’s  ‘principle bureaucracies of geopolitics’ 
which includes finance, trade and foreign affairs. The policy elites that Kuus 
interviewed as part of her ethnographic study of the European Union’s (EU) external 
relations expressed unease and evaded certain questions in ways similar to my 
informants. This led Kuus (2013) to conclude that the difficulty involved in gaining 
access to bureaucratic organisations and persuading elites to open-up has created a 
glass ceiling on the ethnographic study of the upper levels of social stratification. 
However, the distinctive factor in this research is that my informant’s fear of being 
quoted and their assertions that the ToH project is related national security were linked 
to the sensitive political environment at the time I was conducting fieldwork in 
Zambia. A state of emergency had been declared by the president in June 2017 due to 
political tensions, and was still in force during my fieldwork. Senior government 
officials were repeatedly warning civil servants against openly discussing government 
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activities.16 Numerous stories were also circulating in the media about how civil 
servants who were openly criticising the Executive’s interference in policy planning 
and the negotiation of development projects were being forced into early retirement, 
redundancy or transferred to work in remote rural districts. Members of the public 
were also being arrested for publicly expressing negative views of the president or his 
management of the national economy, which the state treats as defamation and a crime 
punishable by imprisonment.17 Another issue that may have created anxiety was that 
the president had embarked on a countrywide tour to assess the implementation of 
development projects and was critical of civil servants overseeing projects that were 
behind schedule.18  
My research was taking place against this background, hence it was reasonable for my 
informants (who are mostly mid-level ranking officials) to question my agenda and to 
be reluctant to speak about the politics of the ToH project and RETT project. These 
contextual issues made me realise the limits to which researchers can make a 
comprehensive assessment of beneficiary country ownership of TDC where the main 
implementing partners in a project are government institutions and where decision-
making power is highly centralised. They also highlighted the linkages between the 
state’s role in development planning and country ownership of TDC, an issue which 
will be examined further in subsequent chapters. However, on reflecting on why 
development practitioners find ethnographic research threatening, David Mosse 
argues that most organisations tend to perceive ethnographic study as a professional 
evaluation that does not allow them to negotiate on what can be an acceptable narrative 
in its report. Mosse (2011, p.55) points out that: 
                                                 
16 Miti, C. (2018) ‘Chasaya advises civil servants to follow job descriptions’, The Mast, 18 January 
2018. 
17 For example, in January 2018 a medical doctor was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for 
publishing satirical images and statements on Facebook. For more, see Amnesty International (2018) 
'Zambia: Release medical doctor jailed for ‘insulting the president’ immediately and unconditionally', 
9 May 2018, available: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/zambia-release-medical-
doctor-jailed-for-insulting-the-president-immediately-and-unconditionally/ [accessed 1 June 2018]. 
18 Mvula, S. (2018) ‘Shiwang’andu projects delay worry Lungu’, Zambia Daily Mail, 29 January 
2018. 
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ethnography draws attention to the irrelevant, the routine the ordinary; it 
examines the instability of meaning rather than defining the successful 
outcomes of expert design; and when it turns its attention to the unnoticed 
effects of analytical forms, it detracts from the substance of official narratives. 
 
Given that academic research is now easily accessible through the internet one 
seemingly harmless anecdote revealed to me as the researcher could unintentionally 
reveal a project failure/weakness. This would enable my account of the project 
activities and the partnership process to unravel the established narrative on the ToH 
project and the RETT project promoted by participating institutions which highlight 
project success rather than failures or complexities. This is probably another reason 
why institutional actors were anxious and skilfully resisted some of my questions or 
interview requests. This is equally true even of representatives from Northern 
cooperation providers, who are often praised for being more transparent. For example, 
when I contacted the person listed as the RETT Programme Manager on UNDP 
China’s official website, his initial response was to enquire how I had acquired his 
name, contact details and knowledge that he had been involved in the RETT project. 
He eventually refused to discuss his time on the project, but did connect me to the new 
programme manager, who in turn emphasised that he had only been hired to close off 
the project and so could only speak with authority on activities from 2018 (Interview 
with UNDP China RETT Programme Manager, 7 September 2018). He also 
encouraged me to access more information on the RETT project through its website 
but this was essentially UNDP’s official narrative of the project. 
JICA showed more openness to discussing the ToH project as a facilitating partner 
when compared to UNDPs guarded approach to handling enquiries on the RETT 
project. However, JICAs flexibility may be related to the fact that the ToH project had 
been complete for almost 5 years by the time I was conducting my fieldwork, while 
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the RETT project was still ongoing.19 Several geopolitical considerations were also at 
play with the RETT project, for example, feasibility studies were being undertaken to 
assess how UNDP and China could replicate the project in Ethiopia at the time I was 
conducting fieldwork. The growing accusations that China is using ‘debt-trap 
diplomacy’ to gain significant influence over the Zambian economy, also made 
research on Chinese development cooperation including the RETT project a 
particularly sensitive subject (see Laterza and Mususa 2018). All of this may have 
contributed to my failure to secure an interview from Chinese representatives in the 
RETT project, although this is not surprising considering the Chinese government’s 
standard secrecy on its development cooperation (see UNDP 2017b). In August 2018, 
I called the Ministry of Science & Technology’s office in Beijing to request an 
interview, through the assistance of a Chinese-speaking colleague but was directed to 
speak to the RETT project management team at ACCA21. Despite stating that I was 
a PhD researcher, the first question the ACCA21 Project Manager who answered the 
re-directed call asked was: are you really a reporter and which newspaper do you work 
for? She eventually agreed to an email interview after reassurances that I was only a 
student but stipulated that I had to send her a list of interview questions beforehand 
and that I would only receive a response if the questions had no implications for 
China’s national security. This was the second time national security was brought up 
in relation to my research. After following this condition and receiving confirmation 
that my research questions did not pose a security risk, I waited for a response but it 
did not materialise (see appendix for questionnaire outline). Taking into account that 
most civil servants have a heavy workload and preparations for the 2018 Forum on 
China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) were underway at the time, I decided to wait 3 
weeks to make a follow-up call. I was reassured that a response to my questions would 
be sent by the end of the week, but this did not happen. After going through the same 
cycle over a period of 4 months, I came to the conclusion that the ACCA21 official 
was using a less direct approach to rejecting my interview request.  
                                                 
19 I did not get to speak to anyone who actually worked on the ToH project at JICA but the 
Programme Officer who happened to have conducted the project ex-post evaluation was assigned the 
task of speaking to me. 
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This experience brought to mind a conversation with one of my research facilitators 
during fieldwork in Lusaka who had mentioned that Chinese officials were refusing 
interviews from Northern-based researchers due to the negative coverage of China-
Africa relations in news and academic publications over the last decade. Clark (2008) 
uses the term ‘research fatigue’ to describe the reluctance of potential informants to 
engage with further research due to past experiences that did not result in positive 
outcomes, which to some extent, may also explain my failure to secure an interview 
from ACCA21. Determining the extent to which research fatigue is affecting the study 
of China-Africa development cooperation falls beyond the scope of this study. 
However, suggestions that it is affecting research in Zambia, does highlight important 
ethical considerations about the expectations and affective responses (anxiety, 
suspicion and frustration) of fatigued groups in qualitative studies. It also raises 
questions about the lengths to which a researcher should go to recruit informants from 
fatigued groups in order to address their research objectives. Nevertheless, this does 
not detract from the fact that “the work of institutions is one of the most powerful 
forces in the creation of the world in which we live” (Escobar 1995, p.107), and for 
that reason, their practices should be scrutinised and brought to light. 
 
Power and Positionality 
The researcher needs to be reflexive “about how his or her own cultural and 
intellectual position shapes their apprehension and discussion of data” (Herbert 2000, 
p.563). This is especially important for avoiding bias in qualitative studies since the 
researcher is the main data collection and data analysis instrument. Reflexivity 
requires that the researcher maintains an open and enquiring mind, is a patient listener 
so that the affective elements of an interview can be captured, and is responsive to 
unanticipated or contradictory findings that emerge throughout the research process 
(Yin 2009). Ethnographic studies also require the researcher to reflect on how power 
relations with their informants shapes knowledge production. In ‘studying down’ the 
researcher usually has significant power to gain access, extract and interpret the data 
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collected on the life of ‘the researched’. This has historically enabled subjective and 
damaging ideas about the global South to be published, such that some scholars 
(Chilisa 2012; Smith 2012) have even compared the researcher-researched 
relationship to that of the coloniser-colonised. However, the exercise of power is, as I 
found, much more complex when ‘studying up’ since policy elites are often more 
influential than the researcher and skilled at resisting intrusive inquisition (Harvey 
2011).  
During fieldwork, I found that my positionality as a Zambian national situated me as 
an ‘insider’ to the extent that I had the ability to understand cultural nuances and an 
idea of which questions made individual informants uncomfortable and close-up. 
However, my role as a researcher from a university located in the United Kingdom 
simultaneously situated me as an ‘outsider’ whose trustworthiness and ‘real’ intentions 
were questioned by my informants. On average the first 5 minutes of each interview 
involved an informant questioning me on issues such as: my nationality; my academic 
background – some informants were suspicious as to why I was asking questions about 
development cooperation when my business card stated that I came from Durham’s 
Geography department; and the overall research objectives of my thesis. It became 
clear from these questions that informant perceptions of my identity were an important 
factor in determining the type of information they were willing to share with me. I got 
the sense that they wanted to know if I was a local with the country’s best interest at 
heart or an outsider who could not be trusted with sensitive information, the disclosure 
of which could result in personal repercussions or other unforeseen circumstances. 
However, once interviewees were satisfied with my answers most interviews usually 
progressed smoothly. That is until, I steered our conversation towards the politics of 
partnership, at which point my informants would become hesitant and again question 
the real intentions behind my research. This made establishing trust with my 
informants an important part of the data collection process.  
I always had to reflect very carefully on how I would present myself to an informant 
before every interview. I often carried out some research online on my interviewee’s 
professional profile so that I could understand their interests and possible sensitive 
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areas to avoid in the interview. However, I found that this preparation was often futile 
because the real power to set the tone of the interview was held by my informants. 
Ryan’s (2015) use of the metaphor of an unstructured dance to describe the interview 
process, perfectly captures how I could not foresee the exact steps an informant would 
take, but I constantly had to be prepared to adjust myself to match their rhythm and 
ensure smooth data collection. For example, I observed that several of my male 
informants approached the interview as if I was ‘clueless’ young woman and they were 
my lecturer and so I had to feign limited knowledge on development cooperation. 
Others, however, first challenged my basic knowledge on their project or SSC more 
generally, before showing a willingness to answer my questions. The UNDP Zambia 
Project Focal Person even tried to bait me with political talk in order to determine the 
kind of person I was, in terms of my political views. These multiple and shifting 
positionalities I encountered over the course of fieldwork underscored the informant’s 
role and power in shaping researcher identity. However, one area that I had the most 
difficulty in navigating during these interviews was my informant’s perceptions of the 
‘real’ and ‘imagined’ spaces in South-South/trilateral development cooperation.  
I found that most of my Zambian informants distanced their project activities from the 
notion of trilateral development cooperation although most accepted the use of the 
term South-South cooperation. For example:  
We at the project level in terms of interaction, we are stronger on the South to 
South exchange. On trilateral cooperation, the donor which is Denmark 
provided the funding for the project so their interaction with us is only at the 
Global Steering Committee (GSC) level….We are really cooperating as two 
countries China and Zambia, but the GSC keeps checking us just to make sure 
that the project is going according to plan. (Interview with RETT Project 
Manager, 22 September 2017) 
This was not a trilateral project. Malaysia was not a major factor in this project. 
It was just one of the many Asian countries that was involved in the project. 
We had investment promotion missions to Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, South 
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Korea and Thailand…I would say the ToH project was more of a bilateral 
partnership between Zambia and Japan but project implementation involved 
several Asian countries. Technical knowledge of Malaysia’s development 
experiences was used in the project, and that is where the Malaysian 
consultants came in. Otherwise, no Malaysian government agency was directly 
involved in the project implementation. However, I would agree to say that it 
was a South-South exchange because all of these Asian countries are part of 
the South. Isn’t Japan part of the South also?  (Interview with ToH Project 
Coordinator, 17 January 2018). 
 
The above statements demonstrate that geographical imaginations of the global South 
are indeed complicated. I reflect on how these viewpoints affected the data collection 
process in Kamwengo (2019), and argue that they seem to be the result of SSC being 
something old and familiar, while TDC is still the unknown at present. Most 
informants emphasised that they had extensive experience of managing or evaluating 
donor-funded projects and, as a result, they engaged in the ToH project or RETT 
project as if each was just another development project. They also generally distanced 
their project activities from the wider discourse of SSC and emphasised that they did 
not see the global North/South distinction because they often worked with different 
development cooperation providers in their respective sectors, be that investment 
promotion, renewable energy, health or banking and finance. The only difference, 
according to Mr K based on his experience working at the Ministry of Finance, is that 
North-South cooperation and South-South cooperation have different histories, 
conditions guiding their negotiation and notions of what they considered 
transparency/accountability (Interview with ToH Banking and Finance taskforce 
member, 28 February 2018). He and other informants hinted that they expected me, 
as a Zambian national, to understand this viewpoint and ensure that my questions on 
their project activities reflected this and not the discourse of South-South/trilateral 
cooperation found in international policy documents.  
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Through these discussions, I also realised that these informants perceived the technical 
aspects of project management (planning, implementation and evaluation) as the 
‘reality’ of development cooperation and the way that South-South/trilateral 
cooperation activities are discussed in international policy spaces and development 
texts as the ‘imaginary.’ It appears that senior technocrats such as Mr K or cabinet 
ministers occasionally engaged in the discourse of SSC in these international donor-
driven spaces in order to secure national objectives, such as foreign investment 
promotion in the case of the ToH or expanding energy access in the RETT project. In 
other words, they approached international development forums and aid negotiations 
as they would a marketplace where they can purchase development knowledge as a 
commodity and, as discussed in Chapter Two, transport it back to Zambia through 
TDC. Their rejection of the institutionalised approach to SSC, specifically the 
vocabularies employed in Northern policy and academic institutions, led me to reflect 
on the debates about decolonizing knowledge production and the challenges involved 
in speaking on behalf of ‘the researched.’ As Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012, p.2) argues, 
“research is a significant site of struggle between the interests and ways of knowing 
in the West and the interests and ways of resisting of the Other.” This made me 
question my situatedness in this complex terrain of knowledge production as a 
‘Southern’ researcher working in a university located in the global North, and how I 
could ensure that my research objectively captures the diverse viewpoints that I 
encountered. 
This self-interrogation was further intensified by the fact that many of my informants 
asked me to produce a brief report on my final findings so that they could understand 
what they were doing in their projects and what is happening ‘out there’ in terms of 
South-South/trilateral cooperation. The RETT Project Focal Person at the Ministry of 
Energy emphasised at the end of our interview that she hoped that I would not forget 
her request like the other researchers who had come to her institution to get 
information, but from whom they never heard back (Interview Miss. J, 27 February 
2018). This encounter brought me back to Creswell’s (2013, p.34) argument about 
how qualitative studies informed by an interpretive paradigm should respect their 
participants and prioritise reciprocity by giving something back. It also resonates with 
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Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) argument that participatory research methods that 
encourage informants to express their experiences and views but fail to ‘empower’ 
them are a form of tyranny. These studies mostly discuss reciprocity in the researcher-
informant relationship when studying the lower levels of social stratification, but it is 
also an important ethical consideration when informants are institutional elites. 
My informants essentially asked me to not only extract knowledge but to also 
‘empower’ them by writing a brief feedback report that could possibly help them 
improve their approach to TDC. Would it be a form of exploitation for me to collect 
this data and not fulfil their request, especially given that the Zambian government 
faces capacity weaknesses in the monitoring and reporting of development 
cooperation? This is a question that has followed me throughout the research process. 
I intend to produce a policy brief for my Zambian informants and even those 
informants representing the development cooperation providers. However, informant 
requests for reciprocity through report writing in order to fill gaps in their own 
processes (and not material requests) in this study, raise an important ethical 
consideration that needs to come to the forefront of methodological discussions on 
qualitative research and should be explored in future studies.  
 
Conclusion 
The challenges I encountered in researching the ToH project and the RETT project 
lead to a number of conclusions. First, TDC projects do not occur in a vacuum, but are 
intertwined with the domestic political and foreign policy concerns of the beneficiary 
country and its cooperating partners. These political concerns are usually rendered 
silent in development texts and policy spaces, which instead tend to concentrate on the 
more technical aspects of project implementation and partnerships such as its 
administration or coordination. This appears to be the narrative preferred by the main 
development institutions/bureaucracies involved in TDC. This brings me to my second 
conclusion. Perhaps the reason there are only a few empirically-based TDC studies is 
that, as I have shown in this chapter, it is difficult for researchers to extract information 
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from key project stakeholders. With the diverse interests at play, full transparency is 
undesirable and individuals do not want to put their careers at stake by diverging from 
their institution’s desired narrative. However, this chapter has unsettled this narrative 
and made the case for more studies on South-South/trilateral cooperation to engage 
with institutional ethnographic approaches, rather than survey-based methods, in order 
to access beneficiary voices and uncover how power and politics influence 
partnerships.  
An IE methodology has enabled this chapter to cast light on how some Zambian 
technocrats perceive TDC projects as part of the wider development landscape and not 
as unique or isolated interventions. It has also shown that senior technocrats perceive 
the discourse on South-South/trilateral cooperation employed in global policy spaces 
as an imaginary, but that they engage in this discourse in order to secure their desired 
outcomes or commodities, which are Southern technologies or knowledge on unique 
policies and programmes. The next chapter draws on these significant findings on SSC 
and beneficiary agency to contextualise the ToH project and RETT project within the 
history of national planning and development cooperation in Zambia. It makes 
additional contributions to debates on beneficiary agency by demonstrating that there 
are differences between beneficiary partner perceptions of country ownership and 
definitions promoted in global policy spaces that concentrate on the need for 
interventions to be driven by beneficiary demand, leadership and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. 
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4 
Contextualising TDC in Zambia  
In order to provide a deeper understanding of beneficiary agency and the nature of 
partnerships in trilateral development cooperation (TDC), this chapter situates two 
case study projects within the history of Zambia’s relationship with its development 
cooperation providers and national planning. It illustrates how notions of self-reliance 
and sustainable development in Zambia’s development discourse have been 
influenced by global thinking on modernisation and the roots of dependency-
underdevelopment since the 1960s. The chapter also sets out to show that Zambian 
agency in development partnerships has fluctuated with the stability of its economy 
and aid dependency, between an overt and less explicit articulation of its development 
priorities. These explanations set the context for the detailed discussion that follows 
on how knowledge transfer and country ownership were exercised in the Triangle of 
Hope (ToH) project and the China-Zambia renewable energy technology transfer 
(RETT) project. This case study approach is used to demonstrate the ways in which 
history matters in development cooperation. It shows that even though policy spaces 
are progressively constructing TDC as a modality that supports equality between all 
partners, contemporary relations are affected by the legacy of the past. Specifically, 
the ‘neo-colonial’ power relations between Northern donors and the Zambian 
government that were reinforced during the Structural Adjustment era, which forced 
bureaucrats to develop and institutionalise diverse strategies to resist and manage 
development cooperation. The chapter makes an important contribution to debates 
about African agency by demonstrating that one of these strategies has been to avoid 
taking leadership of the design, implementation, evaluation of interventions, as 
emphasised in global policy frameworks. Instead, beneficiary partners limit their 
definition of ‘country ownership’ to their ability to secure the technologies or 
development knowledge that they desire and thereafter use these resources to foster 
self-reliance. In developing the ideas discussed in Chapter Three, this chapter also 
demonstrates how institutional actors negotiate and contest these different 
96 
 
 
understandings of ownership, power inequalities, and the real and imagined spaces of 
international development in order to achieve their goals. 
  
Dependency and self-reliance in the imagination of a better 
future  
Skilled and educated manpower is Zambia’s scarcest resource. But hard work, 
initiative and dedication to development are also important, and something 
which all of us, whatever our education or training, can offer. And all of us can 
learn. Our motto must be: “If you know, teach; if you don’t know, learn.” 
(President Kenneth Kaunda cited in Cabinet Office 1966, p.3) 
Zambia has been preoccupied with ‘development’ or what can be described as its 
imagination of a better future, ever since it attained independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1964. As James Ferguson illustrates in Expectations of Modernity, a 
developed Zambia has always been imagined as a fully industrialised, technologically 
advanced and urbanised country with modern housing, transport and energy 
infrastructure, and an educated population with disposable income to spend on 
consumer goods (Ferguson 1999). Early assessments of Zambia’s prospects at 
achieving this imaginary of development, which had been embedded in British 
colonial governance and underpinned by modernisation theory, were very promising 
at independence due to the high revenues generated from the export of its main 
resource, copper, which positioned it as a middle-income country. In spite of this 
promise, Zambia’s post-colonial economy was hamstrung by a number of constraints 
which were a result of its dependence almost entirely on copper export earnings, its 
dual nature, which was defined by urban industrialisation and rural poverty, and the 
presence of a small manufacturing sector, which forced it to rely on the importation of 
most goods and services (Cabinet Office 1966; Office of National Development 
Planning 1966). The most significant challenge to the efforts to address these 
constraints was the shortage of skilled indigenous labour on independence due to 
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restrictive colonial policies on education and technical training that prioritised settler 
communities. This meant, for example, that there were only 100 university graduates 
and 1,200 secondary school certificate holders. As a result, the main objective of 
national planning during the country’s post-independence years was to correct these 
imbalances inherited from the colonial era, and thus “establish the conditions for 
dynamic and sustainable growth” (Office of National Development Planning 1966).  
Initial development thinking was fixed primarily on attaining British-style industrial 
modernity but the Zambian government also adopted some elements of the Soviet 
economic development model. As McEwan (2019, p.125) points out, this was an 
approach adopted by most newly independent African countries, inspired as they were 
by the apparent ‘success’ of socialism in China and some parts of Latin America. The 
socialist policies adopted in Zambia included centralised planning with the regular 
production of 5-year National Development Plans, nationalisation of private 
enterprises, and the implementation of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
strategy to diversify the economy away from copper production and expand industrial 
activity in rural areas (Tordoff and Molteno 1974; Steen 1975). Most of the plans were 
financed using domestic resources but some financial assistance was also obtained 
from development cooperation providers to support the construction of large-scale 
infrastructure projects. Such projects included: the University of Zambia from 1966-
9, which was built with some funding from the UK and World Bank; Kafue Gorge 
hydroelectric power station constructed with Yugoslavia’s support from 1969-74; and 
the TAZARA railway built with China’s assistance from 1970-5 (Tordoff and Molteno 
1974; Kaluba 1990). Technical cooperation from diverse countries including the UK, 
United States, Sweden, Germany, USSR, Japan, India, China, and Cuba also supported 
the government’s efforts to enhance human resources development through the 
provision of overseas university scholarships for degree study, training opportunities 
for civil servants, and the provision of technical experts to support the local health, 
agricultural, and education sectors (Alexander 1983; Kaluba 1990).  
Human resource development was not able to take place at a rate that could sufficiently 
fill skilled labour gaps in the civil service and industrial sector and, consequently, the 
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country had to rely on foreign technical experts to facilitate its national development 
plans and maintain the functioning of government services (Office of National 
Development Planning 1966, p.15). As Tordoff and Molteno (1974) point out, this 
dependency on foreign technical experts, who tended to occupy managerial positions, 
generated racial tensions and arguments that the country was tolerating a form of neo-
colonialism since most experts originated from Europe or neighbouring settler 
colonies such as Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Subsequently, the government 
introduced ‘Zambianisation’ as a strategy to secure self-sufficiency in its skilled 
labour force, and to increase the numbers of locals employed in the civil service and 
industrial sector, through investments in education and technical training programs 
(Cabinet Office 1966). The programme drew on founding President Kenneth 
Kaunda’s teachings on Humanism (a form of African socialism), which promoted the 
notion that sustainable economic growth and the welfare of all the country’s citizens, 
regardless of race, could only be improved through mutual respect and equal access to 
socio-economic opportunities (Shaw 1976). These views on equality were also applied 
to the welfare of people in other countries and influenced policies aimed at supporting 
pan-Africanist, anti-colonial and transnational solidarity movements that emerged 
from the ‘spirit of Bandung,’ such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and the 
campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Shaw 1976; Chan 1992).  
Like many other developing countries, notions of self-reliance amongst Zambian 
political and intellectual elites were also influenced by theories of dependency-
underdevelopment put forward by Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Walter 
Rodney. Although there were significant differences with the Latin American context 
from which it was developed, Chan (1992, p.111) argues that dependency theory 
appealed to Zambian elites because it neatly explained how the country’s integration 
into the global capitalist economy as a source of copper, its reliance on foreign 
technical expertise to run its mines, and its reliance on foreign capital markets to trade 
copper, were all development constraints embedded in colonial governance and not 
outcomes of their own leadership. However, the appeal of dependency theory was 
mostly cemented by the mid-1970s global oil crisis, which triggered fluctuations in 
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the price of copper, a domestic economic recession and a process of de-
industrialization that upended Zambia’s long-held dreams of attaining self-reliance.  
Instead of being able to delink from the global capitalist economy and rely on SSC as 
proposed by dependency theory, the Zambian government became dependent on 
financial assistance from Northern-based financial institutions, as the economic 
recession intensified in the 1980s (see Rakner 2003). At this point development 
cooperation transformed from being a mechanism that complemented national 
planning, mostly in the form of technical cooperation, to a source of financial 
assistance without which the country could not function. Financial assistance from its 
Northern donors also transformed from having very few conditions – a factor which 
Fraser (2009, p.309) attributes to their collective sense of ‘post-colonial guilt’ and a 
desire to influence Zambia’s ideological stance on non-alignment during the height of 
the Cold War – to being attached to the implementation of the Washington Consensus-
based Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP generally encouraged 
Zambia to reproduce some of the neoliberal economic reforms that appeared to be 
successful in Western countries, but these policies were not entirely in line with local 
realities and thereby created a profound economic shock. Most significant were the 
cuts made to government spending on food subsidies as part of austerity, which 
sparked widespread public protests for causing food shortages and increasing the cost 
of living (Rakner 2003). In an attempt to quell public anger, President Kaunda 
cancelled the SAP in 1987 stating that its policies “had brought pain, malnutrition and 
death to the people of Zambia” and swiftly replaced it with the locally designed 
alternative named the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP (Simutanyi 1996, 
p.827).  
NERP was a symbolic object of resistance against Northern donor interference into 
the internal affairs of the country since, as Chimhowu et al. (2019) point out, national 
planning enabled post-colonial states to be imaginative about their future and thus was 
considered an important mark of sovereignty, similar to the respect given to a national 
flag. As Kaluba (1990, p.27) notes, NERP also articulated a criteria for the type of 
development cooperation it expected from its Northern donors, with emphasis on 
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human resources development, which marks it as one of the first times the government 
made a formal distinction between its Northern and Southern donors. During this 
period, Southern countries such as Cuba, Egypt, China and India satisfied this criterion 
by mostly providing support in the form of technical cooperation whilst observing the 
SSC principles of non-interference and non-conditionality. As a result, SSC activities 
in Zambia did not attract much public debate or scholarly interest, although studies 
such as Chan (1992) provide an account of Zambia’s support for non-alignment and 
decolonisation, which as discussed in Chapter Two declined as the Cold War came to 
end and most countries attained independence. Northern-dominated multilaterals such 
as the World Bank and IMF, and key bilateral donors such as the UK, United States 
and Germany responded to the suspension of the SAP by cutting flows of financial 
assistance. As a consequence, the Zambian economy continued to decline, which 
forced the cash-strapped Kaunda government to curb its resistance and reinstate the 
SAP in 1989 (Rakner 2003). Kaunda also agreed to hold the country’s first multi-party 
democratic elections in 1991, which he then lost to Fredrick Chiluba as the domestic 
economy continued to struggle.  
This sequence of events established the disciplinary power of Northern development 
cooperation in Zambia’s development landscape. However, two changes occurred in 
the Zambian development landscape during the 1990s that are significant for 
understanding the discussion on the ToH and RETT’s projects later in this chapter. 
First, relations between the Zambian government and Northern donors became tense 
because donors tended to direct their support to select sectors instead of supporting 
the priorities set out by the government. Donors also started to assign their technical 
personnel to lead development projects anchored in government departments, a factor 
which is now widely criticised for weakening the civil service’s capacity to engage in 
strategic planning20 (Saasa and Carlsson 1996). The biggest source of tension was over 
how the consistent withdrawal and release of development cooperation continued to 
act as a disciplinary tool to influence economic policy and good governance reforms. 
                                                 
20 The legacy of this approach on the civil service’s capacity to engage in strategic planning will also 
be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
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This illustrates Noxolo’s (2006, p.261) argument about how the beneficiary country’s 
agency to control the introduction of development interventions became ‘hidden’ 
behind the power that Northern donors had to demand compliance to their policy 
prescriptions during Structural Adjustment. Second, the Chiluba government fervently 
embraced and promoted the notion that increased trade and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) would translate into economic growth and the benefits would trickle down to 
all. However, the expected influx of investments did not materialise, despite the rapid 
rate with which economic liberalisation was implemented (Fraser 2009). Instead, the 
economy continued to decline and austerity measures that curbed public spending in 
the health and education sector reversed some of Zambia’s post-independence gains 
in human development (see Henriot 1997). This led critical observers such as James 
Ferguson to argue that Zambia is archetypical of how the modernisation school of 
thought’s widely accepted hypothesis, which presents development as a linear 
progression towards prosperity, is in fact “a myth, an illusion, and even a lie” 
(Ferguson 1999, p.158). 
The outlook on Zambia’s development prospects slowly began to improve at the turn 
of the 21st century when a rise in global commodity prices sparked an economic 
renaissance that reduced its dependence on financial assistance (Prizzon 2013). As the 
global debates on aid effectiveness began to intensify, its Northern donors provided 
debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), which enabled 
more domestic resources to be channelled towards social spending21 (Fraser 2009). 
The discourse of ‘partnership’ to describe the donor-beneficiary relationship and 
‘country ownership’ to describe the importance of beneficiary-led development 
planning in global policy frameworks was also domesticated in national policymaking. 
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness also became the main framework 
guiding Zambia’s development partnerships with its Northern partners, although 
knowledge of the principles remains low amongst bureaucrats outside the Ministry of 
                                                 
21 Zambia attained the HIPC completion point in 2005. HIPC is a program that was established by the 
World Bank and IMF, in collaboration with bilateral agencies and commercial creditors, to restructure 
the debt burden of a poor country based on an assessment of the efforts it makes to ensure fiscal 
discipline and poverty reduction. 
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Finance (MoFNP 2011a). The government also published Zambia’s first Aid Policy 
and Strategy where it emphasised that it expected partners to support the actualisation 
of country ownership by ensuring that all forms of development cooperation are 
consistent with the goals set out in Fifth National Development Plan 2006–10 and its 
long-term strategy Vision 2030 (MoFNP 2007, p.13). The Fifth National Development 
Plan 2006–10 and Vision 2030 kept Zambia’s development trajectory firmly focussed 
on the neoliberal model of private sector-led economic growth through trade and 
investments and did not revert to the socialist elements adopted during the early post-
colonial years.22 As a result, it received the backing of the country’s Northern partners 
who harmonised their development cooperation programmes into agreement with the 
plans in a document known as the Joint Assistance Strategy (JASZ) (MoFNP 2011a). 
The government’s space to control national development planning was also expanded 
by the rise in ‘condition free’ development cooperation (loans, grants, technical 
cooperation, military assistance and humanitarian assistance) from Southern partners 
such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Brazil as the global resurgence of SSC 
began to accelerate (MoF 2012; Prizzon 2013). These Southern partners generally 
distanced themselves from the JASZ and the Paris Declaration, and it appears the 
government gave them this concession in order to ensure that they do not change their 
approach of respecting of non-inference and non-conditionality in development 
cooperation. Although, it should be noted that Southern development cooperation had 
always been loosely managed and categorised in policy reports as being separately 
negotiated and delivered through the ‘alternative’ framework of SSC (e.g. MoFNP 
2010).  
Overall, the above changes reverted development cooperation to its post-independence 
role of addressing persistent gaps in the country’s institutional and human resource 
capacity and the financing of large transport and energy infrastructure projects 
(Prizzon 2013). Most changes occurred during the presidency of Levy Mwanawasa 
(2001–8), a period which Hinfelaar and Sichone (2019) note was characterised by an 
                                                 
22 The FNDP has been succeeded by the Sixth National Development Plan (2011-2015), Revised 
Sixth National Development Plan (2013-2016) and the Seventh National Development Plan (2017-
2021). These plans have continued Zambia’s neoliberal development trajectory. 
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efficient civil service and cordial relations with all of Zambia’s development partners. 
However, as Kragelund (2014) argues, the reduction in aid dependence also reset the 
hierarchal power relations with Northern partners and made subsequent 
administrations less diplomatic when resisting donor attempts to use the withdrawal 
and release of development cooperation as a disciplinary tool. Mwanawasa’s 
successor Rupiah Banda described these actions by donors as “blackmail.” He also 
advised that any country that wanted to withhold their support as a way of influencing 
his administration’s approach to economic management and good governance, “to 
pack their bags and leave because Zambia was a sovereign state.”23 Consequently, and 
amidst budgetary pressure in their own countries after the global financial crisis, most 
Northern partners reduced the scope of their development cooperation whilst the 
Netherlands and Denmark phased out their bilateral support when the World Bank 
raised Zambia’s economic ranking to lower-middle income in 2011 (de Kemp and 
Lobbrecht 2016).  
In this gap, China has risen to become Zambia’s most significant bilateral partner, 
which in light of its global power, has roused the international community’s most 
significant interest in Zambia’s political and development ideologies since the end of 
the Cold War. This is amid intense debate on whether China’s disregard for 
transparency and accountability considerations in the dispersal of concessional loans 
for infrastructure development, as part of its policy of ‘non-interference,’ has 
contributed to Zambia’s growing debt burden and economic instability (Laterza and 
Mususa 2018). Some actors in the international community are describing China’s 
loans as a form of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ aimed at securing strategic assets offered as 
collateral from defaulting countries, which in the case of Zambia is rumoured to be 
the state-owned monopoly Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) (Africa 
Confidential 2018). Northern countries led by the United States government have 
expressed concern that China intends to use the debt burden to influence the economic 
policies of its beneficiaries and build a new economic world order where it will 
                                                 
23 Times of Zambia (2010b) ‘Don't Blackmail Us, Banda Tells Donors’, Times of Zambia; Phiri, P. 
(2010) ‘RB Tells Off Nosy Donors’, Times of Zambia. 
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dominate (Bolton 2018; Perdue 2018). As discussed in Chapter Two, these debates are 
part of attempts by Northern governments to fight the ‘dewesternization’ that the rise 
of the BRICS have triggered in the global political economy, and to re-establish the 
legitimacy of Western capitalism, industrial modernity and democratic governance as 
the best option for developing countries (Mignolo 2012). However, as Laterza and 
Mususa (2018) point out, if China’s attempts to use development cooperation to 
institute a new economic order are successful, then this would only mirror the World 
Bank and IMF’s success at advancing the expansion of neoliberalism through the SAP. 
At present China is enabling developing countries to delink from the global North’s 
power to influence their political and economic decision-making, but it is also 
evolving into another hegemonic force of power, and is thereby working against 
decolonization. Chapter Five demonstrates that China is already, directly and 
indirectly, influencing the actions of bureaucrats in Zambia. Nevertheless, Zambia’s 
engagement with China and other Southern partners is not as ideologically driven as 
it was during the Kaunda era. Instead, the government’s extensive procurement of 
infrastructure loans is more related to its desire to project a visible sign of 
‘development’ and secure its political viability with the electorate. This indicates that 
modernisation is still the dominant frame of thought amongst political elites; however, 
elements of dependency theory are still prominent. For instance, ‘Zambianisation’ re-
emerged in national debates on the use of foreign labour during the leadership of 
populist president Michael Sata (2011–4). Although under Sata Zambianisation 
evolved into a nationalistic concept that encourages the notion that only Zambian 
nationals and not foreign technical experts are genuinely committed to ensuring 
equitable and sustainable development (Lusaka Times 2011a). Sata also pushed for 
development cooperation to support capacity building and technology transfer in a 
way that progressively reduces the reliance on foreign technical expertise in specialist 
areas (Lusaka Times 2012).  
The Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy stresses that the government expects technical 
cooperation (which includes the provision of policy advice, project implementation 
and capacity building) to be demand-driven and the government should have control 
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over its targeting and monitoring so that it is in line with national priorities (MoFNP 
2007). The government has not provided clear guidelines on how this can be realised 
in any other documents nor has it articulated an official strategy for managing South-
South/trilateral cooperation. However, the development experiences of East Asian 
countries have recently emerged as an important source of inspiration and basis for 
trilateral cooperation.  
 
The emergence of TDC 
Zambia’s move towards trilateral cooperation started with discussions in international 
forums such as the 3rd Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD), a space in which Japan presented technical cooperation from Asian 
countries as a mechanism for enhancing human resources development and economic 
growth in Africa (MOFA 2003). TICAD also emphasised that such South-
South/trilateral cooperation would only be based on African-driven initiatives, which 
appealed to the Zambian desire for ownership of and leadership in development 
partnerships. This subsequently encouraged the Mwanawasa administration to seek 
Japanese support to transfer knowledge on trade and investment promotion from 
Malaysia in the Triangle of Hope project in 2005 (Jegathesan and Ono 2008). The 
interest in learning from the economic development experiences of Asian countries 
was also boosted by the renewal of commitments to South-South cooperation at the 
2005 Africa-Asia Summit in Bandung, Indonesia in commemoration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the 1955 conference.24 Statements in national development plans 
suggest that the interest in Asian technical cooperation has been motivated by a sense 
of shame at the realisation that Zambia had a significantly higher per capita income 
than countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia in 1964, but the socio-
economic development of these countries had advanced far beyond it by the turn of 
                                                 
24 See Saluseki, B. (2005) ‘There Are Lessons to Learn from Asia's Economic Success - Levy’, The 
Post; Kaimana, G. (2005) ‘South to South Tips on Economic Growth Come to Zambia’, Times of 
Zambia. 
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the century (GRZ 2006, p.15; MNDP 2017, p.34). After failed attempts at reproducing 
British industrial modernity through socialist policies and Washington Consensus 
model of neoliberalism, the rapid development of these Asian countries seems to have 
also generated a sense of hope that Zambia’s long-held dream of a better ‘modern’ 
future is not entirely implausible. Research studies commissioned by multilateral 
agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Africa 
Development Bank (AfDB) have also been influential in getting policymakers to ‘look 
east’ for their development inspiration (e.g. SAIPAR 2015). This is in line with the 
general African gaze on development shifting from the experiences of Western 
countries to Asia, but as seen from Chapter Two, it is also a response to that gaze being 
returned by Japan, China and South Korea with the goal of cementing East Asian 
economic development models as alternatives to the Washington Consensus (Osei-
Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie 2010).  
It is against this context that the next section of this chapter draws on key stakeholder 
interviews, project documents and newspaper archives to examine how the much 
sought after knowledge on East Asian industrial modernity has been transferred to 
Zambia through the ToH and RETT projects. It discusses the links between these 
projects and the country’s long-term goals of achieving economic growth and self-
reliance, and differences between how beneficiary partners exercise ownership in 
these projects and the indicators in effective development cooperation frameworks. 
 
The Triangle of Hope (ToH) investment promotion project 
The Triangle of Hope (ToH) is a technical cooperation project between Zambia and 
Japan that was implemented between 2006 and 2012 with the support of Malaysian 
partners. The main aim of the project was to facilitate the transfer of knowledge on 
Malaysia’s experience transitioning from a resource-dependent economy to a 
diversified upper-middle income economy, with a specific focus on the policies and 
legislation it employed to create a conducive environment for increased trade, 
investments and industrial production. The economic structure of post-colonial 
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Malaysia when it attained independence in 1957 was similar to that of Zambia in that 
it relied on the export of primary commodities such as tin, rubber and palm oil. 
However, Malaysia was able to transform its economy into a regional powerhouse 
during the 1970s and 1980s through the development of an investment-driven 
electronics manufacturing sector (Jegathesan and Ono 2008). Like many East Asian 
countries, its ‘economic miracle’ was influenced by Japanese technical assistance and 
involved the replication of some aspects of Japan’s development trajectory. 
Subsequently, starting from the 1980s, Japan supported Malaysia’s South-South 
technical cooperation programmes to facilitate the further transfer of these policy 
experiences to developing countries. However, as Shimoda (2012) notes, the 
Malaysian government only began to explore opportunities to formally engage in 
trilateral development cooperation with African countries after Japan hosted TICAD 
III in 2003. 
To facilitate TDC, a conceptual framework known as the ‘Triangle of Hope’ was 
developed by Malaysian technical expert Dato J. Jegathesan and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA).25 As illustrated by Figure 5, this framework was centred 
on the key principles credited with supporting Malaysia’s industrial modernity: 
political will, civil service efficiency and private sector dynamism. These principles 
emphasise the need for politicians and civil servants to prioritise national development 
over political inclinations or opportunities for personal enrichment, and the growth of 
a vibrant and independent private sector that could complement national development 
plans (Jegathesan and Ono 2008, p.212). According to Shimoda (2012), Jegathesan 
then presented a proposal for Malaysia-Zambia knowledge transfer based on the 
Triangle of Hope framework to the Minister of Finance and National Planning. 
Malaysia’s development experience was embraced and considered valuable to Zambia 
since, as discussed previously, economic diversification is an unfulfilled national 
development goal the country has attempted to address since independence. The 
Triangle of Hope framework also aligned with plans to improve the business and 
                                                 
25 Dato Jegathesan is a former Deputy Director-General of the Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority (MIDA). 
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investment climate through regulatory reform, as part of the private sector 
development (PSD) agenda the government had adopted from its Northern 
cooperation providers (MoFNP 2006). Evidence that state intervention contributed to 
the Malaysian economic miracle also validated arguments against the push within the 
Washington Consensus for the rolling back and supported the Zambian government’s 
desire to “reposition the country as a developmental state” (MNDP 2017). According 
to the ToH Project Coordinator, the Triangle of Hope framework also aligned with the 
then President Levy Mwanawasa’s personal desire to produce “a national development 
framework that could re-engineer the management of the economy” (Interview, 17 
January 2018). As a result, the Triangle of Hope proposal was well received by 
President Mwanawasa and his cabinet members. 
 
Figure 5: The Triangle of Hope 
 
Source: Shimoda (2012) 
 
In order to uphold Japan’s policy of only supporting ‘African owned and led’ 
initiatives, President Mwanawasa had to formally ask Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi for Japanese technical assistance to facilitate this exchange. Thereafter, a 
technical cooperation agreement for a project known as ‘Strategic Action Initiative for 
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Economic Development’ (ToH-SAIED) was signed in June 2006 between the 
Japanese and Zambian governments (Shimoda 2012). According to Mr K, President 
Mwanawasa had such a strong interest in ensuring its success that the project became 
anchored at State House. In addition, the President’s Special Assistant for Economic 
Affairs, Minister of Finance and National Planning and senior officials from Cabinet 
Office all had significant influence over the project design, although the main 
implementing institutions were the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry 
(MCTI) and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) (Interview with ToH Banking and 
Finance taskforce member, 28 February 2018). Jegathesan and Ono (2008) note that 
Japan limited itself to the role of a knowledge broker by contracting Dato Jegathesan 
and additional Malaysian technical experts to facilitate knowledge transfer and 
capacity building as part of the project team. As a result, the ToH is considered a 
project that was driven by the demands of the Zambian government rather than a 
project that was initiated by its partners. 
 
Knowledge transfer 
The ToH was transformed from a conceptual framework into a strategy that could 
transport Malaysia’s development experiences to the Zambian landscape through three 
measures: policy reform workshops, foreign investment promotion missions and 
capacity development workshops. Policy reform workshops concentrated on revising 
the terms of reference created by the Malaysian technical expert, which contained 
policy and regulatory changes that Zambia could make to stimulate investment-driven 
growth in twelve economic sectors. Many of these recommendations built on older 
sectorial action plans such as the development of an air cargo hub that the Zambian 
government had previously experienced difficulties in realising (Interview with ToH 
Project Coordinator, 17 January 2018). This ensured that the project aligned with the 
government’s vision and development priorities. According to Jegathesan and Ono 
(2008), country ownership was further supported in two ways. First, the President was 
given responsibility for appointing members to the twelve sectorial tasks forces 
covering: banking and finance, cotton, mining, multi-facility economic zones 
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(MFEZ), small and medium enterprises (MSME), agriculture, education, health, 
tourism, air cargo hub and inland ports, information communication technology (ICT), 
and the streamlining of the government machinery.26  Second, the task forces adopted, 
modified or rejected the recommendations, which were consolidated into 12 Action 
Plans for associated line ministries to mainstream, but it was agreed that “ownership 
of an idea would belong to the taskforce, and not the Malaysian expert, once any 
recommendation was accepted” (Jegathesan and Ono 2008, p.223).  
After setting the foundation for an improved investment climate through these 
reforms, a Zambian delegation (comprising bureaucrats and private sector business 
representatives) used foreign investment promotion missions to Malaysia, India, 
Thailand, Bangladesh, South Korea and Japan to promote the country as an ideal 
investment destination (Interview with ToH Project Coordinator, 17 January 2018). 
The Malaysian government did not have a formal role in the ToH project, but its 
external trade and industrial development agencies did organise missions for its 
private sector to explore investment opportunities in Zambia (Shimoda 2012). The 
second phase of the Triangle of Hope known as ‘Zambia Investment Promotion 
project’ (ZIPP-ToH) was agreed to address the institutional and human resource 
capacity weaknesses at the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) in August 2009, 
which at the time was a new institution established through the merger of five 
trade/investment-related institutions.27 Knowledge transfer was achieved through a 
series of capacity development workshops held to address areas such as inter-
governmental communication and coordination, information provision and service 
delivery to the private sector clients, and general administration (JICA 2012).  
 
                                                 
26 Each taskforce comprised focal persons from an associated line ministry, a stakeholder from the 
private sector and/or an academic. See Figure 3 for project management structure. 
27 Zambia Privatization Agency, Zambia Export Processing Zones Authority, Export Promotion 
Board, and the Small Enterprise Development Board. 
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Sustainability of development outcomes 
The Triangle of Hope project’s overall objectives of increasing FDI from Malaysia 
and other Asian countries, increasing domestic investments and the strengthening of 
ZDA’s investment promotion capacity improvement were all achieved during the 
period of project implementation between 2006 and 2012 (JICA 2012; JICA 2017). 
Specific outcomes from the 12 ToH Action Plans include the production of a master 
plan for multi-facility economic zones (MFEZs); an increase in domestic private 
sector investments in the education and health sectors; the expansion of the air cargo 
hub at Lusaka International Airport; the digitization of government services; and the 
expansion of road infrastructure nation-wide (Interview with ToH Project 
Coordinator, 17 January 2018). When asked the reason behind the successful 
implementation of these policies, most informants credited the strong ownership 
displayed by senior government leadership. President Mwanawasa and members of 
his Cabinet described the Triangle of Hope as a “development model” that could help 
Zambia replicate Malaysia’s success story, rather than a mere technical cooperation 
project (for example, see Lusaka Times 2009). However, Shimoda (2012, p.140) 
observed that the strict top-down nature of the ToH project management structure 
undermined feelings of ownership among line ministry officials, and it appears that 
this may have had an impact on the continued implementation of the 12 ToH Action 
Plans after the project closed. 
The Michael Sata-led government, which came to power on a populist mandate 
following elections in 2011, made repeated policy and legislative changes in areas 
such as such taxation, which created persistent uncertainty and a plunge in investor 
confidence, thereby reversing ToH gains made in creating a stable investment climate 
(Rakner 2017). The civil service’s agency to engage in strategic policy planning also 
became constrained by President Sata and senior officials in the governing political 
party, through intimidation and/or dismissal of dissenting voices (Simutanyi and 
Hinfelaar 2018). National policymaking has continued to be a contested terrain, which 
has left line ministry officials with little incentives to continue monitoring and 
evaluating previously planned policies (see Hinfelaar and Sichone 2019). This would 
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explain the reason why JICA’s ex-post project evaluation found that the 12 ToH 
Action Plans have been shelved and current staff at Cabinet Office, ZDA and MCTI 
have very little knowledge about the Triangle of Hope (Interview with Mr H, JICA 
Programme Officer, 5 February 2018). As discussed in Chapter Three, I also had 
difficulty in finding interviewees at MCTI or ZDA. Most significantly, in spite of its 
many positive outcomes, I found that the ToH is now generally known as the project 
that resulted in the development of multi-facility economic zones (MFEZs).28 This 
indicates that the Triangle of Hope evolved within a decade, from a transformative 
model aimed at replicating the East Asian economic miracle, to a relic of one of 
Zambia’s many attempts at achieving economic diversification and overcoming its 
colonial legacy of a dependence on copper exports. 
 
China-Zambia renewable energy technology transfer (RETT) project 
The RETT project is a trilateral cooperation initiative implemented from 2014 to 2019 
in a partnership involving China, Zambia, Denmark and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The main aim of the project was to facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge on how China was able to expand energy access to rural areas 
through renewable energy technologies during its economic transformation in the 
1990s and 2000s (UNDP 2014). The origins of the RETT project are similar to the 
ToH project in the sense that it emerged from a Northern cooperation providers plans 
to support a Southern partner to share its development experiences, in an area the 
Northern cooperation provider had originally provided technical cooperation. More 
specifically, Denmark provided funding for UNDP China to carry out a pilot study in 
2012 of the potential for China-Africa SSC on renewable energy technology transfer, 
following years of China benefiting from Danish bilateral cooperation in the 
renewable energy sector (Danida 2014b). The findings from the pilot study were then 
                                                 
28 MFEZ are special industrial parks/free trade zones aimed at supporting domestic and export-
oriented industries. For an example of how the Triangle of Hope project is discussed in relation to 
MFEZ see Mseteka, E. (2017) ‘Government makes strides in economic zones but…,’ Zambia Daily 
Mail. 
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used to formulate a proposal for a South-South/trilateral cooperation project that 
would improve local knowledge of and capacity to operate/maintain renewable energy 
technologies that could provide off-grid solutions for rural Zambia. It was also 
proposed that the project would facilitate the reform of institutional and regulatory 
frameworks in the energy sector, so as to increase private sector involvement (UNDP 
2014). 
The RETT project’s goal of improving energy access in rural areas addresses yet 
another legacy of colonial governance that Zambia has struggled to overcome. As 
Tordoff and Molteno (1974) point out, investments in energy infrastructure along with 
industrial activity, urban housing, and transport infrastructure were mostly limited to 
areas that aligned with the production and export of copper in the colonial economy. 
Post-colonial administrations made rural electrification a national development 
priority, but plans to expand the national electricity grid to rural areas were often 
constrained by a shortage of specialist technical capacity and financial resources, 
especially during Structural Adjustment (MoFNP 2006). As a result, most of Zambia’s 
rural population has historically relied on wood fuel to meet their energy needs. The 
economic renaissance the country experienced after 2000 created space for the 
Mwanawasa-led government to increase investments in energy infrastructure, in line 
with plans for achieving economic diversification and visions of industrial modernity. 
A target for increasing rural energy access from 3% to at least 50% was set in national 
development plans, in line with the commitments to ensuring access to clean and 
affordable energy in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (GRZ 2006; MoFNP 
2011b). However, progress in closing the energy gap was initially slow until climatic 
changes disrupted the production and distribution of electricity from large hydropower 
plants, which pushed the government to loosen its monopoly of the energy sector and 
encourage more private sector involvement.  
Consequently, the RETT project proposal was accepted when presented to the 
Zambian government through the Ministry of Energy (MOE). However, key 
informants indicate that they consider the RETT project an externally driven initiative 
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instead of a project driven by the demands of the Zambian government as the 
beneficiary partner. The project plan was initially designed by UNDP Zambia and then 
revised by representatives from the Zambian, Chinese and Danish governments in 
Beijing, who became the project’s Global Steering Committee (Interview with Mr A, 
UNDP Zambia RETT Project focal person, 17 September 2019). The project was 
formally launched in September 2014 as the China-Zambia South-South cooperation 
on renewable energy technology transfer project, with the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs providing the project finances and the UNDP China and Zambia country 
offices managing overall the project coordination and administration. While the 
technology transfer process was managed by the Chinese Ministry of Science and 
Technology’s Administrative Centre for China’s Agenda 21 (ACCA21) and the 
Zambian the Ministry of Energy (MOE). In addition, the RETT project document 
emphasises that project management units were established in each agency in order to 
ensure national ownership and the sustainability of the project outcomes after its 
completion (UNDP 2014, p.28).  
 
Knowledge transfer  
Technology and skills transfer in the RETT project was facilitated through three 
mechanisms: foreign exchange trips/matchmaking events, capacity building 
workshops, and the creation of centres of excellence. According to UNDP (2014, p. 
28), the implementation of project activities was managed by a project management 
unit (PMU) within ACCA21 in China and another within the MOE in Zambia as a 
way of ensuring local ownership of the project and its outcomes. The first phase of 
project activities involved a Zambian delegation travelling to China on foreign 
exchange trips, and vice-versa, to engage in partnership meetings so that a common 
understanding of the technology transfer process could be established. The delegation 
included officials from the: Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), Rural 
Electrification Authority (REA), University of Zambia (UNZA), Kafue Gorge 
Regional Training Centre (KGRTC) and some independent renewable energy 
entrepreneurs. Foreign exchange trips or what were described as ‘matchmaking 
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events’ were also held in Beijing, Chengdu and Chongqing to enable Chinese research 
institutions and private businesses to showcase renewable energy technologies (solar, 
biomass, small hydropower, wind power, animal waste-to-energy) and to establish 
partnerships with Zambian stakeholders (Interview with Mr B, RETT Project 
Manager, 22 September 2017). One of the outcomes of this ‘matchmaking’ was that 
KGRTC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on small hydropower with 
China’s International Centre for Small Hydro Power (ICSHP), while Poly Solar 
Technologies Beijing Ltd committed itself to donating solar photovoltaics equipment 
to UNZA. These processes led the project to select solar energy and small hydropower 
as the most appropriate technologies for transfer to Zambia. 
 
Figure 6: RETT project sites in Zambia 
 
(Source: modified from Wikimedia Commons 2015, File: Zambia_location_map.svg)  
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Subsequently, the focal point of the RETT project became the creation of centres of 
excellence in solar energy and small hydropower which would then be tasked with 
disseminating knowledge on these renewable energy technologies locally. The 
Department of Physics at UNZA and KGRTC were selected as the sites for the solar 
energy and small hydropower centres of excellence, respectively, because the 
institutions already had relevant technical expertise but wanted to expand their know-
how and training facilities. According to the RETT Project Manager, this approach to 
site selection was taken in order to enhance beneficiary partners commitment to the 
project’s objectives and ensure that country ownership is strengthened (Interview, 22 
September 2017). Capacity building workshops on the planning and construction of a 
small hydropower plant led by Chinese partners from the International Centre for 
Small Hydro Power (ICSHP) were also held as part of efforts to establish the centre 
of excellence. Finally, policy reform workshops involving relevant energy sector 
stakeholders in Zambia were held and produced recommendations on the policy and 
legislative changes that could remove barriers to private sector participation in the 
production and distribution of renewable energy technologies, which was the RETT’s 
project’s second objective (UNDP 2018). 
 
Sustainability of development outcomes 
The RETT project’s objective of establishing a centre of excellence for the local 
transfer of knowledge on solar energy was achieved with the centre’s official launch 
at UNZA in November 2018. Linkages between the centre and other development 
projects managed by UNDP and the Ministry of Energy have been established in order 
to ensure that the centre contributes to closing the energy gap. For example, the centre 
will train technicians on the installation/maintenance of solar energy systems 
technologies as part of UNDP’s Solar for Health initiative to ensure that rural health 
clinics have a stable source of electricity (Interview RETT Project Focal Person- 
UNDP Zambia, 17 September 2017). It has also supported the development of a 
teaching curriculum in solar energy technologies for use at UNZA and national 
technical-vocational training institutes countrywide. The centre’s PMU has stated that 
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it plans to cultivate industry partnerships and turn the centre into a ‘one-stop-shop’ for 
all solar energy training and consultancy services as a way of ensuring the 
sustainability of its operations (Interview solar energy centre of excellence Project 
Manager, 30 January 2018). However, it appears that the top-down structure of the 
RETT project generally weakened feelings of ownership amongst implementing 
partners in Zambia, similar to experiences in the Triangle of Hope project. For 
example, the solar energy centre of excellence Project Manager asserted that his team 
did not care about RETT project activities beyond the solar energy centre and, as a 
result, they did not make efforts to attend most National Steering Committee planning 
meetings nor did they read most of the quarterly reports generated by UNDP 
(Interview 30 January 2018). However, he conceded that one of the negative outcomes 
of his team not attending steering committee meetings was that bureaucrats, who 
lacked technical knowledge of what is involved in constructing energy infrastructure, 
allocated insufficient funds to the centre in the project budget.  
 
Figure 7: Solar energy centre of excellence construction site, January 2018 
 
(Source: Author) 
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The construction of a small hydropower demonstration plant, which is set to be the 
centrepiece of the KGRTC centre of excellence and a source of electricity for 15,000 
people surrounding its rural locality in Serenje district, had not begun at the time I was 
conducting fieldwork. Various reasons, such as a budget shortfall and complex 
procurement procedures were cited as the reason for the delay. Nevertheless, the delay 
in its construction also led to an extension to the RETT project timeline from its 
original end date of August 2018 to late 2019 (Interview RETT Project Manager, 22 
September 2017). It is difficult to predict the long-term impact the centres of 
excellence will have on developing local capacity on renewable energy technologies. 
However, the RETT project was a significant test case for Chinese participation in 
TDC involving an OECD-DAC member which is something it had previously avoided 
due to ideological differences. The RETT project also marked Denmark’s re-entry in 
the Zambian development landscape after it had, alongside other Northern cooperation 
providers, phased out bilateral cooperation in 2011 when Zambia’s economy had 
improved and tensions with the government were high.29 
One of Denmark’s interests in funding the RETT project was to help the Chinese 
government improve its human and institutional capacity to share knowledge on 
renewable energies through SSC, manage social-cultural differences with beneficiary 
partners and engage in multiple stakeholder development projects (UNDP 2014; 
Danida 2014b). As a result, the project’s third objective was to ensure that RETT 
project management unit at ACCA21 institutionalises the main lessons it has learnt on 
transferring renewable energy technologies to African countries from the project in 
Zambia and another parallel project in Ghana (Interview with RETT Programme 
Manager-UNDP China, 7 September 2018). It has now become the Chinese Ministry 
of Science and Technology’s South-South centre of excellence in renewable energy 
technology transfer and has already moved on to replicate the RETT model in a 
trilateral cooperation project in Ethiopia with the UNDP (UNDP 2019). This approach 
to ‘scaling-up the impact’ of a South-South/trilateral cooperation initiative is not 
                                                 
29 Denmark’s re-emergence in the Zambian development landscape will be discussed further in 
Chapter Five. 
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unique to China and matches the general trend other development cooperation 
providers such as Japan are employing (see Hosono 2013). This would suggest, as 
observers such as Han (2017) and Zhang (2017) have argued, that the Chinese 
government is using its participation in TDC projects to improve the effectiveness of 
its development cooperation and to reinvent its global image from ‘rogue’ actor to a 
responsible development partner. However, it also indicates that the Chinese model 
for expanding energy access is set to play an even bigger role in Africa’s development 
landscape in the near future.  
 
Exploring beneficiary views on country ownership of TDC 
The ToH and RETT projects are two different development interventions in terms of 
their scale, focus and links to national planning. However, it is clear from the above 
discussion, that the Zambian government is using TDC as a vehicle for transporting 
policies, programmes and technologies that it considers valuable from other Southern 
countries and can help it achieve its long-held desire for industrial modernity. The 
main vehicles of cooperation that have facilitated this process are (i) capacity building 
workshops; (ii) policy and legislative reform workshops; (iii) foreign exchange 
trips/matchmaking events to link private sectors businesses in partner countries; and 
(iv) the development of centres of excellence with specialist knowledge in particular 
fields. These mechanisms have resulted in varied outcomes in each project but, overall, 
have enabled the government to address specific human and institutional capacity 
gaps. As discussed in Chapter Three, global policy frameworks on effective 
development cooperation would argue that the effectiveness of these interventions and 
the sustainability of their outcomes is reliant on their having been driven by 
beneficiary demand, leadership (over their planning, implementation and evaluation) 
and consultative multi-stakeholder partnerships. Table 2 provides a breakdown of 
project activities according to these principles:
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Table 2: Overview of country ownership findings 
Principle 
 
Indicator ToH project RETT project 
 
Demand-
driven 
Partner(s) who identified the 
development need or initiated the 
project. 
GRZ made a formal request to Japan for technical 
support after Malaysian consultant proposed an 
exchange based on the ToH framework. 
UNDP China and Denmark initiated the 
project. GRZ accepted the proposal 
because project goals aligned with local 
development priorities. 
The proportion of project design 
based on preferences of Zambian 
government (GRZ) or development 
cooperation providers. 
GRZ used the ToH to refine and implement pre-
existing sectorial development plans. Senior 
government officials had a major role in project 
design. 
Each partner had the opportunity to give 
input on the plan. UNDP Zambia was 
more assertive than GRZ representatives. 
 
Multiple 
stakeholders 
The extent to which non-state actors 
participate in project 
planning/implementation. 
Line ministry officials, academics and private sector 
business associations mainly included in 
implementation i.e. participating in 12 ToH 
taskforces and capacity training. 
Line ministry officials, academics and 
private sector businesses mainly included 
in project implementation i.e. capacity 
training and centres of excellence 
 
Partnership 
The presence of common 
understanding on the partnership 
model, country ownership and 
project goals. 
Yes, Zambia takes lead in planning, financing, and 
implementation. Malaysia provides development 
knowledge and Japan acts as a facilitator. 
Project goals clear but ownership vague in 
the project plan. Consequently, partners 
have different understandings. 
The extent to which competition 
and/or cooperation shapes relations 
between partners. 
Japan-Zambia relations have traditionally been 
positive. Japan reducing ODA but increasing 
technical cooperation and interested in increasing 
trade/investments. 
Importance of China-Zambia economic 
and diplomatic relationship had an impact 
on stakeholders approach to partnership. 
 
Beneficiary 
leadership 
 
Government strategy for negotiating 
with partners and managing TDC. 
Very strong and guided by national plans. Less explicit and not seen as a priority by 
some local stakeholders as long as desired 
outcomes attained. 
121 
 
 
Even though global policy frameworks on effective development cooperation 
emphasise the importance of beneficiary demand, leadership and consultative multi-
stakeholder partnerships (as detailed in the above table), some of the opinions 
expressed by Zambian technocrats suggest that they have different views on how 
important these principles are in their exercise of country ownership and management 
of TDC. Therefore, before proceeding to a discussion of how the politics of partnership 
supports or undermines Zambian ownership of TDC in Chapter Five, it is first 
necessary to analyse the ways of knowing and understanding the idea of country 
ownership from the perspective of those involved in both projects. 
 
Who voices the development concern?  
Postcolonial critiques of development cooperation highlight the importance of 
creating space in which the subaltern or marginalised can be a part of the process that 
defines a development need or problem and the type of intervention (policy, 
programme or project) that can be employed to address that need. As McEwan (2019, 
p.294) points out, a postcolonial approach can help to overcome inequality by opening 
up spaces for the agency of people in the global South through asking questions such 
as “who voices the development concern, what power relations are played out, and 
how do local or global identities and structural roles shape priorities.” Perceptions of 
country ownership in effective development cooperation frameworks tend to limit 
their focus to the question of who voiced the development concern and recommend 
that development interventions should be driven by the demands of the beneficiary 
partner. A comparison of experiences in the two case studies suggests that demand-
driven and the externally driven TDC projects do indeed generate different levels of 
interest and commitment from the beneficiary partner. The ToH project was an 
internally driven initiative, which generated strong interest and commitment from the 
President and senior government officials during both its planning and implementation 
phase because it enabled the government to refine and implement pre-existing plans 
aimed at supporting economic diversification. In contrast, stakeholders at the Ministry 
of Energy and UNZA repeatedly referred to the RETT project as an “external project 
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started by UNDP China and Denmark,” and this view of it being an external 
intervention appears to have negatively affected Zambian participation during the 
planning stage.  
According to the UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person, government representatives did 
not assert their preferences at the initial RETT project appraisal meetings with the 
GSC in Beijing, even though they were afforded plenty of space to negotiate, and it 
took some urging from the UNDP to get them to voice their opinions (Interview with 
Mr A, 17 September 2017). The RETT Project Focal Person went to state that UNDP 
institutionalized the RETT project management unit (PMU) into the Ministry of 
Energy and gave its Director authority to direct project activities and the 
disbursements of project funds, in order to stimulate Zambian commitment and 
participation in the implementation of the project. However, he emphasised that the 
UNDP Zambia held the funds in its accounts for “safekeeping to protect against misuse 
or re-directing of funds to other government projects.” This appears to contradict 
agreements on country ownership in the Paris Declaration that require development 
cooperation providers to use the finance systems of the beneficiary country (MoFNP 
2011a). The idea that the Zambian government cannot be trusted with project finances 
can be traced back to age-old tropes about the inadequacy of African partners (as 
discussed in studies such as Crewe and Harrison 1998). Recent corruption scandals 
involving the misappropriation of donor funds meant for social welfare and 
infrastructure projects have further reinforced these notions30 (BBC 2018). 
Nevertheless, UNDP’s strategy appears to have succeeded as it was observed that the 
Zambian ambassador in Beijing actively participated in the GSC and verbally 
expressed the government’s commitment to ensuring that the RETT project goals were 
achieved (Interview RETT Project Manager, 22 September 2017).  
The fact that the RETT project was initiated and financed by UNDP, China and 
Denmark clearly created a power imbalance that gave them ownership over the overall 
                                                 
30 Northern cooperation provider’s suspended aid funding in 2009-10 after it was discovered that 
finances meant for healthcare sector had been embezzled, and again in 2018 when funds aimed at 
supporting social cash transfer programmes were misused 
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project objectives, while Zambian beneficiaries simply agreed to the implementation 
of these objectives because they aligned with domestic plans. However, a significant 
finding on beneficiary agency is that the Zambian government does not simply accept 
any South-South/trilateral development cooperation proposal from its partners, which 
is a risk previous studies have cautioned against (e.g. Kragelund 2014, p.158). There 
is a linkage between a TDC proposal’s chances of progressing into a tangible project 
and the beneficiary’s vision on how progress in a specific sector can be achieved. For 
example, it could be assumed that the Zambian government accepted the RETT project 
proposal from its partners because it aligned with national plans to expand rural energy 
access. However, a 2008 UNIDO-funded tour of the Brazilian biofuels industry aimed 
at encouraging SSC between Latin American and African countries, resulted in a 
proposal for TDC on biofuels production involving Zambia, Brazil and UNIDO that 
was not accepted (see Mulenga and Sinkala 2008). This project could have also 
contributed to closing the energy gap through bioethanol production from local crops 
such as cassava, but it did not get past the exploratory stage because the Ministry of 
Energy’s interest in biofuels development declined due to political lobbying from 
fossil fuel companies and concerns that it could harm food security by changing the 
use of agricultural land to cash crop production (Interview with Mr F, Renewable 
Energy Specialist, 18 January 2018). The politics of energy access in Zambia is 
complex and its impact on country ownership of the RETT project is discussed further 
in Chapter Five. However, this example demonstrates the Zambian government 
accepted the RETT project proposal because it aligned with its specific interest in 
expanding energy access through solar energy and hydropower technologies. Overall, 
this also underscores that beneficiary country perspectives on how a development need 
can be addressed are not static. 
 
Ownership for self-reliance 
As discussed in Chapter Two, postcolonial scholars have criticised assumptions that 
actors from global North are the ‘knowers’ and those from the global South are the 
‘learners’ in international development. These assumptions are now being replicated 
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in SSC and problematizing the notion that South-South relations are based on 
horizontality and mutual learning. However, the Zambian case illustrates that the 
relationship between power and knowledge is often much more complex, especially 
from the perspective of those at the upper levels of power. First of all, the statement 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates that the Zambian government has 
historically aimed to ‘learn’ from others and use technical cooperation to rectify the 
country’s lack of skilled labour and its reliance on foreign technical experts in the civil 
service and industrial sector, which is legacy of restrictive colonial education policies. 
Second, Zambian stakeholders in the ToH and RETT projects explicitly expressed a 
desire to learn from their Malaysian and Chinese partner’s experiences. For example, 
when discussing the benefits of drawing from China’s experience the UNDP Zambia 
Project Focal Person stated:  
We have been able to identify policy barriers and gaps by learning from other 
countries with similar experiences. For example, there was a Chinese colleague 
who was working with me in the office here for almost 8 months at the 
beginning of the project. When we [Zambians] identified gaps and came up 
with possible solutions, he would be able to advise us by saying, “We also 
found this problem in China but this solution did not work, try XYZ instead.” 
This saved us time and effort. (Interview, 7 September 2017) 
Malaysia and China’s development experiences were also used to refine and 
implement pre-existing development plans, which essentially turned these pivotal 
partners into cost-effective blueprints of how to use FDI and expanded energy access 
to spur industrial modernity. According to Ms J, the Zambian government specifically 
accepted the RETT proposal because it aligned closely with national plans on 
expanding rural electrification and it is perceived that local capacity development in 
renewable energy technologies can reduce Zambia’s dependence on expensive foreign 
experts to construct and maintain energy infrastructure in the future (Interview with 
Ministry of Energy RETT PMU member, 27 February 2018). This notion of using 
technical cooperation to foster self-reliance can also be seen in statements from 
members of the solar energy centre excellence PMU: 
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I don’t know who the geniuses behind this project are, but I am not really 
bothered to find out as long as we have gotten what we wanted out of this, 
which is our solar laboratory. (Interview solar energy centre of excellence 
Project Manager, 30 January 2018) 
We have owned this project because we have gotten the knowledge on solar 
that we wanted and we are now experts who will train other people. We now 
have a laboratory with equipment and solar modules from this project that will 
remain with us in this department. We are going to charge fees for training 
sessions once the solar energy lab starts operating and hopefully this will help 
us to maintain the lab. (Interview with members of solar energy centre 
excellence PMU, 25 September 2017) 
 
This ‘getting what we want’ definition of country ownership may appear simplistic, 
but as Abdenur (2019, p.35) points out, it is important for studies in international 
relations to open up to new vocabularies and conceptual definitions if they are to 
adequately capture the ways of knowing in South-South cooperation. These statements 
demonstrate that some beneficiary partners interpret country ownership as their ability 
to secure the development knowledge or technologies that they desired from an 
intervention, and to thereafter use these resources to foster self-reliance. Members of 
the solar energy centre excellence PMU also brought into question arguments for 
consultative multi-stakeholder partnerships instead of ‘government-owned and led’ 
TDC projects (see GPEDC 2016), by asserting that they were not concerned with 
playing a leading role in the planning and implementation of the RETT project as long 
as they were able to get the solar centre built. Similar sentiments on ownership of the 
ToH project were expressed by a member of the ToH Health taskforce who insisted 
that, “We at the project level didn’t care what happened with planning at the ToH 
steering committee level, we [at the Ministry of Health] were just interested in what 
we could get from the project which was a health diagnostics centre” (Interview with 
Mr I, 13 February 2018). This would partially explain Shimoda’s (2012) observation 
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of the differing levels of commitment between senior government officials/steering 
committee members and line ministry officials in the ToH. However, when asked for 
his views on these differences, the JICA Programme Officer, who happens to be a 
Zambian national, offered a different perspective: 
There was a difference in participation. This is true. One of the reasons was 
that a lot of the senior leaders had a desire to create change. There was more 
participation from the top. While some of the line ministry officials viewed 
project activities as an extra responsibility/commitment from their day-to-day 
work. I have seen this same bad attitude in our [JICA] current project on 
KAIZEN. Most government officials have no interest in progress. Most 
government officials only work when senior leadership pushes them. There is 
a need for a change in the mind-set of how people approach their work. 
(Interview, 5 February 2018) 
Frustration with beneficiary passivity was also expressed by the UNDP Zambia 
Project Focal Person, who stated that his organisation often tells the government to 
come up with a strategy for how they can get what they want before entering into aid 
negotiations “but sometimes they just go in there and ask the donor what do you want 
us to do” (Interview, 17 September 2017). When taken at face value it would be 
reasonable to interpret the above observations, by two actors who have the dual 
identity of being both Zambian nationals and representatives of the development 
cooperation provider, as a further evidence of how pervasive stereotypes about the 
inadequacy of the ‘passive’, ‘dis-organised’ and ‘lazy’ beneficiary are in international 
development cooperation (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Baaz 2005). Their statements 
can also be seen to validate claims that the Zambian government struggles with 
human/institutional capacity weaknesses. The latter is a factor the ToH Project 
Coordinator acknowledged and suggested could be mitigated if national development 
plans were more detailed so that civil servants would have a better idea of specific 
national interests when entering aid negotiation meetings with development partners 
(Interview, 17 January 2018). However, instead of deficit theorizing like the other 
officials, the ToH Project Coordinator also suggested that failure is not always failure:  
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The reason donor reports often cite policymakers or government institutions 
as lacking capacity is because there is a mismatch between donor plans or ideas 
for the [beneficiary] country outlined in their aid plans and what the 
government wants. When the government shows little commitment or 
participation in some donor-funded development projects that do not match 
local ideas than the donor reports it as no cooperation or poor capacity. But the 
government views it as non-implementation of projects that mismatch with our 
needs and resources.  
 
He also pointed out that even though JICA’s evaluation reports were critical of how 
some ToH Action Plan recommendations were not implemented, the government had 
resolved to not carry forward with suggested reforms in areas such as small and 
medium enterprises (SME) development because of some differences between 
Malaysia and Zambia’s socio-economic context. It is unclear the extent to which this 
approach has been employed by government officials involved in the RETT project. 
However, if we use the ToH Project Coordinator’s logic then in some instances the 
government’s ‘uncooperative behaviour’ in planning meetings and/or the non-
implementation of donor-driven recommendations is an indirect approach to 
maintaining control over the type of interventions that are introduced into the local 
development landscape (rather than being a sign that it lacks the strategic capacity to 
engage in aid negotiations). This approach gives fresh insight into beneficiary partner 
strategies for negotiating with development cooperation providers and was most likely 
developed and institutionalized in government systems during Zambia’s Structural 
Adjustment period as a response to the dominance of Northern donors.  
It underscores how claims that contemporary TDC partnerships are based on ‘equality’ 
and ‘respect’ cannot erase the legacy of the strict hierarchal relations that were 
developed during the colonial era and reinforced through the disciplinary measures 
used to ensure adherence to policy conditions during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
approach that some local partners employed of relegating their understanding of 
128 
 
 
country ownership to securing what they want instead of exercising leadership over 
project planning and implementation, appears to be another institutionalized response 
to power inequalities with donor and with bureaucratic structures within Zambia as a 
beneficiary country. These findings indicate that the diverse actors involved in TDC 
Zambia continue to, as Maldonado-Torres (2007) would put it, “breathing coloniality” 
in their relations. However, they also indicate that the institutions from beneficiary 
countries are not passive, but rather have diverse strategies for engaging in 
development cooperation even though official documents do not clearly articulate 
these strategies. It also points to how arguments that automatically assume the 
beneficiary is in a position of weakness relative to its development cooperation 
providers, fail to reflect the reality of how power relations in TDC are not only 
determined by material wealth or possession of development knowledge, but also by 
the practices of institutions involved in its implementation. This further underscores 
the importance of studying the practices of the institutions involved in trilateral 
development cooperation and their impact on external spaces. 
 
Conclusion 
The discourse promoting TDC in policy spaces and development texts is framing the 
partnership process as one that supports equality and country ownership. This chapter 
has challenged these claims and has shown that the historical context of agency is 
important for understanding how a beneficiary country negotiates and leverages the 
space available to claim ownership and exercise leadership of TDC. It has 
demonstrated how global policy trends and external actors have influenced Zambia’s 
participation in TDC, but are underpinned by ideas from the modernisation and 
dependency school of thought. TDC is encouraging the Zambian government to 
replicate East Asian policy experiences in the same manner Western theories on 
modernisation have always encouraged Zambia to mimic the development 
experiences of other countries. However, the notion that the country can only realise 
its desired vision of industrial modernity if it breaks its intellectual/economic 
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dependence on foreign countries and becomes self-reliant, which is rooted in 
dependency theory, is still prevalent amongst Zambian political and intellectual elites. 
Consequently, in spite of postcolonial arguments on the problematic nature of the 
knower-learner framework in international development, the Zambian government has 
embraced TDC projects that encourage it to reproduce the development trajectory of 
other countries and it even emphasises that it wants to ‘learn’ from these countries. 
However, its long-term goal in participating in TDC is to build local capacity in 
specialised areas (such as renewable energy technologies) and reduce its dependence 
on external assistance to support the functioning of public institutions and the 
industrial sector.  
Globalization has made it nearly impossible for a competitive economy to avoid the 
use of foreign expertise in its development process. However, economic sovereignty 
has remained an important part of the Zambian imaginary of development due to its 
history of colonial domination and later donor domination during the Structural 
Adjustment era. The research findings indicate that the structure of TDC does grant 
beneficiary countries greater policy space and ownership of development when 
compared to other modalities, but it cannot completely dismantle the deep-rooted 
unequal power relations embedded in international development cooperation. For this 
reason, some beneficiary partners do not believe that space to take leadership of the 
design, implementation and evaluation of TDC is available to them or a priority, and 
hence they relegate their understanding of exercising ‘ownership’ to securing their 
desired outcomes from a project (that is, skills, technologies or infrastructure). 
Nevertheless, trilateral partnerships are complex and should not only be viewed 
through the traditional lens of arguments that assume donor-beneficiary relations are 
strictly hierarchal or exploitative, instead it should be recognised that the beneficiary 
country does assert its authority in silent and unexpected ways. Zambian stakeholders 
are more active and committed to seeing the successful implementation of a TDC 
project that is demand-driven (such as the ToH project) when compared to that 
proposed by a development cooperation provider, which is viewed an external 
intervention infringing on their control of the local development landscape (for 
example, the RETT project). As a consequence, some of the actions that development 
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cooperation providers label as ‘passive participation’, ‘uncooperative behaviour’ or 
‘non-implementation of recommendations’ in evaluation reports, are in fact part of a 
silent strategy deployed by Zambian stakeholders to challenge the uneven power 
relations created in partnerships through the development cooperation provider having 
more material wealth and political influence. Beneficiaries also assert their power over 
the local development landscape by only supporting the implementation of externally-
generated TDC proposals that align with what they consider to be the top development 
priorities (e.g. rural electrification) and the solutions to address these problems (e.g. 
solar energy technologies).  
The next chapter draws on these arguments to illustrate the diverse ways in which the 
beneficiary partner manages the diverse political and commercial interests that 
underlie TDC and have an impact on country ownership. It also explores how private 
sector involvement in TDC further complicates the complex interplay between 
stakeholder self-interests and the beneficiary country’s ability to exercise ownership 
of and obtain sustainable outcomes from TDC initiatives. This is followed by a 
discussion in Chapter Six that challenges ongoing assumptions that TDC contributes 
to sustainability and self-reliance, seeing as institutional memory on investment 
promotion built up from the ToH project has been lost and there is a risk that 
knowledge concerning renewable energies gained from the RETT project may also 
disappear.   
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5 
Power and Politics in TDC 
This chapter examines the extent to which the politics of partnership supports or 
undermines beneficiary country ownership of TDC. The use of an institutional 
ethnographic approach enabled the research to uncover the multiple layers of power 
and politics driving the institutions/countries involved in Triangle of Hope (ToH) 
project and the China-Zambia renewable energy technology transfer (RETT) project, 
and their subsequent impact on the beneficiary country’s ability to exercise ownership. 
These layers of power and corresponding interests can be divided into three domains 
– the global, national, and institutional. The institutional scale comprises the 
bureaucratic, academic and privates sector organisations that are involved in the day-
to-day implementation of project activities. Most mid-level technocrats and 
development practitioners from these institutions tend to concentrate on the technical 
aspects of TDC, that is, accomplishing the overall project objectives. It is for this 
reason, as discussed in Chapter Four, informants such as the solar energy centre of 
excellence Project Manager and his team expressed that they did not care about any 
issues related to RETT project beyond the construction of the solar energy laboratory. 
However, in spite of their desire to focus on only the technical aspects of TDC, the 
implementation of the ToH and RETT projects are affected by the domestic and 
international political concerns of partner countries. At the national scale, this is 
because senior policymakers and politicians involved in the negotiation and design of 
TDC projects tend to make decisions aimed at tackling national development 
priorities. In some cases, decision-making is also influenced by domestic political 
concerns, especially those aimed at sustaining their political viability, or opportunities 
to obtain personal economic benefits. At the global scale, policymakers and politicians 
in the beneficiary country and partner countries also view TDC initiatives through the 
lens of their national interests (that is, commercial, soft power or security interests). 
These factors limit the room available for institutional actors to express agency and 
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select the most suitable interventions to be introduced through TDC. This chapter 
demonstrates the unexpected ways in which beneficiary partners negotiate these 
challenges, and their perception that global policy discourses on TDC do not 
accurately reflect development practice, in order to ensure that they secure the 
development knowledge and technologies that they desire from these interventions. It 
also demonstrates that arguments for multi-stakeholder partnerships are not 
straightforward through a discussion of how private sector involvement in TDC 
initiatives complicates the complex interplay between stakeholder self-interests and 
the beneficiary country’s ability to exercise ownership.  
 
‘Denmark’s only interest is China’: TDC as a space for 
rewesternization? 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the rapid economic growth experienced by middle-
income Southern countries has generated alternative models of industrial modernity 
for developing countries, and intensified debates about the effectiveness of Western 
knowledge frameworks in the post-structural adjustment and post-global financial 
crisis world. China, Brazil and India (as part of the BRICS grouping) have received 
significant praise for accelerating the dewesternization of knowledge production and 
for creating a counter-hegemonic challenge to the dominance of Northern institutions 
in international development, through their establishment of multilateral institutions 
such as the New Development Bank (Mignolo 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019). This 
thesis contends that Zambia’s interest in learning about East Asian models of industrial 
modernity in the ToH and RETT projects makes TDC a space to observe how 
dewesternization of development thinking is occurring in Zambia. However, TDC is 
also a space to observe how Northern countries are attempting to manage and influence 
how development knowledge is disseminated in South-South exchanges. The 
relevance of these arguments can be seen through an exploration of the opinions key 
stakeholder in the ToH and RETT projects expressed on the underlying reasons 
development cooperation providers supported these projects.  
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Significantly, most informants on the RETT project in Zambia expressed that 
Denmark’s only interest in the project was China. The UNDP Zambia Project Focal 
Person stated that, “Denmark’s role in the RETT project has been limited to providing 
the project finances [US$2.6 million] and contributing towards the project design, 
particularly the expected outcomes. However, its role after this has been minimal. 
Denmark’s only interest in the project was to influence China” (Interview, 7 
September 2017). Most informants could not elaborate on what this interest was but 
their opinions did cast light on the potential reason Denmark re-emerged in the 
Zambian development landscape with the RETT project in 2014 after its formal retreat 
in 2011. As discussed in Chapter Four, this retreat occurred in the midst of tensions 
with a less aid-dependent and assertive Zambian government that told its Northern 
development cooperation providers that it expected them to respect the principles of 
non-interference and non-conditionality or to leave. When the question of Denmark’s 
reason for supporting the RETT project was put forward to the Danida Advisor in 
Beijing, she responded with the following statement: 
Denmark decided to support this project in the process of seeking partnerships 
with new development actors, and triangular cooperation with UNDP was seen 
as an interesting concept. Denmark has six decades of experience with 
development cooperation that we wished to convey to new development 
actors, such as China. Accordingly, the purpose of the Danish support is to 
promote good development practices for new and growing actors in Africa (in 
this case in Ghana and Zambia), where China is becoming more 
committed...Apart from addressing the specific needs related to the transfer of 
renewable energy technology from China to Ghana and Zambia, the project 
also attempts to empower Chinese institutions in general in managing social 
and cultural aspects related to China’s transition from being a receiver to 
becoming a provider of development assistance, and in including the local 
context when implementing development assistance programmes. The overall 
aim of the support is thus to develop a more effective South-South cooperation 
platform. Additionally, the project has strong links to Danida funded activities 
in China and Africa in the field of renewable energy technology transfer and 
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climate change. The project is the first of its kind for Denmark, and also for 
international donors working with China in Africa. It is therefore seen as a pilot 
case for indirect Danish support to South-South cooperation as current donor 
countries move from least developed to mid-developed countries, and 
traditional donors phase-out. This development changes the donor landscape 
and the aid architecture making models for cooperation between traditional 
and newer donors, including within South-South cooperation, very important. 
(Email communication with Ms N, 9 December 2018) 
 
This statement aligns with objectives outlined in RETT project documentation (UNDP 
2014; Danida 2014b). This perspective also matches the explanation provided by the 
UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person who asserted that:  
The Danish were interested in helping the Chinese government to learn how to 
interact with African countries. Chinese culture, way of doing business and 
expectations are different when they come to African countries, so one focus 
of the project is to develop Chinese skills to interact with different stakeholders 
in African countries (Interview, 7 September 2017).  
These statements on how Denmark wants to teach China and enhance its capacity to 
deliver SSC indicate the extent to which trusteeship and the knower-learner frame of 
thinking are embedded in international development cooperation. Like many other 
Northern countries, Denmark has moved on from directly delivering development 
cooperation to the poorest countries, to supporting the development cooperation 
activities of Southern partners with more context-relevant development knowledge. It 
views the global development architecture as a space for global diplomacy and TDC 
as a vehicle through which it can sensitise Southern cooperation providers on its best 
practice, norms and values. For example, Denmark’s 2012 Strategy for Development 
Cooperation emphasises its ‘global responsibility’ to ensure that we live a world 
characterised by peace, security, a human rights-based legal order, economic stability 
and joint solutions to environmental and health problems (Danida 2012, p.3). It also 
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states that these objectives and values should not be taken for granted with the 
emergence of China, India, Brazil, South Korea, South Africa and the Gulf states, who 
appear to prioritise commercial opportunities in development cooperation, and hence 
Denmark has to forge partnerships with these actors and argue more persuasively for 
its values (Danida 2012, p.7). This would indicate that Denmark intends to use 
trilateral partnerships to convince these Southern cooperation providers and 
beneficiary countries that Western political, economic and epistemic values and 
practices are the best frameworks to operate within. 
Denmark’s intentions in the RETT project maybe to impart Western traditions and 
regulatory standards to China, but China has also recognised the benefits of learning 
from or at least appearing to learn from Northern countries. As Zhang (2017) points 
out, participating in TDC enables China to improve the quality of its technical 
cooperation, re-brand itself as a responsible global development actor and counter 
Northern discourses on the Chinese ‘threat’ and ‘new imperialism’. TDC initiatives 
such as the RETT project also enable China to build its allies across the North-South 
divide who can support its position in debates on its complex internal affairs and global 
strategy. This is especially important in light of ongoing concerns from the United 
States government that China is using its development cooperation, more broadly, to 
develop a new world order built on its own image. In many ways, China is replicating 
lessons from the historical trajectory of Northern countries, especially how the 
operations of empire enabled colonial powers to embed the notion that their 
knowledge frameworks and practices are superior and, therefore, colonised peoples 
should mimic them in order to attain modernity. This has enabled former colonial 
powers to influence knowledge production, policymaking and ‘the contents of the 
conversation’ in post-colonial times. As Edward Said points out, nations are 
themselves narrations and the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from 
forming and emerging, is crucial in the construction of a great empire and its ability 
to retain power (Said 1993, p.xiii). This is where TDC emerges as a space from which 
to observe the counter processes of dewesternization and rewesternization. On the one 
hand, TDC enables China to disseminate its development model, signal that it is not a 
rogue predator, to build allies, and to block narratives that would hinder its global 
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strategy to become a superpower. On the other hand, Denmark is able to use TDC to 
promote its (Western) values and uphold its status as ‘a small country with a big voice’ 
in global governance structures. Its 2012 Strategy supports this argument by 
emphasising that Denmark will have to bring all its “strengths and competencies into 
play in our cooperation with developing countries in order to ensure that we remain a 
relevant and sought after partner, in light of the fact that developing countries are 
creating new alliances, which are similar to and even excluding traditional donors” 
(Danida 2012, p.7).  
It was surprising to find that key stakeholders in the ToH and RETT projects also put 
forward this notion of Northern countries engaging directly with SSC partnerships in 
order to maintain their relevance in global governance structures as the underlying 
reasons driving trilateral development cooperation:  
Western countries are trying to remain relevant by engaging in trilateral 
partnerships. People need to accept that China is now a superpower. China has 
avoided participating in trilateral projects with the North. As much as Western 
countries may have their own interests (whether its economic or political 
interests) for trying to maintain a trilateral partnership with China they also 
have to realise that for China to now agree now it must also have its own 
interests. That is what we also need here.  (Interview with the UNDP Zambia 
Project Focal Person, 7 September 2017) 
Japan did not get much from this project. We see the project as a failure 
because outcomes were not maintained. Even for us to state that the project 
was satisfactory in the ex-post evaluation report was a matter of us being 
diplomatic. But if I had to say one reason that made Japan get involved in the 
project, it was image building. To be able to say ‘we are also there in Zambia 
or Africa working’. (Interview with JICA Programme Officer, 5 February 
2018) 
I would describe Japanese ODA as aid that you do not see. Chinese aid is more 
visible with all their infrastructure projects and even Western aid is seen. 
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However, Japanese aid is quiet in the background. They do not really provide 
much funding for aid projects. That is why they use selected projects such as 
the Triangle of Hope to maintain their relationship with countries like Zambia. 
(Interview with ToH Project Coordinator, 17 January 2018) 
 
However, one point that stood out from these statements was the role that the Sino-
Japanese rivalry plays in Japan’s development cooperation activities in Africa. The 
JICA Programme Officer alluded to this rivalry while explaining Japan’s process for 
appraising beneficiary requests for technical cooperation. He stated that, “The 
approval process for JICA support takes long, we are not like the Chinese who do 
things anyhow. JICA experts came to Zambia on about 3 to 4 missions to survey the 
need for the ToH project and its viability” (Interview, 5 February 2018). This framing 
is significant given that China has eclipsed Japan to become Africa’s leading Asian 
development cooperation provider over the last decade. Japan’s official narrative on 
its relationship with Africa has sought to distinguish itself from other development 
cooperation providers by emphasizing its history as an all-weather friend. For 
example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website states that: 
When the Cold War ended, developed countries’ interest in providing aid to 
Africa began to wane. Under such circumstances, it was Japan that argued for 
the importance of Africa, and the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD) was the proof of Japan taking action. Nowadays, there 
are various fora through which many countries engage themselves with Africa, 
but TICAD launched by Japan was the forerunner of such fora for African 
development (MOFA 2016).  
 
Burghart’s (2017, p.411) review of Japanese development cooperation literature finds 
that it tends to emphasise its role as a global leader in various fields, which positions 
it in a hierarchal relationship with its beneficiary countries. However, as Abdenur and 
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Da Fonseca (2013, p.1486) point out, JICA has specifically adopted the discourse of 
‘co-creation’ in its policy literatures to create the perception that it supports horizontal 
and mutual learning, and to distance itself from debates on the paternalism in North-
South partnerships. This research finds that Japan also frames some of its past bilateral 
cooperation as TDC in order to strengthen its reputation as the leading facilitator of 
TDC from the global North. JICA publications such as Kato (2012) and Hosono 
(2013) present the ToH project as trilateral cooperation. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, most informants refused to describe the ToH project as a TDC 
initiative, describing it instead as a bilateral technical cooperation project between 
Japan and Zambia, but in which Malaysian technical experts were contracted to help 
plan and implement the knowledge transfer process. The JICA Programme Officer 
also confirmed it was a bilateral cooperation project. The OECD has identified four 
ways in which TDC is established: a Northern cooperation provider offers its support 
to a South-South exchange; a Southern cooperation provider joins a North-South 
bilateral project; bilateral cooperation between a Northern and Southern cooperation 
provider is used as a basis to develop a new project in another Southern country; or a 
Northern cooperation provider, Southern cooperation provider and the beneficiary 
partner jointly develop a TDC project (OECD 2013, p.15). Therefore, the ToH project 
can be defined as a TDC project, even though it was officially negotiated and 
implemented on a bilateral basis. However, the contradiction between the reality of 
development practice and how Japan frames its partnerships in its texts and policy 
spaces provides another example of how nations form and control narratives in order 
to magnify or preserve their power. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Japan’s soft power ambitions also include using TDC 
to position East Asian economic development models as developing countries 
preferred alternatives to the Washington Consensus model. Despite the presence of a 
Sino-Japanese rivalry, China’s development cooperation is modelled on the Japanese 
approach and is also attempting to promote the ‘easternization’ of development 
thinking. However, Japan’s actions underscore that geographical imaginations of the 
global North are more complex than assumed and that the global North is not a united 
force in the efforts to counter the dewesternization of the development thinking that 
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the emerging powers have accelerated. Nevertheless, Japan’s attempt to maintain 
some control of how East Asian models are disseminated in the global South by 
positioning itself as the leading facilitator of TDC also mirrors the actions of other 
Northern countries.  
Overall, the above findings support McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) and Abdenur and 
Da Fonseca’s (2013) arguments that Northern countries interest in facilitating SSC 
through trilateral development cooperation are part of the wider power struggle over 
economic, political and security spaces. However, despite this evidence, most key 
stakeholders in the ToH and RETT projects stressed that they did not care about the 
geopolitics underlying each intervention and that they were only interested in the 
technical aspects of TDC at the institutional scale. For example, the UNDP China 
RETT Programme Manager emphasised: 
I don’t know what you found in the other trilateral projects that you have been 
researching but you could argue why is Denmark financing this project? Why 
do they care? Zambia is not a priority country for Denmark anymore, although 
Ghana and China are priorities. To me, it has to do with their difficulty in 
getting access to the Chinese government and these types of projects create 
access through, for example, the steering committee meetings. This is a project 
that does a lot of good and really builds South-South capacity, but it also opens 
up opportunities for them to sit with government representatives from the 
highest levels. From these meetings, they develop various knowledge products 
and activities which allow them to interact with each other and/or access 
information. So maybe this is the context the Danish were looking at in order 
to get around the difficulty of getting access to the Chinese government. 
However, my task is as the Programme Manager for the RETT projects in 
Zambia and Ghana is to make sure that things get done. These projects are 
measured based on their outputs, outcomes and the impact. This project really 
has nothing to do with the relationship building between the donor and China. 
It is focussing on developing global technology transfer under the SSC 
framework and that is what we are measured on. Have we been able to deliver 
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this project and get the outcomes that we set out to achieve when we agreed to 
implement this project on behalf of Denmark? We are never measured on 
Denmark’s ability to get access to the Chinese government. I do think that is 
an interesting perspective on the trilateral modality. And by all means, if that 
is what they want from this project, then that is great. However, that is not 
something that we talk about or think is relevant for the project. (Interview, 7 
September 2018) 
 
This demonstrates that many development practitioners are committed to ensuring that 
development interventions are efficiently delivered to beneficiary partners even 
though senior policymakers and politicians having underlying motives for 
development cooperation at the national or global scale. However, his emphasis on the 
technical aspects of the project also supports David Mosse’s (2011, p.53) argument 
that development practitioners tend to view any questions related to the wider context 
of their work or notions of self-interest in development interventions as undermining 
their professionalism. Mosse (2011, p.55) also points out, that development 
practitioners tend to lead researchers away from narratives that draw attention to the 
informal processes that underlie official actions and have the potential to disrupt the 
professional networks built around the shared representation of specific interventions 
and towards narratives of success that promote ideas and practices that can be 
replicated in other contexts. In the case of the TDC, this narrative tends to be that it 
assists beneficiary countries to achieve priorities in their national development plans 
and builds the project management capacity of Southern cooperation providers. 
However, the findings of this study have disrupted that narrative and shown that 
development cooperation providers have diverse interests underlying their 
engagement in TDC. The next section will proceed to examine how Zambian 
stakeholders negotiate the geopolitics of TDC. 
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Beneficiary agency and the geopolitics of TDC 
The absence of beneficiary country perspectives in ongoing debates on the changing 
geographies of power and development undermines their agency and contributes to 
their ‘subalternity’ or marginalisation to a lower rank within international 
development (Sharp 2013). This underscores the importance of listening to the 
subaltern’s voice and acknowledging that they employ diverse strategies to contest 
and negotiate the power that enables dominant countries to influence their local 
development landscape. Chapter Four demonstrated that the country’s history of 
colonial domination and donor domination during the Structural Adjustment era has 
increased the importance of economic sovereignty and non-conditionality in policy 
elite’s visions on country ownership in Zambia. It also highlighted that the government 
has in recent years chosen to strengthen its economic relations with ‘non-interfering’ 
Southern partners in order to counter the power that Northern countries have had to 
influence national policymaking. Zambian technocrats in both the ToH and RETT 
projects also adopted a number of strategic actions to manage the geopolitics of TDC 
and specifically the risks to diplomatic relations with China.  
According to the ToH Project Coordinator, one strategic response occurred during 
preparations for a series of foreign investment promotion missions, at which it was 
noted that Japan pushed for Taiwan to be included on the list of Asian countries that 
would be targeted. However, he emphasised that the Zambian government rejected 
this suggestion because “we were interested in maintaining our diplomatic relationship 
with China and didn’t want to upset them” (Interview with ToH Project Coordinator, 
17 January 2018). Archival analysis sheds light on how the China-Zambia diplomatic 
relationship was strained at the time due to Michael Sata’s populist campaign for the 
2006 Presidential elections, which incorporated an anti-Chinese investment and 
immigration discourse following fatalities at Chinese-owned businesses. Sata also 
upset the Chinese government by establishing links with Taiwanese businesses and 
politicians and promising to recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state if he won the 
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elections.31 This was during a period when the Levy Mwanawasa-led administration 
and private sector actors were actively seeking investments and development 
cooperation from China. Consequently, senior government officials had to repeatedly 
express their support for the ‘One China Policy’ in order to appease the Chinese 
government, which had begun to threaten an end to its diplomatic relations with 
Zambia.32  
Michael Sata’s position gradually shifted to being pro-Beijing after he ascended to the 
presidency in 2011 and he even went on record to state that his new strategy would be 
to use partnerships with the Chinese government to develop the country (Lusaka 
Times 2011b). China also committed itself to strengthening its relationship with 
Zambia, and, over the course of the last decade, became one of the country’s most 
important bilateral partners. Even though Michael Sata’s actions were initially aimed 
at altering the practices of Chinese business entities and winning over the electorate, 
Sautman (2015) argues that Sata’s strategic use of a racializing rhetoric is an important 
example of how African actors are also influencing the actions of the Chinese state 
based on the knowledge that China needs Africa’s resources, commercial markets and 
political alliances. This underscores the importance of mutuality within international 
relations. China’s power and authority as one of the most significant providers of SSC 
is not solely a result of its material wealth or its ownership of valuable development 
knowledge or technologies, it is also dependent on African countries actually seeking 
its development cooperation. Unfortunately, a negative consequence of Sata’s 
racializing rhetoric is that public opinion and Zambian news media coverage of 
Chinese economic and development cooperation activities have remained negative 
and continued to characterise ‘the Chinese’ as untrustworthy and predatory.  
                                                 
31 For more see Chellah, G. and Malupenga, A. (2006) ‘Taiwanese, Sata Meet in Lilongwe’, The Post; 
Mupuchi, S. (2006a) ‘Zambia Doesn’t Owe China Anything- Sata’, The Post; The Post (2007) ‘Sata 
visits Taiwan’, The Post; Times of Zambia (2007) ‘State Monitors Sata’s Anti-China Campaign’, 
Times of Zambia. 
32 Former president Kenneth Kaunda was sent to Beijing to formerly apologise and repair diplomatic 
relations with China. See the Times of Zambia (2006d) ‘China threatens to cut ties’, Times of Zambia; 
Times of Zambia (2006c) ‘Levy Apologises to China Over Sata's Remarks’, Times of Zambia; Sunday 
Times of Zambia (2007) ‘China valid partner- Kaunda.’ 
143 
 
 
This brings us to the second example of how technocrats managed risks to the 
country’s relations with China in the RETT project. One of this study’s main research 
questions is aimed at understanding the nature of partnerships in TDC and key 
stakeholder interviews included questions on the partnership process (see Appendix 
for template). Given the wider context of the China-Zambia relationship discussed 
above, I anticipated that there was a possibility that some Zambian informants would 
express an anti-Chinese sentiment. Surprisingly, most informants became guarded but 
insisted that they had a great working relationship with their Chinese partners in the 
RETT project when asked about their interactions. 
From what I hear the Chinese treasure trust so much. Therefore, I think it just 
takes patience and some understanding that we are from different cultures to 
make such partnerships work. It is important for us to make an effort to learn 
Chinese because they have gone out of their way to learn a little English. Last 
year we had thought of enrolling for Chinese lessons at the Confucius centre 
at UNZA but the schedule has just been too tight. But I think as Africans we 
also need to learn a little bit about their language and culture. (Interview RETT 
Project Manager, 22 September 2017)  
The language difference was the main barrier. We are not able to speak 
Chinese so we had to rely on interpreters when discussing with our Chinese 
colleagues. Otherwise, the people in China were generally more welcoming 
and accommodating than other countries where we have travelled too. 
(Interview with members of solar energy centre excellence PMU, 25 
September 2017) 
  
The UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person also suggested that the project had helped to 
foster understanding and break negative stereotypes of Chinese people (Interview, 7 
September 2017). Subsequently, these statements could be taken as an indication that 
the RETT project’s goal of increasing understanding between Chinese institutions and 
Zambian stakeholders was accomplished. However, these statements also support 
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studies that have argued that anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa is a lot more complex 
than it is usually presented in the news media (e.g. Hess and Aidoo 2015; Sautman 
and Hairong 2016). As Breslin (2013) points out, the Chinese presence in Africa 
countries can be disaggregated into large-scale private investors, small to medium-
scale entrepreneurs, state-owned enterprises, and diplomatic/development cooperation 
officials, with each group having different interests and relations with local people. 
The majority of anti-Chinese sentiments in Zambia are directed towards large to 
medium-scale entrepreneurs due to past scandals in the mining sectors, fears that local 
producers will be pushed out of the market, and rumours over corrupt practices in the 
purchase of land and bidding for road contracts from the government. However, the 
RETT project is being managed at the state-to-state level at which relations have 
generally been cordial since the construction of the TAZARA railway in the 1970s. 
Hence, it was reasonable for Zambian stakeholders in the RETT project who are 
mostly technocrats and academics from public institutions to express positive views 
of their Chinese partners. Given the wider context surrounding the controversy about 
China-Zambia relations, it was also pertinent for them to protect future flows of 
development cooperation by being careful about how they presented their relationship 
to external parties such as journalists or researchers. This would also explain the 
suspicions and challenges I encountered in securing key stakeholder interviews on the 
ToH and RETT projects (see Chapter Three), and the reasons potential research 
informants may have felt that this study had implications for their own national 
security.  
It is important to highlight these strategic responses since African agency is often only 
attributed to acts of resistance, such as the previous chapter’s examples of how 
stakeholders in the ToH and RETT projects resisted pressure from its partners to 
implement recommendations that it did not agree with, when they do express agency 
in different ways. However, Zambian stakeholders are not passively observing 
geopolitical concerns in TDC but have diverse, if not occasionally silent, strategies to 
manage these partnerships. It is clear that they are self-censoring statements on China-
Zambia relations in order to control the public discourse on China and ensure that they 
continue to access the economic benefits of this relationship.  
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Comparing South-South and North-South partnerships 
In the course of discussions concerning the China-Zambia-Denmark partnership, it 
became clear that Denmark’s minimal role in the implementation of the RETT project 
created more room for Zambian stakeholders to exercise ownership and leadership of 
project activities. However, key stakeholders from the RETT and ToH projects also 
confirmed findings from past studies that suggest beneficiary partners view South-
South relations as easier than North-South relations: 
SSC is helpful. Partnerships between countries with similar background or 
circumstances are much more meaningful and easier. China is still considered 
a developing country. It is easier to interact with the Chinese than with 
counterparts from developed countries like the United States or the UK. 
Relationships are more respectful and mutually beneficial. (Interview with 
UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person, 7 September 2017) 
Malaysia’s development experience was a good model for Zambia to learn 
from them more generally because it still faces some of the challenges found 
in developing countries like ours. So it easier to learn from them then it is with 
partners from Western countries who have less ability to understand the 
challenges found here. Have you been to Malaysia? They have made lots of 
progress especially in areas such as education. My son is actually studying 
architecture at a university in Malaysia. (Interview with ToH Project 
Coordinator, 17 January 2018) 
In spite of the fact that most stakeholders were diplomatic when addressing questions 
of their partnership with China, the RETT Project Manager also conceded it was easier 
to negotiate with Chinese partners in trilateral modality rather than in a bilateral 
partnership since the funding came from a third source [Denmark] and to some extent 
this placed China and Zambia at the same level in the project (Interview, 22 September 
2017). Other research informants such as Mr C (RETT solar energy centre of 
excellence PMU) and Mr I (ToH Health taskforce member) did not agree with such 
viewpoints but felt, based on their experience working on multiple development 
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projects, that partnerships with Western donors such as Sweden were no different from 
South-South partnerships. Moreover, the RETT Project Manager asserted that the 
main lesson he learnt from managing a TDC partnership with China was not to be 
passive. This mirrors comments made by the solar energy centre of excellence Project 
Manager when relaying how he resisted pressure from Poly Solar Technologies 
Beijing Ltd to market its solar energy equipment across the country as part of their 
memoranda of understanding (MoU). He emphasised the importance of “knowing 
what you want and being assertive when dealing with Chinese partners” (Interview 
with, 30 January 2018). 
These differing perceptions of partnerships underscore the complexity of power 
relations in TDC. However, Mr K who is a senior civil servant at the Ministry of 
Finance also emphasised the limits to which a beneficiary country can express its 
agency when negotiating with development partners:  
Our ability to strategically leverage our position in South-South or trilateral 
cooperation is affected by the fact that development projects are always 
influenced by the donor. It is easier to ensure win-win outcomes with Southern 
partners. Northern donors tend to emphasise too much on political 
conditionalities like good governance or economic conditionalities like private 
sector development and debt sustainability (will not lend if debt exceeds 40% 
of GDP). But none of these issues matters when it comes to our relations with 
Southern countries like China. We just ask them for whatever we want such as 
roads, when we need it, and we know that they will assist us. With the North, 
there will never be equality between us as long as they are more financially 
wealthy than us African countries. But at the end of the day whether you want 
to call these other countries our cooperating partners or donors, and we are the 
recipient or beneficiary, or whatever words you use to sugar-coat it, the aid 
relationship is always affected by the issue of comparative advantage. The 
North introduced the Paris Declaration and the Busan Partnership Agreement 
to improve the effectiveness of aid but most countries have continued with 
business as usual and have not implemented the changes that were agreed. For 
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example, most Northern donors refuse to channel project finances or handle 
procurement through local systems…So you see our ability to secure 
ownership of development projects is affected by the fact that donors tend to 
be inclined to self-interest, especially commercial interests. (Interview with 
ToH Banking and Finance taskforce member, 28 February 2018) 
Mr K’s statement is a resounding judgement on how the rhetoric of ‘equality’ and 
‘country ownership’ in policy spaces and development texts, does not reflect the 
reality of what occurs in development practice. His views on the differences between 
the reform of development language (for example, the use of the term ‘beneficiary’ as 
opposed to ‘recipient’) and the reality of what occurs in development practice, is a 
primary example of how the participants in the TDC projects contested the real and 
imagined spaces in international development. It underscores how efforts to reform 
the language used to describe development partnerships, as part of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, has not restructured power relations in development practice. 
This is an issue that also requires further reflection in postcolonial scholarship in order 
to ensure that the critique of development texts, discourse and the changing 
geographies of power, adequately captures the priorities and perspective of the 
‘subaltern’ countries.  
 
Private sector development and the limits to inclusive 
ownership  
Mr K’s description of private sector development as an economic conditionality 
imposed by Northern donors draws specific attention to how the material wealth held 
by development cooperation providers sustains power imbalances and enables them 
to influence the development process of the beneficiary country, in spite of  the 
rhetoric of ‘country ownership’ circulating within policy spaces. His assertion that 
development cooperation providers tend to be inclined to using development projects 
to secure self-interests aligns with views expressed by most of this study’s informants 
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on the RETT and ToH projects, who believed that commercial opportunities were the 
main underlying factors driving Chinese and Malaysian partner’s interest in each 
project: 
I think the Chinese interest in this project was to create a market in Zambia to 
offload surplus technologies from their renewable energy industry. There is a 
lot of attention to African countries right now, so you see this project allowed 
them to introduce their products here easily without them spending a lot of 
money since the funding came from Denmark. We could clearly see that was 
their objective. Nobody is coming here for charity. This is fine as long as we 
can also take care of our interests. (Interview with solar energy centre of 
excellence Project Manager, 30 January 2018) 
 
However, the UNDP Zambia Project Focal Person emphasised that the overall aim of 
the RETT project management team was to create a platform for mutual benefits from 
which Chinese and Zambian engineers and entrepreneurs can develop renewable 
energy technologies and engage in exchanges (Interview, 7 September 2017). The 
Triangle of Hope project had similar objectives and outcomes, such as the signing of 
MoUs for joint ventures and business contracts. Nevertheless, what is most significant 
in the solar energy centre of excellence Project Manager’s statement is the recognition 
that self-interest is a normal part of international relations and they were not passively 
observing these actions. The ToH Project Coordinator expressed a similar opinion 
when discussing how Malaysian businesses secured investment opportunities in 
Zambia and he emphasised that “each country knows what it wants in such 
partnerships” (Interview, 17 January 2018).  
As discussed in Chapter Two, economic cooperation is an integral part of SSC and, as 
a result, development cooperation activities that result in opportunities for investment, 
trade and market access is considered a part of mutually beneficial relations among 
developing countries. Therefore, the commercial opportunities Malaysian and Chinese 
private sector business companies were able to benefit from in the ToH and RETT 
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projects are a normal part of South-South relations. This approach to development 
cooperation initially attracted criticism from Northern cooperation providers for going 
beyond their definition of official development assistance. However, Mawdsley 
(2018) points out that, Northern development cooperation underwent an ideational 
shift in focus from poverty reduction to promoting private sector-led economic growth 
after the 2008-9 global financial crisis, and most countries are now explicitly blending 
development finances with their trade and investment agendas. For example, the 
Danish government’s initial appraisal of the RETT project emphasised the importance 
of ensuring that the project provides a platform for promoting Danish renewable 
energy technologies and expertise, and that the China-Zambia exchange should not 
contribute to a situation where Danish companies lose market shares in Zambia 
(Danida 2014a).  
Mawdsley (2018, p.182) also argues that by adopting this approach and the discursive 
practices of SSC, Northern countries have moved past having only tutelary ambitions 
to embracing some of its elements. The 2018 State of the Union address by the 
European Commission President, which evokes ‘the imaginary of similarities’ in order 
to emphasize that the future of Europe’s relations with Africa should be trade, 
investments and capacity building, is a primary example of how this ‘Southernisation’ 
of international development cooperation has transformed discursive practices: 
To speak of the future, one must speak of Africa – Europe’s twin 
continent…We need to invest more in our relationship with the nations of this 
great and noble continent. And we have to stop seeing this relationship through 
the sole prism of development aid. Such an approach is beyond inadequate, 
humiliatingly so. Africa does not need charity, it needs true and fair 
partnerships. And Europe needs this partnership just as much (Juncker 2018). 
Juncker’s statement on Europe’s dependence on Africa further supports the argument 
that mutuality is an undisputable part of international relations and that the position of 
African countries in the changing geographies of power has clearly been strengthened 
by the rise of the Southern cooperation providers. However, TDC is only pushing 
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beneficiary countries such as Zambia further along the neoliberal trajectory of private 
sector growth, which it was compelled to follow through donor conditionalities, and 
which Northern-led policy forums on TDC are consistently claiming can help generate 
innovative development solutions and enhance sustainable development (see GPEDC 
2016; OECD 2017; UN 2019). For example, one of Japan’s main reasons for 
supporting the ToH project was to play a role, alongside other Northern cooperation 
providers, in assisting Zambia to improve its investment climate as part of the private 
sector development (PSD) reform process that was initiated in 2004 (Shimoda 2012, 
p.132). In addition, one of the RETT project’s main objectives was to reform Zambia’s 
institutional and regulatory frameworks in order to create an environment where the 
private sector can take over the government’s responsibility for producing and 
distributing electricity.33   
It is important to note that the ToH and RETT projects were not based on the 
Washington Consensus model, which favours full deregulation and a reduced role of 
the state. Rather, both projects promoted East Asian models of economic development 
which support limited deregulation to create a conducive environment for private 
sector economic growth while upholding government ownership of development. This 
is the development model the Zambian government has committed to in its Seventh 
National Development Plan 2017-21, where it states it intends to reposition itself as a 
developmental state based on lessons from countries such as South Korea (MNDP 
2017, p.34). This indicates that policy elites in Zambia have reverted to the post-
independence approach of development planning which involved the adoption of 
elements from both Northern and Southern development models, in order to achieve 
their desired vision of industrial modernity. However, increased private sector 
involvement in development can complicate country ownership. On the one hand, 
increased private sector involvement can help to mitigate some of the challenges 
                                                 
33 As part of the PSD agenda, a significant amount of the development cooperation that Zambia has 
received in recent years has been directed to the construction of transport and energy sector 
infrastructure, the adoption of low carbon use technologies and other measures to address climate 
change adaptation. All the projects listed on the Ministry of National Development Planning’s 
website, which includes the RETT project, fall under these themes. MNDP (2019) ‘Projects’, 
accessed 16 September 2019, http://www.mndp.gov.zm/ 
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associated with the state having monopoly power over economic activity, such as 
limited service provision. However, it can also create opportunities for the state to 
magnify its power. As Power and Kirshner (2018, p.504) point out, this is because 
access to electricity extends ‘progress’ to rural households by broadening the range of 
appliances that can be utilised and the economic opportunities that people can engage 
in, which creates the perception that the state is bringing modernity to its citizenry. 
Accordingly, the RETT project’s goal of creating a conducive environment for private 
sector participation in the expansion of electricity infrastructures in Zambia benefits 
the government by enabling it to both close the energy gap between the rural and urban 
areas and consolidate its legitimacy and domestic power.  
The state has the authority to act on behalf of the general citizenry in all activities; 
therefore, government ownership and leadership of development interventions is not 
necessarily a problem as long as it secures the best interests of the people. However, 
rural electrification also empowers the private sector and expands the neoliberal 
agenda of bringing more people into the energy market. Private-sector ownership of 
development can be problematic since it does not have a public mandate nor the 
obligation to ensure that interventions align with local priorities and results in 
sustainable development outcomes. Research has shown the private sector is less 
likely to engage in participatory planning or consider community needs when 
introducing a project. For example, McEwan’s (2017) study of South Africa’s 
renewable energy transitions finds that private sector actors tend to cluster energy 
projects in high-density areas where resources are available and profits can be 
maximised. Similarly, the state’s delegation to the private sector over the expansion 
of electricity infrastructures in rural Zambia has the potential to lead to ‘islands’ of 
progress and to create tensions in rural communities. In addition, various studies have 
found that private sector energy companies rarely engage in community awareness 
initiatives to ensure that potential users understand and support the introduction of new 
technologies or infrastructure (e.g. McEwan 2017).  
In the case, of the RETT project, institutional actors involved in the design of the 
project plan focussed on how they could ensure that there is a sustainable source of 
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energy production in rural areas, but not how the introduction of the small hydropower 
plant at Chipota Falls would affect the everyday life of people in its vicinity. As the 
RETT Project Manager noted, it was more of an afterthought that came up during 
project implementation with a group of social scientists from the Rural Electrification 
Authority (REA) handling community liaison activities (Interview, 22 September 
2017). REA helped the project by sensitizing the local community on the entrance of 
the contractor in the community, labour issues related to how not everyone would be 
employed, to where the transmission line will pass, the need to add electric wiring to 
their housing units and the productive uses of electricity. However, the likelihood of 
a purely private sector-led hydropower project adopting this approach to community 
engagement is low.  
These challenges will only be further complicated by the fact that TDC initiatives such 
as the RETT project promote the involvement of both domestic and international 
private sector energy companies in Zambia’s energy market. As seen in the statement 
below, the politics of energy access is complex and can affect country ownership of 
development interventions, such as the RETT project: 
We have made a lot of attempts to promote biofuels development in Zambia 
but there are a lot of counter forces working against us, including in this 
UNDP-China-Zambia renewable energy technology transfer project you are 
researching. What happened at the beginning of this project is that the 
government advertised a tender for the production of ethanol as part of the 
project. My company put in a bid and won but after 7 months, we heard nothing 
from the ministry. After some time they told us that the project focus had 
changed and biofuels were no longer one of the renewable energies being 
promoted. I approached the Minister of Energy at a workshop to find out what 
really happened and he said “You know how these things are, some other 
things came up”. That is when I knew there was more to the story and decided 
to follow up on the issue with UNDP. Some consultants from UNDP China 
that were here as part of the project told me that the tender had been cancelled 
because they felt that there was no Zambian company component enough to 
153 
 
 
do the work. I threatened to sue them so that they could prove their claims in 
court that my company was not component enough to do the work. That is 
when they backed off and gave me 50% of what I would have received for the 
contract. I later found out that the whole problem was caused by different 
interests being at play. Some local politicians had wanted energy companies 
that they were aligned with to win the contracts [in the RETT project]. 
However, these companies were late in submitting their bids and the 
procurement officer’s in charge of the tender did not want to be accused of 
engaging in corrupt practices so they rejected their bids. Then instead of 
proceeding with the project, the ministry decided to cancel our contract. UNDP 
China also had its own interest in influencing which renewable energies were 
to be promoted as part of the project. It seems the Chinese wanted to get the 
tenders for solar energy technologies. (Interview with Mr F, Renewable energy 
Specialist, 18 January 2018) 
 
This statement demonstrates that diverging stakeholder interests complicate 
arguments for multi-stakeholder TDC partnerships. The selection of the most 
appropriate intervention to tackle the energy gap in the RETT project was negatively 
affected by senior policymakers and politicians involved in its negotiation and design, 
whose decision-making is alleged by Mr F, to have been based on opportunities for 
personal enrichment. The commercial interests of the development cooperation 
provider are also considered to have been an influential factor in the final selection of 
renewable energy solutions for the RETT project. This demonstrates that the 
introduction of a TDC intervention is not based solely on its suitability to the local 
context. It also supports this thesis’s overall argument that TDC is not only a modality 
aimed at supporting capacity development and technology transfer in the beneficiary 
country, but is also about strategic partnerships that can help secure national interests. 
Nevertheless, a key take away from the controversial ProSavana project in 
Mozambique is that even though policymakers and development cooperation 
providers may consider private sector involvement important for socio-economic 
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progress, civil society and local communities have different views on what constitutes 
progress or improved well-being (Chichava et al. 2013; Shankland and Goncalves 
2016). It is, therefore, important to reflect on the political economies of development 
cooperation and the validity of policy discourses that suggest private sector 
involvement in TDC can enhance inclusive national ownership of interventions and 
sustainable development.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that politics is at the heart of TDC even though policy spaces 
tend to downplay the geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions underlying technical 
cooperation. It has shown that country ownership and the effectiveness of TDC 
initiatives are highly influenced by domestic and international political concerns of 
the development cooperation provider and beneficiary country. Global image building 
and expanding soft power influence are the primary drivers for development 
cooperation providers such as Japan, Malaysia, Denmark and China to engage in TDC 
projects in Zambia. China’s rise as an economic and political superpower particularly 
stood out in both the ToH and RETT projects and reflects the logics and dynamics of 
TDC. Northern countries such as Denmark are attempting to use TDC to sensitise 
Southern cooperation providers such as China to deliver their development 
programmes within the Western political, economic, legal and epistemic frameworks. 
It can be argued that these actions reflect Northern cooperation provider’s efforts to 
manage the dewesternization of development thinking that emerging powers such as 
China have accelerated in the global South. Denmark is also supporting South-
South/trilateral development cooperation in order to maintain its relevance and 
influence in the global development architecture and to access the many benefits that 
are associated with being a donor country. Japan shares this motive. However, it is 
also using TDC to promote its model of industrial modernity and to compete with 
China for leadership in facilitating the transfer of policy experiences from East Asia 
to African countries. However, China is primarily using TDC to improve its image 
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and to counter narratives about its ‘predatory’ development cooperation and global 
strategy.  
Africa’s role as a strategically important development partner is rising in the midst of 
this global power struggle over economic spaces, political spaces and the sources of 
knowledge production. However, there is a risk that African beneficiary partners will 
have difficulty in strategically leveraging their negotiating positions in future TDC 
initiatives if Denmark and other Northern cooperation providers are successful in their 
efforts to socialise China into adopting their best practice. Nevertheless, this chapter 
has shown that the agency of the subaltern in geopolitical spaces is not only 
demonstrated through resistance. The Zambian government has used strategies such 
as upholding its recognition of the ‘One China’ policy and even co-signing China’s 
strategy of controlling narratives on its development cooperation in order to sustain 
the easy flow of economic benefits from this relationship. Significantly, Zambia’s 
ability to strategically strengthen its bargaining power in TDC is negatively affected 
by internal politics and diverging interests. The next chapter will build on this 
argument by examining how the changes in the domestic political terrain and 
bureaucracies have affected development planning, institutional memory, and the 
sustainability of development outcomes in the ToH and RETT projects. 
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6 
Learning and Forgetting: Knowledge transfers 
and Sustainability in TDC 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that decolonization is an 
incomplete process in Zambia. This is because the country is still attempting to use 
technical cooperation to address its skilled labour and knowledge gaps in the civil 
service and industrial sector, which are the legacies of restrictive colonial education 
and training policies. Zambian policy elites primarily want to use Southern policy 
experiences as cost-effective blueprints to refine longstanding development plans and 
to accelerate industrial modernity. However, knowledge transfers in TDC have the 
potential to constrain country ownership by domesticating global policy experiences 
that do not adequately address Zambia’s political and economic context and/or 
influencing how the country’s most pressing development problems can be solved. 
This chapter makes an important contribution to debates about country ownership by 
demonstrating the ways in which Zambia uses appropriation and hybridization of 
policy experiences to negotiate and contest its development partner’s power to 
intervene in the local development landscape through TDC.  
The chapter also contributes to debates on country ownership through an exploration 
of the factors that have affected the sustainability of development outcomes from TDC 
projects and the wider implications for development effectiveness in Zambia. It 
examines how outcomes related to economic policy reforms are easily reversed or 
erased when changes take place in the domestic political terrain and bureaucratic 
structures. This is because all stakeholders leave responsibility for maintaining the 
skills and knowledge acquired with the beneficiary partner based on the notion of 
country ownership, but Zambia does not have sufficient measures in place to ensure 
that institutional memory is retained.  Subsequently, even though Zambia has obtained 
observable outcomes such as the solar energy centre of excellence from the China-
Zambia renewable energy technology transfer (RETT) project and the development of 
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a master plan for multi-facility economic zones (MFEZs) from the Triangle of Hope 
(ToH) project, the chapter argues that the knowledge transfer process in TDC is flawed 
because Zambia is trapped in a cycle of learning and forgetting, and self-reliance 
remains unattainable. The findings also provide further evidence that that Zambia is 
less disempowered by the geopolitics of TDC and more by internal dynamics. 
 
Knowledge hierarchies and the hybrid nature of development 
planning 
A history of colonial governance and the perpetuation of specific hierarchies and 
inequalities through international development cooperation initially embedded the 
notion that post-colonial Zambia should learn from Northern countries in order to 
attain industrial modernity. Later, the notion that technical cooperation from other 
developing countries could provide context-relevant knowledge to build Zambia’s 
human resource capacity gained ground, following the emergence of dependency 
theory in the late 1960s. Dependency theory also promoted the idea that collaborating 
and learning from the experiences of other developing countries could strengthen 
Zambia’s ability to generate internal development solutions, to delink from its 
dependence on Northern technical expertise and eventually become self-reliant (Shaw 
1976; Chan 1992). There is some resistance to this knower-learner approach to 
development thinking amongst some development practitioners and it has been 
criticised by development scholars (e.g. Crush 1995; Baaz 2005). However, the notion 
of utilising South-South technical cooperation to support local capacity building, 
economic growth and self-reliance is still prominent in the Zambian imaginary of 
development.  
The current structures of TDC are also helping to reinforce the fundamental problems 
associated with positioning the beneficiary country as the learner in development 
partnerships, instead of disabling them. This is because the knowledge, technology 
and finances are still flowing in one direction – from the development cooperation 
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providers to the beneficiary partner. For instance, when I enquired what development 
cooperation providers had learnt from them, most Zambian key stakeholders in the 
ToH project stated that their partners had learnt nothing at all from them, while those 
in the RETT project stated that Chinese institutions learnt how to collaborate with 
African partners and manage cultural differences. Zambian stakeholders did not 
appear to believe that their development partners were superior to them but that they 
were in possession of the technical expertise or resources that they required. They 
explicitly emphasised that their objectives when participating in the ToH and RETT 
projects were not to impart any knowledge to their Malaysian and Chinese partners, 
but to acquire specialist knowledge from them (that is, attracting foreign direct 
investment and developing/maintenance of renewable energy technologies). The fact 
that the development cooperation providers are not learning from the beneficiary 
country in these projects indicates that policy narratives that claim TDC supports 
mutual learning and horizontality are not reflected in development practice and 
outcomes in Zambia.  
Knowledge transfers in TDC are also more complicated than assumed since the ToH 
and RETT projects have enabled China, Malaysia and Japan to promote East Asian 
models of economic development as alternatives to the Washington Consensus model, 
and thereby advance the ‘dewesternization’ of development thinking in Zambia. The 
ToH and RETT projects have also facilitated the domestication of global development 
policies such as the private sector development agenda and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and in doing so, notions of what are the most pressing 
development needs in Zambia. As Chapter Two pointed out, these global policies work 
against country ownership by overlooking the needs and realities of individual 
countries. In addition, these policies perpetuate narratives of success and failure in the 
global South by focusing on economic growth indicators but disregard the conditions 
and activities in developing countries that operate outside the global capitalist 
economic framework (Brooks 2017). For this reason, it is important to scrutinise the 
source of development interventions introduced through TDC, especially given that 
the use of policy conditionalities in North-South cooperation took significant control 
of development planning away from beneficiary countries during the Structural 
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Adjustment era. However, there is a real risk of infantilising beneficiary countries if 
we assume that its development cooperation providers have an overwhelming 
influence over their national development planning.  
As Adriana Abdenur (2019) points out, the beneficiary country does not passively 
accept and replicate all policy experiences transferred in South-South technical 
cooperation, instead it uses appropriation and hybridization to manage the introduction 
of external interventions into the local development landscape. Abdenur (2019, p.45) 
specifically draws on the concept of anthropophagy (or cannibalism) as a metaphor 
for explaining how the beneficiary partner exercises agency, consisting of action and 
of reflection, by selectively ingesting and digesting parts of the ‘other’ before 
regurgitating them into something new. The outcome is one of hybridity in which, 
mirroring processes of resistance outlined by Bhabha (2004), the beneficiary country 
contests and negotiates the power of its development partners to transfer their cultural 
practices by modifying these practices to suit local needs or contexts. Similarly, 
Zambian stakeholders in the ToH project selectively ‘devoured’ and regurgitated 
policy experiences from their Malaysian partners:  
In the ToH Action Plans, there were suggestions on how to encourage small 
and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development based on the Malaysian 
experience but it did not match the local context. For example, Malaysia has 
more job opportunities than the population of its skilled labour force, but 
Zambia has high unemployment and a shortage of skilled labour in some 
sectors. As a result, we found that most of the recommendations that the 
Malaysian consultant provided based on his country context in this sector were 
not suitable for Zambia, so we did not implement them. However, Malaysia’s 
development experience was a good model for Zambia to learn from more 
generally because it still faces some of the challenges found in developing 
countries like ours. (Interview with ToH Project Coordinator, 17 January 2018) 
Mr K from the ToH Banking and Finance taskforce corroborated the above statement 
from the ToH Project Coordinator and clarified that the Zambian government was still 
160 
 
 
able to draw on knowledge gained from the Malaysian experience to come up with 
alternative policy reforms to encourage SME development after the ToH project had 
ended (Interview, 28 February 2018). Another sign of beneficiary agency is that an 
external proposal for TDC is more likely to be ‘ingested’ in Zambia if it aligns with 
local views on how development problems can be addressed, such as how the 
promotion of solar energy technologies in the RETT project aligned with plans for 
rural electrification. In addition, evidence from the RETT project indicate that 
beneficiary partners only accept technical training and policy recommendations that 
they feel align with local plans or needs: 
The project plan did not prescribe the type of technological and institutional 
capacity building that should be undertaken in the project, so this opened up 
space for us to work out what we want. Each partner had different views on 
capacity building. The Danish Programme Manager at UNDP China had a 
different perspective on the type of training that we needed and even our 
Chinese partners had their own views. However, we also prescribed what we 
wanted to get out of the training. For example, last year when we sent people 
to China for solar and small hydropower training, we sent a write-up of the 
kind of training that we wanted them to receive… In these kinds of 
partnerships, you need to understand what is best for each one of you. The 
Chinese can be pushy. Always trying to push their own agenda. Like even 
during the planning for the small hydropower demonstration plant we’ve had 
cases where they feel “we need to do this,” but we also give them the 
perspective from the Zambian side to show them that their dynamics are 
different and ours. For example, our demographics are different. In China, a 
small community can be a million people but when we take the small 
hydropower plant to Serenje district the population size there will only be a 
few hundred, so we need to adjust to the different conditions. The Chinese feel 
that maybe everything including the policies that work there can work here, 
when the truth is that some of them cannot. (Interview with RETT Project 
Manager, 22 September 2017) 
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These are all important examples of how Zambian stakeholders exercised agency and 
negotiated power inequalities. However, as Islam (2012, p. 169) points out, while 
anthropophagy is a useful concept for understanding how actors position themselves 
with regards to an ‘other’, it cannot easily be employed to negotiate contradictions 
within the ‘self.’ Consequently, Zambian bureaucrats who participated in the ToH and 
RETT projects were successful at employing anthropophagy or hybridity to negotiate 
the power that development cooperation providers have to introduce external 
interventions in the local development landscape. However, they were not as 
successful at employing this strategy when negotiating internal power struggles with 
senior policymakers and politicians who have authority to shape national development 
planning and the execution of development projects. The interference of the senior 
leadership has significantly affected the sustainability of development outcomes from 
the Triangle of Hope (ToH) project as changes in the political leadership have resulted 
in the modification of national policies, staff turnover in the civil service and, 
subsequently, loss of institutional memory.  
 
The struggle for sustainable development and self-reliance 
All research informants on the ToH and RETT projects were of the view that the 
beneficiary partner has overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluating project 
activities and for ensuring the sustainability of any development outcomes, based on 
the notion that this is a part of country ownership. However, findings indicate that 
there are limits to which inclusive national ownership of development interventions 
can result in sustainable development in a country such as Zambia, where decision-
making power is highly centralised and politicised.  The politicisation of development 
planning has occurred in Zambia since the Kenneth Kaunda presidency (1964-1991). 
This has meant that the president, cabinet ministers and members of the ruling political 
party can interfere in policymaking and negotiations for development projects even 
though specific government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance, have the 
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official mandate to manage national development planning and development 
cooperation. However, a common view amongst informants is that political 
interference in national development planning from senior leadership was not a 
problem during the Levy Mwanawasa administration (2001-2008), which most 
described as the most visionary and productive period in Zambia’s recent history. 
However, key stakeholders on the ToH project attributed the interference of leaders 
that have come to power after President Mwanawasa’s death in 2008 for subsequent 
changes in national policies, high staff turnover in the civil service and the loss of 
institutional memory on the Triangle of Hope: 
Leadership is very important when it comes to policy. If Mwanawasa had not 
died things would have really changed. For real development to occur you need 
a leader like him with an analytical mind and who can take things 
far…President Sata lacked an analytical mind that is why things fell apart. The 
proposals and recommendations developed from the Triangle of Hope were 
good and well planned. Like the ToH Action Plan to develop a health 
diagnostics centre, that could treat both local people and health tourists from 
neighbouring countries. That was a very good document but the problem is it 
just wasn’t implemented. It is now probably gathering dust on some shelf 
somewhere at the Ministry of Health. (Interview with Mr I, ToH Health 
taskforce member, 13 February 2018) 
I have always said that things would have really changed in Zambia if we 
didn’t lose Levy Mwanawasa as President. He had a vision and passion for 
change and even aggressively sought it…. There has always been a lack of 
continuity in development planning with every change in government ever 
since the Kaunda-Chiluba transition in 1991. Each leader has dropped policies 
or programmes that the previous administration worked on, even the good 
ones! Rupiah Banda had his own ideas on how things should be done in the 
ToH project when he became president. Then President Sata also made 
changes. Each of these leaders has also brought changes to the cabinet and 
government ministries. There is a need for strong institutions but what we have 
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are strong men and when they go everything falls apart. You can see that they 
have strong institutions in the United States and that is why President Trump 
cannot just do whatever he wants. There are strong checks and balances. The 
institutions remain strong even though there is a change in leadership. 
(Interview with the JICA Programme Officer, 5 February 2018)  
 
The challenges that a change in political leadership create in sustaining development 
outcomes are not unique to Zambia. Nordtveit’s (2009) study of World Bank-funded 
literacy projects in Senegal, also found that development interventions can only stand 
the test of time if there is stable political leadership. This argument was based on 
findings that indicated that the passion of Senegal’s delegate cabinet minister for 
literacy had a positive impact on civil service morale and the implementation of 
development projects in the 1990s. However, the minister’s departure from this post 
in addition to staff turnover and widespread political instability led to the decay of 
institutional memory and national literacy levels (Nordtveit 2009, pp.29-32). In the 
case of Zambia, studies such as Hinfelaar and Sichone (2019) support key stakeholder 
arguments that the implementation of the ToH Action Plans have been negatively 
affected by the inconsistent and repeated policy changes successive leaders have made 
since 2012. Extensive executive interference in policymaking, negotiations for 
development projects and foreign investment agreements in the infrastructure and 
energy sectors, has particularly worked against the ToH Action Plans that eased the 
cost of doing business and improved the investment climate. For example, the JICA 
Programme Officer pointed out that ZDA has introduced a paid membership scheme 
for registered businesses in order to raise extra revenue, but this has increased 
operating costs for businesses because they have to pay a similar membership fee to 
the local chamber of commerce (Interview, 5 February 2018). 
Political patronage rather than merit has become the primary driver of appointments 
in Zambia’s civil service in recent years (Hinfelaar and Sichone 2019). However, there 
are no protection mechanisms to support civil servants whose advice opposes the 
164 
 
 
views of the senior leadership and is not well received. This has led to several civil 
servants being forced into early retirement, redundancy or transferred to work in 
remote rural districts. These actions have negatively affected the civil service’s 
capacity to engage in strategic planning and gradually reversed the gains made by the 
ToH project in improving the efficiency of the civil service to manage economic 
development (see Chapter Four). The FDI promotion capacities of the Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI) and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) 
have also been significantly weakened as participants in the Triangle of Hope have 
departed and taken institutional memory with them. An examination of the Seventh 
National Development Plan 2017-21 reveals that the main structural reforms that the 
government has set out to encourage private sector development include: 
Reducing the cost of doing business is key for stimulating growth. The reform 
area will be on streamlining business registration, licensing and granting of 
incentives. Furthermore, the Government will accelerate the implementation 
of measures aimed at improving the general business environment and making 
the country a prime destination for investment and wealth creation. In addition, 
the Government will continue with programmes and reforms aimed at growing 
SMEs. The Government will also provide the requisite incentives to the private 
sector for industrialisation and export diversification (MNDP 2017, p.46) 
The problem is that significant progress was made on addressing all of these issues 
during the ToH project, but they were reversed through reforms instituted by 
successive administrations. The fact the Zambian government is currently reproducing 
its previous strategies indicates a trend in which Zambia keeps learning but then 
forgetting. One of the main reasons it struggles with development amnesia is there are 
not enough measures in place to ensure that the knowledge acquired from technical 
cooperation is disseminated and retained within the relevant institutions in Zambia.  
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Loss of institutional memory 
We need institutional memory to ensure continuity of government programmes 
and to ensure effective and sustainable development. There is also a need for 
reporting so that the government can keep track of project activities. Because 
it is a waste of time and resources for the donor and the recipient country if 
activities are not continued. The government receives a lot of support from its 
different donors but nothing is changing. There are so many cooperating 
partners that supported the Private Sector Development Reform Programme 
(PSDRP), which complemented the Triangle of Hope. However, we have 
found that the levels of FDI flowing into Zambia, which was increasing during 
the implementation of the ToH project, have dropped or remained stagnant 
since it ended in 2012 (Interview with the JICA Programme Officer, 5 
February 2018) 
This statement about institutional memory from the JICA Programme Officer points 
to the importance of long-standing arguments about the urgency of ensuring 
knowledge and technology transfers are maintained in the beneficiary country (e.g. 
Matthews 1987). The ToH project generated significant knowledge on how Zambia 
could attract and steer domestic/foreign investment towards stimulating growth and/or 
addressing development needs in diverse socio-economic sectors. However, as 
discussed previously, no official report was produced of the ToH project by any of the 
key implementing institutions in Zambia such as the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI) and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA). In 
addition, bureaucrats who participated in the project at these institutions have either 
retired or transferred to other agencies after the project end date. I also found that 
knowledge on the ToH project at the Zambia Chamber of Commerce Trade and 
Industry (ZACCI), which was the primary private sector representative, has also 
disappeared with staff turnover. Significantly, most of the knowledge and skills that 
Zambia gained during the ToH project has gradually been lost over the last 8 years.  
It is important to note that loss of institutional memory due to staff turnover is a 
common problem in international development cooperation, in government, non-
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governmental and private sector organisations (see Kontinen 2018). Even the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lacks a reputable system to retain the 
knowledge it acquires from development projects, which has affected its ability to 
understand the full extent of South-South/trilateral cooperation and provide support to 
beneficiary countries (Interview with UNOSSC Policy Analyst, 23 October 2018). 
Nevertheless, the costs of an institution failing to retain valuable knowledge can 
sometimes be very high for developing countries. Take, for example, de Holan et al.’s 
(2004, p.47) case study of how the Central Bank of Argentina had to frantically access 
archives and ask former employees to locate knowledge on how to enact strategic 
responses, such as floating currency, when the government ordered it to manage the 
country’s monetary policy in the midst of a severe recession and debt crisis in 2002. 
However, the Central Bank found that it had lost all its knowledge on how to manage 
some specialist areas such as foreign trade and the exchange rate, and this undermined 
Argentina’s ability to overcome its economic crisis.  
In the case of Zambia, staff turnover at key stakeholder institutions involved in the 
ToH project has significantly weakened the country’s ability to attract foreign 
investment and steer it towards its long-term goal of diversifying the economy away 
from a dependence on copper production. This can be seen from how ZDA and MCTI 
asked the Japanese Government to provide Investment Promotion Advisors to assist 
them in specialist areas in which they lacked skills, yet capacity building during the 
Triangle of Hope project had provided former employees at these institutions with the 
same skills (Interview with JICA Programme Officer, 5 February 2018). This indicates 
that even though the Zambian government contributed significant time, financial and 
human resources towards the ToH project and ‘got what it wanted’ in the form 
technical skills and know-how, it did not put in place enough measures to retain these 
skills and knowledge and ensure that it becomes self-reliant. According to JICA, 
Zambia’s failure to sustain the ToH project outcome is the main reason its ex-post 
evaluation categorised the project as unsatisfactory, “although in the report it wrote 
‘partially satisfactory’ as a way of being diplomatic” (Interview with JICA Programme 
Officer, 5 February 2018).  
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The sustainability of the development outcomes obtained from the RETT project are 
also at risk of a similar fate. This is because measures to retain institutional memory 
through report writing and to communicate the RETT project’s overall goals, 
including its links with national development plans and with other government 
agencies, were not put in place in Zambia. Most knowledge on the RETT project 
activities is held by members of the National Steering Committee from UNDP, the 
Ministry of Energy and the University of Zambia, but their colleagues at these key 
stakeholder institutions have little or no knowledge on the project: 
The Head of the department is aware about our activities. We have different 
specialized research groups in the department but we don’t share information 
on our project at meetings. We chat a bit about the project with our colleagues 
when we meet in the corridor, but we don’t concern ourselves with things like 
writing reports (Interview with members of solar energy centre excellence 
PMU, 25 September 2017) 
I think almost everyone in the Ministry of Energy knows about the project 
because my other colleagues also participate in the technical committee for this 
project. We also have a system where quarterly reports and annual reports are 
produced where anyone who wants information on a project can access the file. 
We also have meetings where we present ongoing issues on different projects. 
So in relation to institutional memory, I would say most members of the 
department are privy to what is going and no one can say later they were not 
aware. Although that is not to say everyone is actually involved in the day-to-
day activities of the project. (Interview with Ministry of Energy RETT PMU 
member, 27 February 2018) 
I will be frank my impression after working on this project for only a few 
months is that a lot of knowledge about the project has been lost, specifically 
because of staff turnover in all the project management units….We have found 
that it takes time for new people to learn about the project and to run with it. 
The change in project personnel means that new trust has to be developed. That 
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is why we have been forced to extend the project timeline. Probably one of the 
main challenges I can identify in trilateral partnerships, which is not project 
related but rather country-to-country related, is the need to establish the 
necessary trust between the different institutions which are implementing the 
project. (Interview with UNDP China RETT Programme Manager, 7 
September 2018) 
 
The institutions involved in the RETT project have not only gained knowledge about 
renewable energies but also vital knowledge concerning how Zambia can strategically 
manage South-South/trilateral projects as a beneficiary partner. It is not clear if the 
lack of reporting on development cooperation activities is part of the wider SSC trend 
of securing national sovereignty by ‘controlling the unknown.’ The Zambian 
government’s power to control knowledge about what is happening in the local 
development landscape is similar to how dominant states block narratives to retain 
power in global politics. However, a lack of reporting and poor communication within 
government agencies will compound the loss of institutional knowledge in these areas 
once participating officials depart. This is a challenge which seems already to have 
begun given the UNDP China Programme Manager’s statement above. It is not clear 
if the government will develop a plan to address these challenges in its planned 
revision of the 2007 Zambia Aid and Policy Strategy. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Finance (Mr K) pointed out that 
he felt any strategy to improve Zambia’s role in future TDC projects is constrained by 
the power inequalities that finances create in the relationship between the development 
cooperation provider and the beneficiary partner. He also argued that the main reason 
government agencies tend not to write reports after the end of a project’s lifecycle is 
because they are understaffed: 
I’m not surprised if you say that JICA is the only one who has written reports 
on the Triangle of Hope and there is nothing from the government. OECD 
monitoring and evaluation measures are very time consuming and the 
169 
 
 
transaction costs are too high. However, there is also the issue of us not having 
adequate staff to deal with reporting on development projects. Once a project 
is done we have many other responsibilities to manage. There are also several 
practical issues that affect the sustainability of project activities after 
completion. Most of them are related to practices that started in the 1990s when 
Northern donors started proposing a lot of projects. First, donors tend to 
request that the government seconds some staff from a related ministry to work 
on a project or that a project is embedded in a government agency. The civil 
servants working on the project receive their monthly government salary and 
an allowance for their project work. However, when the project finishes they 
stop getting that allowance so they have no incentive and interest in continuing 
any project-related activities. They just view it as an extra responsibility on top 
of their normal workload. Second, in some other cases, you find that project 
consultants from donor countries receive a higher salary and more allowances 
for comparable work with their Zambian counterparts. This creates low morale 
amongst Zambian officials and a lack of commitment to monitoring, 
evaluation and writing reports on project activities after the official end date 
of the project. (Interview with ToH Banking and Finance taskforce member, 
28 February 2018) 
 
Several studies on the Structural Adjustment era support Mr K’s argument that the 
parallel work systems created by Northern donors affected the efficiency of African 
bureaucracies and the morale of civil servants (e.g. Saasa and Carlsson 1996; 
Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). His claim that these practices continue to affect 
feelings of ownership and the sustainability of outcomes at the institutional scale in 
TDC further underscores the argument here that TDC does not occur in a vacuum but 
is affected by the legacy of past partnerships. However, the JICA Programme Officer 
was of the view that the commitment of some civil servants towards monitoring and 
evaluation of project activities is less about donor actions and more about their 
personal attitude. He emphasised that: 
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There is a need for people to change their mind-set and attitude towards work 
for any trilateral development project to work. Government officials should be 
committed to their work whether there is an opportunity for them to earn extra 
money or not (Interview, 5 February 2018).  
There is no doubt that civil servants should be committed to fulfilling their 
responsibilities without requiring additional financial incentives. However, arguments 
about how they only work when motivated by financial incentives and the need to 
change their attitude towards work can be traced to stereotypes about the inadequacy 
of African people that were embedded in colonial education. As postcolonial debates 
on trusteeship have pointed out, the civilising mission of colonial administrations was 
driven by Orientalist assumptions that people in non-Western societies are lazy, 
unreliable and cannot be trusted to attain progress without guidance (Mercer et al. 
2003; Baaz 2005). It has been observed that many governments, organisations and 
technical experts in the international development sector have mimicked the idea that 
there is a need to enhance the capacity or ‘will to improve’ of people who are 
beneficiaries of their development programmes (Li 2007; Power 2019). This approach 
to development planning was also internalised by Zambia’s post-independence policy 
and intellectual elites. The discourse in the country’s first set of national development 
plans clearly indicates that the Zambian government considers mind-set change a 
necessary measure to improve the population’s capacity to facilitate industrial 
modernity. For example, the Report on Manpower, Education, Training and 
Zambianisation 1965-1966 states,  
Widespread development depends on attitudes and quality education and 
training, as well as the number of persons with a particular type of skill. 
However, a first-rate education and training by itself is not enough in a 
technologically-oriented world, skills become obsolete quickly. Therefore, a 
country’s manpower must be dynamic, continuously enterprising, creative and 
inventive in order to keep pace. A sense of involvement and achievement is 
also necessary. Development means hard work, persistence and initiative as 
well as knowledge. Although not easily measured, these attitudes are as 
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essential as skills. Furthermore, they are something which everyone, of 
whatever level of education or skill, can provide. The task of development is 
to mobilise every person for the fullest efforts which his abilities and 
background make him capable (Cabinet Office 1966, p.vi). 
 
The report goes on to emphasise that the government intended to remedy its people’s 
“attitudes which reflect the values of the colonial and traditional past, and often 
fostered prejudice against technical skills and manual work, rather than emphasising 
the needs of development in an independent Zambia” (Cabinet Office 1966, p.1). 
However, this thesis has demonstrated that failure is not always failure since 
beneficiaries occasionally use inaction or a lack of commitment to project plans, to 
block development interventions that do not match with their vision. Therefore, this 
Cabinet Office statement raises important questions about whether the government 
directed its citizens to adapt to a form of development that conflicts with their values, 
needs and visions of progress or well-being. The answer is far beyond the scope of 
this research. However, the notion that Zambians need to change their mind-set 
towards work is still prominent in development thinking and has even been 
strengthened by its prominence in cultural explanations for the rapid economic 
development of East Asian countries. For example, the Seventh National Development 
Plan 2017-21 uses South Korea’s trajectory to emphasise the fundamental impact that 
a change in people’s mind-set to work can have on a country’s development. It argues 
that Zambians will also have to change their mind-set, “this will include, but not 
limited to, institutional and family values, work culture, self-reliance, partnerships, 
transparency, innovativeness, harnessing of social capital, result-orientation and 
public accountability” (MNDP 2017, p.34).  
In light of such statements, the JICA Programme Officer’s comments on the need for 
civil servants to undergo a change in mind-set towards how they approach work, 
would not be considered particularly controversial in Zambian policy circles. 
However, the ToH Project Coordinator raised an important counterpoint in these 
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debates about civil service efficiency and mind-set change. He argued that the 
Zambian civil service’s capacity to engage in strategic planning has been hampered 
by the transformation of post-independence civil service training institutions such as 
the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) and the President’s Citizenship 
College (PCC) into public tertiary institutions (Interview, 17 January 2018). This is 
the reason that civil service efficiency and capacity building were cornerstones of the 
conceptual framework aimed at re-engineering the management of the national 
economy in the ToH project (see Figure 5). Unfortunately, as this chapter has shown, 
the erosion of political will at the national scale has had a significant impact on the 
civil service’s capacity to ensure the sustainability of development outcomes from the 
ToH project at the institutional scale. This highlights the challenges involved with 
TDC projects that promote government ownership of development and the need to 
take political will and individual attitudes towards work into account in debates on 
beneficiary country ownership. It will be important for future TDC projects to develop 
mitigating measures to these challenges since this research shown they significantly 
hampered Zambia’s ability to secure sustainable development outcomes from the ToH 
project and its objective of developing a skilled labour force that can fill all capacity 
gaps in the civil service and industrial sectors.  
 
Beneficiary recommendations for enhancing TDC 
Despite the diverse challenges found in TDC, this study is committed to not only 
highlighting ‘subaltern voices’ in order to understand their approach to partnership 
and their views on global politics, but also drawing attention to their ideas on how 
different stakeholders can navigate partnerships and enhance the development 
effectiveness of TDC. Many of the recommendations put forward by key stakeholders 
in the ToH and RETT projects concentrate on the technical aspects of a trilateral 
partnership. For example, the ToH Project Coordinator and the ToH Banking and 
Finance taskforce member (Mr K) emphasised the importance of using the beneficiary 
country’s financial systems to channel project funds instead of donor systems. They 
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both contended that this would help to reduce the sense of donor paternalism and 
encourage feelings of ownership over TDC projects amongst stakeholders in the 
beneficiary country. In addition, the solar centre of excellence Project Manager 
suggested that academic and technical institutions involved in TDC should take 
planning meetings more seriously. He cautioned that his team lost out on an 
opportunity to ensure their centre was allocated a sufficient portion of the RETT 
project budget by missing project planning meetings. 
Key stakeholders on the ToH and RETT projects also had several suggestions on how 
partner countries can manage the power relations and politics in TDC. Most significant 
is the idea that promoting self-interests is a function of development cooperation and, 
therefore, the beneficiary partner must have a strategy for ensuring it can secure its 
desired objectives from TDC. 
One thing I can say about these kinds of projects like the Triangle of Hope is 
that donors do not want the aid and trade relationship with developing 
countries to change at the end of it. Therefore, even though the ToH project’s 
overall objective was to improve the trade and investment climate in the 
country, I would say the donors [Japan and Malaysia] aim was not to stimulate 
real development in Zambia to the extent that it could change the trade and aid 
relationship. If we are importing a lot from them, then they would still want it 
to remain that way at the end of the project. That is why I said we need to know 
what we want when negotiating for and planning development projects, and 
we must also have an idea of what our cooperating partner wants. You know 
their inner or ulterior motive for proposing the project. That way, if it is not 
good for us than we can go to another country. Because there is no shortage of 
cooperating partners nowadays. (Interview with the ToH Project Coordinator, 
17 January 2018) 
In line with this argument, stakeholders in the RETT project emphasised the 
importance of a beneficiary partner being assertive when dealing with influential 
Southern cooperation providers such as China. This is because they felt their Chinese 
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partners were trying to push their own agenda and interests. The solar centre of 
excellence Project Manager pointed to a nearby building to emphasise his argument 
that China is not providing development cooperation to Zambia purely for charity but 
with the additional motive of increasing its soft power influence: 
You can see the Chinese influence outside there at the Confucius Centre. Every 
time you come into University of Zambia through the main entrance it’s the 
first thing you see, which doesn’t always make me happy. I mean they are good 
at construction and fast. But people say it’s almost like they bought their way 
here. Apparently, they invited the Vice-Chancellor to China and gave him an 
award for something, and soon after that, he gave them the approval to build 
the centre. The Chinese are very good at making their presence felt through 
strategic projects. I mean there are so many places on campus that the 
Confucius Centre could have been located, but they put it right in the front.34 
(Interview with solar energy centre of excellence Project Manager, 30 January 
2018) 
 
In addition to these concerns about ulterior motives, stakeholders in the RETT project 
stressed that beneficiary countries should be cautious and responsive to how 
development cooperation providers may attempt to impose their work culture on the 
overall project management: 
I have interacted the most with the Chinese as the RETT Project Manager in 
Zambia. However, I don’t speak Chinese so communication has been a 
challenge. There was a Chinese project manager who had problems with 
                                                 
34 There are widespread concerns China is using Confucius institutes as vehicles for increasing its soft 
power influence and surveillance activities. However, Confucius institutes have also become a key 
source of knowledge on East Asian culture for African countries. See Einashe, I. (2018) ‘How 
Mandarin is conquering Africa via Confucius Institutes and giving China a soft-power advantage,’ 
South China Morning Post, 16 May 2018, available: 
https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/2146368/how-mandarin-conquering-africa-confucius-
institutes-and-giving-china-soft. 
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speaking English but she has left now. There are two seniors officials who have 
always worked on the project and two young women have joined them who 
are able to speak English quite fluently. So things are a bit easier but 
communication is still a challenge when it comes to issues such as poor internet 
connectivity when using Skype to have meetings. The Chinese also have a 
different culture and way of doing things. They like to keep things to 
themselves and then on short notice they start telling you that they want certain 
things to be done. So we’ve spent a lot of time managing the communication 
part of this project, especially since there is a similar South-South renewable 
energy technology project taking place in Ghana. We try to have meetings 
together as Zambia, China, Ghana and UNDP. (Interview with the RETT 
Project Manager, 22 September 2017) 
This suggests that a strategy to manage cultural differences between the different 
institutions participating in TDC should be established at the beginning of every 
project. The importance of investing time in establishing trust, communication and a 
common understanding amongst project partners were also reiterated by RETT project 
partners from UNDP China and Denmark: 
The coordination aspect has been a very time consuming thing around these 
trilateral projects. It requires a lot of patience especially when things are not 
going the way that they should. You can kind of expect that when you have 
three countries all with different political interests and when the projects are 
being implemented at the national level by different government ministries, 
with three very different cultures. I think the cultural aspect is very important 
in TDC. This project has dealt with three countries [China, Zambia and Ghana] 
that have a very limited understanding of each other’s culture, ways of working 
and engaging. For instance, China is very keen on doing things the Chinese 
way and when they travel abroad, that does not always resonate very well with 
the other countries and vice versa. In a way that is a normal part of managing 
a development project. However, for this project, the amount of time spent on 
making people talk and actually trying to make people do what they were asked 
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to do, has been quite a challenge. (Interview with UNDP China Programme 
Manager, 7 September 2018) 
It is very important that all the partners involved agree on the terms and 
conditions of a project, including co-creation of the project, cost-sharing, 
criteria for success, clear implementation plans and outcomes, standards, 
responsibilities, joint monitoring and evaluation. A common and agreed 
understanding of these factors will facilitate a strengthened ownership by all 
involved parties. It is also important to map out the needs and wishes of the 
recipient countries as well as considering the overall donor/project landscape 
so that activities complement rather than overlap. (Email communication with 
Danida Advisor, 9 December 2018) 
 
The importance of critical planning skills and civil service efficiency in the beneficiary 
country are additional issues that stand out, with regards to enhancing ownership of 
TDC. As mentioned earlier, the ToH Project Coordinator suggested that beneficiary 
partner must make an effort to understand the underlying motives of their development 
cooperation providers and then craft a strategy for negotiating and planning TDC 
projects. In recent years, policymakers have also begun to call for greater introspection 
on how Zambia can benefit from its development partnerships, especially those 
involving China. A junior parliamentarian recently emphasised that “We need to 
understand what we are not doing right so that we can make sure that our dealings, 
especially with China, are ringing the necessary dividends that will trickle-down to 
the Zambian people” (Kalito 2018). This aligns with ongoing debates on African 
agency and its shifting dependency from Western countries to East Asia (e.g. Agbebi 
and Virtanen 2017). However, another insightful argument on the role of TDC, and 
development cooperation more generally, in Zambia’s development landscape was 
expressed by the ToH Project Coordinator:  
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We do not actually need donor funds for projects like this, and the truth is that 
we already have most of the necessary skills and the plans to implement them. 
We just need to manage our resources properly. (Interview, 17 January 2018) 
This is a line of thinking that has gained prominence in several African countries since 
2005, after debt relief and increased income from commodity exports increased the 
space for governments to take control of national policymaking. It especially gained 
traction amongst Zambian intellectual and policy elites after Damibisa Moyo 
published her renowned thesis Dead Aid. Moyo (2009) argued for African countries 
to concentrate on mobilising finances from trade and investments to achieve their 
national development plans, and to reduce their reliance on foreign aid, which she 
suggested diminishes government accountability and fuels financial mismanagement. 
However, JICA’s Programme Officer was less optimistic about the possibility of 
change in Zambia as long as a lack of political will from senior government leaders 
and weak institutional memory continue to hamper civil service efficiency and the 
suitability of development outcomes. His advice to other donors contemplating the 
idea of engaging in TDC projects in Zambia is blunt: 
To donors, I would say: do you really want to support a government that is not 
committed to real change? Any donor that embarks on a development project 
here should be prepared to find that the outcomes will not be sustained after a 
project is completed. So they should ask themselves whether it is worth even 
providing support in the first place. (Interview, 5 February 2018) 
 
In spite of this gloomy outlook on partnerships, the notion that Zambia has sufficient 
resources, and does not really need assistance from its development cooperation 
providers, also suggests that the disinterest and inaction exhibited by some bureaucrats 
in TDC projects is not only an attempt for them to block and control the development 
interventions introduced in the country, but a sign of their ambivalence. On the one 
hand, they recognise that the country has challenges that hamper its effort to reduce 
poverty and achieve its vision of industrial modernity, such as weaknesses in its human 
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and institutional capacity, and therefore it needs development cooperation. On the 
other hand, they recognise that some development projects can be financed with 
domestic resources. This makes them less concerned about the potential losses 
incurred from a donor-funded project failing or project outcomes not being sustained 
through their inaction because they can self-finance alternative projects or negotiate 
for support from the diverse pool of development cooperation providers available. 
What is left to be seen is if they can transform the increased space to exercise agency 
and to control the introduction of development interventions into strategies that ensure 
sustainable development and improved well-being for the citizens of their country. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that institutional actors in the beneficiary country 
engage in a form of anthropophagy (cannibalism) or the hybridization of policy 
experiences to control the development cooperation provider’s power to introduce 
external development interventions through TDC. However, they are not as successful 
at employing these strategies when contesting and negotiating internal power struggles 
with senior policymakers and politicians, who have the authority to interfere in 
development planning and civil service appointments. More specifically, development 
outcomes gained from the ToH project have not been sustained due to frequent 
changes in the senior political leadership and corresponding changes made to national 
policies and civil service personnel. These challenges also threaten the sustainability 
of development outcomes from the RETT project, given that measures to retain 
institutional memory are not prioritised. Consequently, any knowledge gained from 
South-South/trilateral development cooperation in Zambia is gradually erased and 
long-term capacity development and self-reliance are not being achieved.  
Despite the prominence of ‘equality’ and ‘mutual respect’ in policy discourses on 
TDC, the chapter has demonstrated that postcolonial debates on trusteeship and the 
inadequacy of African peoples are still relevant for the study of TDC. Some key 
stakeholders on the ToH and RETT projects focussed on ‘getting what they wanted’ 
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out of each intervention and did not prioritise monitoring and sustaining the project 
outcomes in the long-term. This led, some of Zambia’s development partners to 
suggest that there is a need for a significant change of mind-set and desire for change 
at all levels of the beneficiary government. This argument is also prominent in current 
and past national development plans dating back to Zambia’s independence in 1964, 
which indicates that echoes of its colonial past are still resonating in the present. 
Significantly, the research has also found that Zambian stakeholders are not passively 
observing these challenges, but also have diverse suggestions for how the development 
effectiveness of TDC can be improved. This underscores the benefits of listening to 
‘subaltern’ voices in order to understand both their approach to international 
development cooperation and their ideas on how global challenges can be resolved. 
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7 
Conclusions 
The research informing this thesis set out to provide an empirically rich and 
theoretically informed analysis of a beneficiary country’s perspective on how the 
politics of partnership affects country ownership of trilateral development cooperation 
(TDC). To achieve this objective it employed an institutional ethnography, based on 
key stakeholder interviews and archival analysis, to capture the beneficiary 
perspective of country ownership and partnerships. It also engaged with postcolonial 
perspectives on power, agency and knowledge production to demonstrate the 
significance of opening up to alternative explanations on TDC from beneficiary 
countries who are ‘subaltern’ in geopolitics. A postcolonial lens also enabled a deeper 
understanding of how power and agency operate in the production and dissemination 
of development knowledge. The research focused on scrutinising three of the 
dominant narratives used to promote TDC in development texts and policy spaces such 
as the United Nations BAPA+40 or the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation (GPEDC) (see OECD 2017; UNDP 2017a; UN 2019). The first narrative 
presents TDC as a ‘win-win’ modality that supports country ownership and equality 
between all partners. The second credits the low levels of beneficiary country 
ownership that have been observed in some TDC projects (in terms of leadership over 
the design, implementation and evaluation) to weaknesses in the beneficiary’s human 
and institutional capacity. The third narrative presents TDC as a modality that 
enhances development effectiveness and efforts to achieve sustainable development.  
Research into TDC projects in Zambia has demonstrated that these policy narratives 
do not accurately reflect the reality of development practice nor that there are many 
ways of understanding country ownership. Policy narratives tend to focus on the 
technical aspects of TDC and neutralise its political dimension. However, this thesis 
has shown that beneficiary ownership is significantly influenced by power 
inequalities, changes in political leadership, conflicting stakeholder interests within 
the beneficiary country and in its relationship with the development cooperation 
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provider. This chapter reviews and synthesizes the overall research findings to argue 
that the beneficiary country can achieve effective development outcomes (that is, real 
and observable) from TDC initiatives, despite the complex politics of partnership. 
However, Zambia’s ability to ensure the sustainability of these development outcomes 
is hindered to a large extent by its internal dynamics rather than the geopolitics of 
development. This chapter also examines the wider implications of these research 
findings on the changing geographies of global power and development. 
 
Country ownership and the politics of partnership 
One of the main objectives of the research was to provide a deeper understanding of 
the nature of partnerships developed through trilateral development cooperation. This 
thesis utilises theoretical concepts derived from postcolonial theory to offer critical 
insight into the machinations of power within TDC, their linkages to the production 
and dissemination of development knowledge, and the significance of a more nuanced 
understanding of the exercise of beneficiary agency within the partnerships. The 
research suggests that there is enough evidence to support claims that TDC expands 
the space for the beneficiary partner to exercise leadership over the design, 
implementation and evaluation of development interventions, which is the definition 
of country ownership in global policy frameworks. Perceptions of country ownership 
in effective development cooperation frameworks also place considerable emphasis 
on the question of which partner voices the development concern and recommend that 
development interventions are most effective when the beneficiary partner initiates 
them. A comparison of experiences in the internally driven Triangle of Hope (ToH) 
project and the donor-driven China-Zambia renewable energy technology transfer 
(RETT) project suggests that the beneficiary partner shows more interest and is more 
active in TDC initiatives that are driven by its own demands.  
Institutional ethnography (IE) also reveals that the institutional actors involved in the 
implementation of TDC in Zambia perceive and operationalise country ownership in 
a different manner. Specifically, some actors tend to limit their focus to ‘getting what 
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they want’ from a development intervention such as development knowledge or 
technologies. In the case of the ToH project, the desired goal was to secure knowledge 
about foreign investment promotion and economic diversification, while the objective 
in the RETT project was to secure expertise on the construction and maintenance of 
solar energy and small hydropower technologies. These actions are part of the diverse 
strategies bureaucrats developed and institutionalised in response to the hierarchal 
power relations between Zambia and its Northern development cooperation providers. 
These unequal power relations are rooted in the country’s history of having undergone 
colonial governance and donor dominance during the 1980s and 1990s when it was 
significantly dependent on foreign aid. Northern donors extensively interfered in the 
Zambian development landscape by using the withdrawal and release of development 
cooperation as a disciplinary tool to influence national policymaking, especially the 
uptake of neoliberal economic reform and good governance. Northern donors also 
assigned their technical experts to lead development projects anchored in government 
departments or implemented as standalone projects, which contributed to weakening 
the civil service’s efficiency and country ownership of development.  
Chapter Two argues that the paternalism in Northern development cooperation is 
rooted in the colonial practice of trusteeship, which promotes the notion that people in 
the global South are incapable of managing their development and so there is a need 
to supervise and enhance their capacity for progress. This paternalistic approach to 
development cooperation has made self-determination, non-conditionality and self-
reliance central concepts in post-colonial developing countries perspectives of country 
ownership. Dependency theory was particularly influential in convincing Zambian 
political and intellectual elites that the country can realise its desired vision of 
industrial modernity only if it breaks its economic and intellectual dependence on 
foreign countries and becomes self-reliant. In the past, this dependence was 
specifically on Northern countries due to the structural inequality that colonialism 
created in the national economy, such as its reliance on copper production, skilled 
labour shortages, and its inadequate transport and energy infrastructure. Therefore, 
like many other newly independent developing countries, Zambia engaged in South-
South cooperation (SSC) in order to address these structural inequalities. Over the last 
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15 years, SSC from countries such as China, India and Saudi Arabia has become a 
significant source of support that has emboldened the Zambian government to 
denounce and gradually delink from ‘the coloniality of power’ that enabled its 
Northern partners to influence national policymaking. Tensions in the relationship 
between Zambia and its Northern partners reached a high point in 2011 such that 
several countries, including Denmark, phased out their bilateral development 
cooperation activities. 
The rapid economic growth experienced in Zambia’s Southern allies has also 
presented the country with an alternative to the British model of industrial modernity, 
which it has struggled to emulate since it attained independence. The Zambian 
government has developed a particular interest in replicating some of the policy 
experiences of East Asian countries. Consequently, although as Chapter Three has 
shown, Zambian bureaucrats perceive global policy discourses on South-
South/trilateral cooperation to be an imaginary, they still participate in these 
modalities to access knowledge on the unique policies, programmes and technologies 
that have contributed to the economic development of East Asian countries. Key 
stakeholders in the ToH and RETT projects specifically emphasise that they want to 
‘learn’ from their Malaysian and Chinese partners. They also point out that their 
overall goal is to use these projects to build local capacity in specialised areas (foreign 
investment promotion and renewable energy technologies) and subsequently reduce 
their dependence on foreign technical expertise to support operations in these areas.  
Drawing on Walter Mignolo's (2012) concept of ‘dewesternization’, this thesis argues 
that Zambia’s interest in East Asian models of economic development is a sign of the 
‘dewesternization’ of development thinking that emerging powers have accelerated in 
the global South. It contends that Mignolo’s arguments about how some Northern 
governments are making efforts to re-establish the legitimacy of Western knowledge 
systems can be seen through Denmark’s underlying interest in the RETT project. 
Chapter Five demonstrates that Denmark used the RETT project as a vehicle to 
transfer its best practice on delivering development cooperation to China. This is part 
of its wider strategy to ensure that it becomes a much sought after intermediary in 
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South-South knowledge exchanges and, through these means, maintain its relevancy 
in the global development architecture (Danida 2012). Similarly, key stakeholders in 
the ToH project observed that Japan’s underlying interest in supporting the project 
was to maintain its reputation as one of Africa’s most important development 
cooperation providers. In the face of intense competition from China, this makes TDC 
an important vehicle for Japan to build its soft power influence and retain its status as 
a global power. Japan’s promotion of Malaysia’s development experiences in the ToH 
project also aligns with its approach of using TDC more generally to advance East 
Asian models of economic development. Despite their rivalry over leadership in the 
global development architecture, Japan and China both have an interest in establishing 
their individual models of East Asian industrial modernity as their beneficiary 
partners’ preferred alternative to the Washington Consensus model. However, China 
is also using TDC to signal that it is capable of learning from and collaborating with 
Northern countries, to build its image as a responsible global actor and to counter 
narratives that suggest its development cooperation is predatory.  
This brings us to the second research objective aimed at understanding the extent to 
which the politics of partnership supports or undermines beneficiary country 
ownership of trilateral development projects. Apart from the image building and soft 
power interests mentioned above, commercial opportunities are also a key driver of 
TDC. As discussed in Chapter Five, key stakeholders in the ToH and RETT projects 
assert that their Chinese and Malaysian partners’ underlying interest in each project 
was to create a market for their domestic industries in Zambia. These goals align with 
the SSC approach of ensuring that any form of cooperation results in mutually 
beneficial relations. This includes enabling a development cooperation provider to 
obtain market access, trade and investment opportunities for their domestic industries. 
This approach to development cooperation initially attracted criticism from Northern 
cooperation providers who argued for altruism, but many have now adopted it and are 
explicitly blending development finances with their trade and investment agendas. 
This includes to a lesser degree Japan and Denmark in the ToH and RETT projects, 
respectively. However, both projects were also primarily aimed at promoting private 
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sector development in Zambia – a development agenda the country initially adopted 
as a policy condition from its Northern cooperation providers almost 20 years ago. 
The promotion of the private sector development (PSD) agenda and Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) by Zambia’s development cooperation providers in the 
ToH and RETT projects constrained, to some extent, country ownership. This is 
because these global policy frameworks promote external ideas of what the most 
pressing development needs are and strategies/targets for how the country can address 
these needs (such as economic diversification and closing the gap in energy access). 
However, this research makes important contributions to the debates on beneficiary 
agency by demonstrating that the Zambian government does not engage in a blind 
acceptance of every donor proposal for TDC projects, but instead only supports the 
interventions that align with its views on how its development priorities can be 
addressed. This includes, for example, the promotion of solar energy technologies to 
address rural electrification in the RETT project. The Zambian government also 
asserts its sovereignty over the local development landscape through explicit acts of 
resistance and silent strategies, such as unenthused participation in aid negotiations 
and project planning or non-implementation of agreed recommendations. 
Consequently, when it comes to understanding beneficiary agency, lack of action is 
not always a sign of capacity weaknesses or inadequacy, but is sometimes an active 
strategy to block the introduction of external development interventions that do not 
match the beneficiary country’s vision. Chapter Six has shown that the concepts of 
anthropophagy (cannibalism) and hybridisation also provide critical insight into how 
beneficiary agency in the ToH and RETT projects involved reflection and action 
through the selective ingestion, digestion and appropriation of policy 
recommendations on East Asian models of economic development. 
Zambia’s participation in TDC is also shaped by its foreign policy concerns. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, Zambian stakeholders have taken several measures to 
protect the country’s diplomatic relations with China and to sustain the easy flow of 
development cooperation and economic benefits from this relationship. These 
strategies include supporting the ‘One China’ Policy and hiding negative stories on 
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the China-Zambia relationship in order to support China’s strategy of blocking 
negative narratives on its development cooperation to African countries. China’s 
economic relationship with Zambia has been strengthened to the point that is now 
another hegemonic force of power and influence in its development landscape. This 
has the potential to work against the SSC objectives of ensuring that developing 
countries have autonomy over their economies and are not dependent on a foreign 
entity. However, Zambia’s ability to strategically improve its bargaining power in 
TDC is constrained more by its domestic politics and diverging interests amongst local 
stakeholders rather than by the geopolitics of development. For example, some 
politicians interfered in the selection of the companies to be awarded contracts in the 
RETT project, which resulted in legal issues, a budget shortfall and a change in the 
type of renewable energy technologies to be promoted (that is from biofuels to solar 
energy technologies). 
These findings have several implications for development effectiveness in Zambia. 
This thesis has shown that public institutions tend to be the main stakeholders in TDC 
and, as a result, Zambia’s ability to ensure that development outcomes stand the test 
of time, is severely challenged by the politicization and centralisation of development 
planning. At the institutional scale, one of the main reasons for this is that the top-
down structure of project management generates high levels of ownership amongst 
steering committee members, but undermines feelings of ownership amongst other 
stakeholders (e.g. participants from line ministries, academic institutions and the 
private sector). In the case of the ToH project, this resulted in line ministry officials 
losing interest in the monitoring and evaluation of the 12 ToH Action Plans once the 
project had ended. Chapter Six also highlights that Zambian bureaucrats generally tend 
to have weakened feelings of ownership and less commitment to monitoring and 
reporting of donor-funded development interventions, largely as an institutionalised 
response to the dominance of Northern donors in the 1990s. This includes the donor 
approach of creating parallel work systems by anchoring development projects in the 
civil service or implementing them as standalone projects. This is further evidence that 
TDC does not occur in a vacuum, but is affected by the legacy of past partnerships. 
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The lack of internal reporting on project activities also has a serious bearing on the 
sustainability of development outcomes from TDC since there are insufficient 
measures in place to retain institutional memory when personnel retire or leave public 
institutions in Zambia. At present, most bureaucrats at the main institutions involved 
in the ToH project have little or no knowledge of the 12 ToH Action Plans and the 
outcomes of the project. The ToH Action Plans have now been shelved, even though 
significant time and country finances were spent developing them. This study also 
finds that the sustainability of development outcomes from TDC in Zambia is hindered 
by changes in the senior political leadership and bureaucratic structures. The president 
and cabinet ministers tend to interfere in development projects and policymaking 
which is a factor that has contributed to the reversal of development outcomes from 
the ToH project, particularly its economic policy reforms. Executive interference in 
civil service appointments has also led to high staff turnover and the loss of 
institutional memory gained on foreign investment promotion. The irony is that the 
Zambian government has recently asked Japan to provide it with technical assistance 
in the areas of foreign investment promotion in which the ToH project had previously 
managed to build local capacity.  
Development outcomes from the RETT project are at risk of a similar fate. 
Consequently, it could be argued that knowledge is gained, then forgotten and Zambia 
is not able to achieve its overall goal of building (long-term) local capacity and 
attaining self-reliance. Sustainable development is a prominent narrative in policy 
spaces on effective development cooperation. However, the above examples of 
dysfunctional knowledge acquisition and retention also challenge claims that TDC can 
help attain the SDG agenda and address the global challenges associated with extreme 
poverty, conflict and environmental degradation in fragile and low-income developing 
countries. The research findings also present several lessons on the role of TDC in the 
changing geographies of power and development.  
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The changing geographies of global power and development  
This research has shown that TDC is not only a modality aimed at supporting capacity 
development and technology transfer in the beneficiary country, but is also about 
strategic partnerships that can help both the beneficiary and its development 
cooperation providers to secure their institutional, national and global interests. At the 
institutional scale, development practitioners are committed to ensuring that 
development interventions in TDC are efficiently delivered in the beneficiary country. 
At the national/global scale, senior policymakers and politicians view TDC as a 
vehicle for controlling the movement of development knowledge, gaining soft power 
influence, accessing commercial opportunities and enhancing economic growth. This 
raises the question, then as to whether this a sign of the death of development or a sign 
that TDC has always been driven more by political motivations rather than 
development effectiveness. As discussed in Chapter Two, the origins of TDC lie in 
efforts to strengthen the use of Southern knowledge during the 1990s when Northern 
institutions, practices and policies dominated the global development architecture. 
This is in contrast to SSC, which has always been a political tool for developing 
countries to address the socio-economic inequalities that come out of the colonial era 
and to assert their sovereignty in global governance structures. However, TDC has 
also become a space for observing how the traditional Northern powers and emerging 
Southern powers are competing for influence over the global economy, governance 
structures and the sources of knowledge production.  
As previously discussed, Zambia’s interest in replicating East Asian models of 
industrial modernity in the ToH and RETT projects reflects the ongoing 
dewesternization of development thinking in the global South. The dewesternization 
of development cooperation, in particular, has raised concern amongst some Northern 
governments. Consequently, Northern countries such as Denmark are using TDC to 
convince beneficiary partners such as Zambia and Southern cooperation providers 
such as China, that Western political, economic, regulatory and epistemic values and 
standards are the best frameworks through which to deliver and receive development 
cooperation. However, TDC is also a space in which to observe how these countries 
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control or block narratives from forming in order to build and or retain their soft power 
influence. As discussed in Chapter Two, the OECD-led international development 
community established the aid effectiveness principles (succeeded by development 
effectiveness) in 2005, to guide how development cooperation should be delivered 
(OECD 2011). China, India and Brazil initially rejected these principles and started to 
create their own standards. These Southern cooperation providers were labelled as 
‘rogue predators’ (Naim 2007), but it was later recognised that they could change these 
narratives and their global image by collaborating and learning from Northern 
cooperation providers through TDC. Denmark’s proposal to collaborate with China in 
the RETT project also demonstrates how, within a decade, many Northern countries 
shifted from contesting Southern cooperation providers to embracing them. In this 
rapidly changing landscape, Japan has also distinguished itself from other 
development cooperation providers by strategically framing past bilateral 
development projects as TDC in its policy texts and framing itself as the all-weather 
friend that African countries can rely on to support horizontal and mutual learning. 
However, Japan’s underlying objective is to position itself as the leading facilitator of 
TDC and to maintain its influence in the global development architecture. 
TDC is also a space in which to observe the hybrid nature of development planning. 
In this space, beneficiary countries can learn and emulate the experiences of other 
countries without coercion from their development providers, as was the case with 
neoliberalism through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). At the same time, 
TDC enables Southern countries such as China and Malaysia to ingest and digest 
elements of OECD best practice and thereby improve the effectiveness of their 
development cooperation. Chapter Four has shown that China has institutionalised 
some of the lessons learnt from Denmark in the RETT project and established a South-
South centre for renewable energy technology transfer that is currently promoting its 
model in developing countries such as Ethiopia. More effective Chinese development 
cooperation will help it to mitigate narratives of the Chinese threat in the African 
development landscape, build its network of allies, increase its soft power influence 
to contest the dominance of Northern countries over global governance structures, and 
possibly build a new world order based on its economic development model. Thus, 
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China’s move to cement its economic development model as a preferred alternative 
for developing countries does not accord with the efforts to reform knowledge 
production. As Mignolo (2018) notes, these efforts encompass diverse social actors 
(including activists, academics and journalists) who are working to ensure a 
pluriversal world in which different political, economic and epistemic traditions are 
respected and co-exist.  
Despite this, China’s influence in global development appears to be moving from 
strength to strength. China’s Belt and Road Forum and the United Nations BAPA+40 
conference are considered two of the most significant South-South/trilateral 
development cooperation events to have taken place in 2019 (UNOSSC 2019). 
Remarkably, 36 heads of state prioritised attending the Belt and Road Forum in April 
2019, one-third of whom were from Europe, when compared to the 6 heads of state 
that were present at the United Nations BAPA+40 conference a month earlier (Steiner 
2019; Tiezzi 2019). Of course, China’s global power is not guaranteed to continue to 
rise. Abrupt changes in the domestic political and economic terrain threaten the 
stability of development programmes in countries that provide development 
cooperation, in the same way that they affect the beneficiary country. This can be seen 
from how the 9/11 terror attacks and the 2008–9 global financial crisis completely 
altered the scope and priorities of development cooperation programmes in most 
Northern countries. In addition, Brazil’s rise as one of the most influential providers 
of SSC and as a pivotal partner in TDC has successively declined with every change 
in leadership from Lula da Silva to current President Jair Bolsonaro (Marcondes and 
Mawdsley 2017). The Bolsonaro administration has even indicated that it would like 
Brazil to join the OECD and its plans have received the support of the United States 
government (Verdelio 2020). It is unclear if this signals the demise of SSC as a 
mechanism that promotes ‘the Bandung spirit of decolonization’ and the emergence 
of a multipolar world order in which the North-South division is no longer 
distinguished by geography or a common set of principles (for example, the principles 
of SSC versus aid effectiveness). Nevertheless, these changes have the potential to 
make it more difficult for beneficiary countries to secure their national interests by 
playing Northern and Southern development partners against each other.  
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This does not automatically imply that beneficiary partners are simply vulnerable to 
the power that material wealth, political clout or development knowledge provides its 
development partners. This study has demonstrated that the beneficiary country can 
employ diverse and unexpected strategies to contest the influence of its development 
cooperation providers. It has also argued that the rise of the Southern cooperation 
providers has been key to strengthening Africa’s bargaining position in these changing 
geographies of power. However, the limitations I encountered when researching the 
RETT project indicate that China’s plans to use TDC to reform its image as a 
responsible global actor is also dependent on its African partners cooperating with its 
strategies, in this case blocking negative narratives on its economic and development 
cooperation activities. This suggests that scholarship on the decolonization of 
knowledge production needs to expand beyond the hegemonic nature of Western 
knowledge systems to the ways in which wealthy and influential Southern countries 
are suppressing knowledge that either falls outside their preferred frameworks or 
opposes their national interests. However, mutuality is an undisputable part of 
international relations. The legitimacy and power of all development cooperation 
providers is also dependent on their recognition and requests for support from Africa 
countries. This why Japan’s development discourse places emphasis on its role as 
Africa’s all-weather friend, and European countries have also recognised that their 
relations with Africa have to move beyond aid to trade, investments and capacity 
building. What remains to be seen is if African countries can ensure that South-
South/trilateral development exchanges lead to effective development outcomes that 
stand the test of time, in spite of the complex politics of partnerships that constrains 
country ownership.  
 
Policy Implications 
Policy texts tend to concentrate on the technical aspects of TDC, such as project 
management and coordination amongst the different partners. However, this study has 
shown that TDC has a political dimension and there are unequal power relations 
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between the different partners that can constrain efforts to achieve beneficiary country 
ownership, inclusive partnerships and the sustainable development outcomes. These 
findings present a number of policy implications (discussed below) for development 
practitioners and multilateral forums that are working to improve the effectiveness of 
development cooperation. 
Promoting national interests is a function of trilateral development cooperation.  
TDC can act as a vehicle for partner countries to build their diplomatic relations or 
access commercial opportunities. At present, most beneficiary countries have not 
articulated official strategies to manage the potential opportunities and challenges that 
can be encountered in TDC due to the diverse interests at play.  Evidence suggests that 
the Zambian government is engaging in TDC projects to access knowledge on the 
development experiences of Southern partners that can enable it to refine longstanding 
development plans, build its human/institutional capacity in specialist areas such as 
renewable energy, and attain self-sufficiency. In addition, the government only 
accepts TDC proposals that align with its national development priorities. However, 
an official strategy would help Zambia, or any other the beneficiary country using a 
similar approach, to improve its ability to secure its desired development objectives 
from future TDC projects. Development cooperation providers must also map out the 
beneficiary country’s development priorities and preferred solutions in TDC projects, 
and ensure that their additional interests align rather than conflict with the 
beneficiary’s plans. 
 
There are many ways of understanding country ownership. 
Evidence suggests that the beneficiary partner has more space to negotiate and 
leverage project activities towards national benefits in TDC than in some bilateral 
partnerships. However, some institutional actors in the beneficiary country do not take 
up opportunities to lead the planning or implementation of project activities. Instead, 
they relegate their understanding of exercising ‘country ownership’ to securing desired 
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development outcomes from a TDC project, such as technical skills, technologies or 
infrastructure. This is an institutionalised response to Zambia’s history of being 
dominated by its Northern donors during a period of aid dependency in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, and the enduring assumption that donors will dominate development 
projects even though a commitment to country ownership is expressed in project plans. 
Therefore, measures aimed at supporting country ownership in TDC must take into 
consideration the historical context of a beneficiary country’s relationship with both 
its Northern and Southern development cooperation providers. 
  
Non-implementation of recommendations is not always a sign of capacity weaknesses, 
but an indirect strategy the beneficiary country employs to preserve sovereignty. 
Another institutionalised response to Zambia’s history of donor domination is that 
bureaucrats tend to use unenthusiastic participation in project activities or non-
implementation of recommendations to block and/or control the introduction of 
externally-driven development interventions, instead of directly expressing their 
disagreement. This strategy is also employed to contest and negotiate the South-South 
transfer of policy experiences in TDC projects. In other instances, beneficiary partners 
use hybridization of South-South policy experiences and development knowledge. 
This involves the careful selection, modification and implementation of some 
elements of a donors recommendations to suit local needs or contexts, and the 
disregard of other elements. However, development cooperation providers also have 
different cultures and approaches to work. This can lead to disagreements and 
opposing views on how issues such as capacity development should be delivered in 
TDC projects. Consequently, investing time in establishing trust, communication and 
a common understanding of the project goals, can help to mitigate potential conflicts 
stemming from cultural differences between the different partners and improve the 
development effectiveness of TDC. 
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There are limits to which inclusive national ownership can be achieved in countries 
where development planning is politicised and decision-making power is highly 
centralised. 
Public institutions tend to be the main implementing partners in beneficiary countries. 
However, there are limits to which inclusive national ownership of TDC can result in 
sustainable development outcomes in a developing country such as Zambia, where 
development planning is politicised and decision-making power is highly centralised. 
Interference from senior policymakers and politicians in negotiations for TDC projects 
can result in cheaper and more suitable development interventions being side-lined 
during project implementation. Changes to national policy, when there is a change in 
senior leadership, can result in the reversal of TDC outcomes related to policy reforms. 
Significantly, political interference in civil service appointments can also result in high 
staff turnover and the loss of knowledge gained through TDC. These are challenges 
that have contributed significantly to the reversal of policy reforms and the loss of 
knowledge on foreign direct investment promotion that Zambia gained during the ToH 
project. This indicates that civil service institutions need to develop strategic plans on 
how to mitigate executive interference so as to ensure that there is continuity of 
planned project activities and that development outcomes from TDC are sustained. 
 
Measures to retain institutional memory should be prioritised in TDC. 
Remarkably for projects aimed at building beneficiary country capacity, the loss of 
institutional memory appears to pose the greatest threat to the sustainability of 
development outcomes from TDC. This is mainly a result of the fact that poor internal 
communication and reporting mechanisms (such as the publication of project reports) 
within government institutions result in the loss of institutional memory on projects 
when there is staff turnover. This also weakens the sustainability of project outcomes 
because officials who replace them have little or no knowledge of the programmes, 
including its goals and links with long-term development plans. Loss of institutional 
memory is also a problem in donor agencies and further weakens the overall 
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management of TDC projects. These challenges with institutional memory appear to 
have led to observations in studies, such as those by Lengfelder (2016) and the UN 
(2019), that there is only a limited amount of information on TDC collected and made 
available by participating institutions. Therefore, all partners should prioritise the 
evaluation and reporting of TDC projects in order to preserve institutional memory 
and improve information sharing with relevant stakeholders and the general public. In 
addition, beneficiary partners should ensure that project activities are integrated into 
the day-to-day activities of participating institutions, and/or linkages are established 
between a TDC project and other development interventions. For example, linkages 
have been established between the RETT solar centre of excellence and development 
projects in the health and renewable energy sectors managed by UNDP and the 
Ministry of Energy in Zambia. 
 
Avenues for further research 
This research has contributed to filling knowledge gaps in the study of TDC and has 
highlighted several conceptual and methodological avenues that merit further 
exploration. Firstly, it has demonstrated the significance of concepts that originated in 
postcolonial theory in enabling a deeper understanding of the machinations of power 
within TDC, its relationship to the production and dissemination of knowledge, and 
the importance of examining beneficiary agency in development partnerships. Most 
significant are the theories concerning how power is a form of knowledge that enables 
actors that are perceived to possess development knowledge significant authority to 
define and influence the trajectory of those actors that are in the position of receiving 
their knowledge (see McEwan 2019). Debates have traditionally focused on the power 
that Northern countries have had to influence development thinking and planning in 
developing countries. However, this thesis has shown that China is just as, if not now 
more significant, in influencing the Zambian government’s approach to managing the 
economy and its foreign policy through its development cooperation.  
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Zambian bureaucrats, including participants in the RETT project, are self-censoring 
or hiding the negative aspects of China-Zambia relations to safeguard the continued 
flow of development cooperation, trade and investments from China. Zambian 
bureaucrats involved in the ToH project also avoided opportunities to seek foreign 
direct investment from Taiwan in order to uphold China’s one country policy. 
Therefore, future postcolonial studies on development cooperation might help to 
expand scholarship on the relationship between power and knowledge in development 
by exploring the ways in which Southern hegemonies are constraining or influencing 
the space for beneficiary countries to control their policymaking and development 
processes. However, the concept of anthropophagy (cannibalism) has also enabled this 
thesis to cast light on how the beneficiary country is not simply passive in response to 
the considerable economic power and influence its development partners possess in 
TDC. It has demonstrated that the beneficiary country uses appropriation and 
hybridization to negotiate the transfer of policy experiences and to maintain some 
control of the local development landscape.  
In his discussion of how hybridity emerged in the colonial context, Homi Bhabha 
(2004) documented the ways in which the colonial encounter also led the coloniser to 
embrace some of the cultural practices of those they colonised. This calls attention to 
how policy diffusion is not only moving in the South-South direction in the changing 
geographies of power but rather, as discussed in Chapter Five, Northern countries have 
also begun to absorb elements of SSC. They have adopted practices such as the 
blending of development finances with trade and investment agendas, as part of a 
transformation that Emma Mawdsley (2018) refers to as the ‘ Southernisation’ of 
international development cooperation. Therefore, fresh insight into the exercise of 
beneficiary agency and debates on the relationship between power and knowledge in 
development cooperation can be obtained through further research into the role of 
anthropophagy or hybridization in South-South/trilateral development exchanges. 
The Zambian case has also demonstrated that postcolonial critiques of the presence of 
a knower-learner dichotomy in development cooperation are far more complex when 
examined at the scale of the state or policy elites. The Zambian government has 
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historically used technical cooperation to ‘learn’ from others and address the country’s 
skilled labour shortage and its reliance on foreign technical expertise in the civil 
service and industrial sector, which are the legacy of colonial governance. The views 
expressed by stakeholders in ToH and RETT projects indicate that Zambia is also 
using TDC to learn from the policy experiences of other developing countries and to 
address persistent capacity gaps in specialist areas. Further reflection on this 
beneficiary country perspective on learning can enrich debates on the politics of 
knowledge production and the nature of partnerships in TDC. 
The second area in which this research has contributed to filling knowledge gaps 
concerns methodology. Employing an institutional ethnography (IE) has enabled it to 
demonstrate that one of the main reasons there are only a few empirically-based TDC 
studies is because it is difficult for researchers to extract information from the main 
development institutions and bureaucracies involved in the implementation of TDC 
projects. Key stakeholders tend to prefer narratives of TDC that focus on: the technical 
aspects of project implementation and coordination, how it assists beneficiary 
countries to achieve priorities in their national development plans, and how it builds 
the project management capacity of Southern cooperation providers. Key stakeholders 
tend to find narratives that suggest underlying interests in development cooperation as 
undermining their professionalism and as a threat to potential opportunities to replicate 
development practice. However, this thesis has unsettled this narrative and revealed 
that there are geopolitical and geoeconomic interests driving TDC.  
IE specifically enabled this research to capture and centre the beneficiary country’s 
ways of knowing and understanding into the collection and analysis of data of how the 
politics of partnership affects country ownership. The research was also able to 
contribute additional insights into beneficiary agency by demonstrating that Zambian 
stakeholders do not agree with the institutionalised approach and vocabularies 
Northern academic and policy circles employ in researching South-South relations. 
However, they engage in these discourses when operating in donor-driven policy 
spaces in order to secure development cooperation. These findings make a strong case 
for future studies committed to decolonizing knowledge production to engage with 
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institutional ethnography instead of the current dependence on survey-based research 
methods in order to open up to new perspectives on South-South/trilateral cooperation. 
The difficulty I experienced in securing an interview from RETT project stakeholders 
from China cast light particularly on how Chinese institutions are reluctant to 
participate in interviews with Northern-based researchers. This appears to be a 
response to the negative coverage of China-Africa relations in past news media and 
academic publications. The reluctance of Chinese informants, alongside the 
discomfort exhibited by Zambian informants when I asked questions concerning 
aspects of their partnership with China, led me to reflect on the expectations and 
affective responses (anxiety, suspicion and frustration) of over-researched groups 
Most methodological studies tend to focus on the ethical considerations involved in 
dealing with research-fatigued groups positioned at the lower levels of social 
stratification, especially vulnerable groups such as women and indigenous peoples. 
However, there is need for further reflection in methodological studies on how 
researchers can manage the ethics of engaging with policy elites who are similarly 
affected by research fatigue, and specifically the implications of research fatigue on 
the study of China-Africa relations.  
This research has also cast light on the ‘tyranny’ involved in researchers extracting 
information and not empowering their informants when ‘studying up.’ Given that TDC 
is a relatively new modality of which very little is known, some informants asked me 
to produce a brief report containing policy findings so that they could better understand 
TDC. I intend to write this report and distribute it to key informants from the Zambian 
government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
A failure to respect this request could potentially be seen as a form of exploitation 
since Zambia struggles with bureaucratic challenges around monitoring, evaluation 
and reporting on development cooperation. Therefore, it is imperative that future 
qualitative studies of South-South/trilateral development cooperation not only show a 
commitment to recovering the beneficiary perspective, but that they will also reflect 
on and prioritise reciprocity (in the form of information sharing) with policy elites 
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from developing countries. As this research has demonstrated, these policy elites are 
‘subaltern’ in international development and are likely to remain so as long as their 
countries have difficulties in researching, publishing and sharing knowledge on their 
development experiences.  
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I. Interviewees 
Fieldwork site: Lusaka, Zambia 
Name Date 
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m= 
minutes) 
Institution affiliated Role 
A 
7 
September 
2017 
1h 00m UNDP Zambia 
RETT Project Focal 
Person 
B 
22 
September 
2017 
0h 45m 
UNDP Zambia & 
Ministry of Energy 
RETT Project Manager 
C and 
D 
25 
September 
2017 
0h 30m University of Zambia 
Members- RETT solar 
energy centre of 
excellence PMU 
E 
17 January 
2018 
1h 30m 
Private Consultant 
(previously with Zambia 
Development Agency) 
ToH Project 
Coordinator  
F 
18 January 
2018 
1h 00m Private Consultant 
Renewable energy 
Specialist 
G 
30 January 
2018 
1h 00m University of Zambia 
Project Manager- 
RETT solar energy 
centre of excellence  
H 
5 February 
2018 
1h 00m 
Japan International 
Cooperation Agency 
Programme Officer 
I 
13 February 
2018 
0h 45m 
Private Consultant 
(previously with 
Ministry of Health) 
Member- ToH Health 
taskforce  
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J 
27 February 
2018 
0h 15m Ministry of Energy 
Member- RETT project 
PMU 
K 
28 February 
2018 
1h 30m Ministry of Finance 
Member- ToH Banking 
and Finance taskforce 
L 
7 
September 
2018 
0h 30m 
(Skype) 
UNDP China - Beijing 
RETT Programme 
Manager 
M 
23 October 
2018 
1h 00m 
(Skype) 
UN Office for South-
South Cooperation - 
New York  
Policy Analyst 
N 
9 December 
2018 
Email 
Royal Danish Embassy- 
Beijing 
Political 
Officer/Danida Advisor 
 
II. Government Documents 
Cabinet Office (1966) Manpower Report: A Report and Statistical Handbook on 
Manpower, Education, Training and Zambianisation 1965-1966, Lusaka: 
Government Printer. 
GRZ (2006) Vision 2030: A prosperous middle-income Nation by 2030, Lusaka: 
Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
MNDP (2017) Seventh National Development Plan 2017-2021, Ministry of National 
Development Planning, Lusaka: Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
MoF (2012) Development Cooperation Report 2010, Ministry of Finance, Lusaka: 
Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
MoFNP (2006) Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010, Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning, Lusaka: Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
MoFNP (2007) Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, Lusaka: Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
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MoFNP (2010) Development Cooperation Report 2009, Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning, Lusaka: Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
MoFNP (2011a) Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration Phase II 
in Zambia, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Lusaka: Government of the 
Republic of Zambia. 
MoFNP (2011b) Sixth National Development Plan 2011-2015, Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning, Lusaka: Government of the Republic of Zambia 
Office of National Development and Planning (1966) First National Development 
Plan 1966-1970. Lusaka: Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
 
III. Newspaper archives (selected) 
Chellah, G. (2006) ‘ECZ Summons Sata’, The Post, 17 August 2006. 
Chellah, G. and Malupenga, A. (2006) ‘Taiwanese, Sata Meet in Lilongwe’, The 
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Chirwa, J. and Zinyama, F. (2007) ‘ZDA board should promote private sector 
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Times of Zambia, 15 June 2005. 
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Limwanya, K. (2006) ‘Japanese ambassador sees hope for Zambia’, Times of 
Zambia, 2 December 2006 
Miti, C. (2018) ‘Chasaya advises civil servants to follow job descriptions’, The 
Mast, 18 January 2018, available: 
https://www.themastonline.com/2018/02/09/chasaya-advises-civil-servants-to-
follow-job-descriptions/ [accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Moonze, L. and Nombuso, C. (2005) ‘Chambishi Explosion Kills 51 Workers, 
Another Tragedy’, The Post, 21 April 2005. 
Mseteka, E. (2017) ‘Government makes strides in economic zones but…,’ Zambia 
Daily Mail, 5 September 2017, http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/government-makes-
strides-in-economic-zones-but/. 
Mulenga, C. (2006a) ‘Zambia is Indebted to China, Says Sikatana’, Times of 
Zambia, 4 November 2006. 
Mulenga, C. (2006b) ‘Levy Hails Beijing Meet’, Times of Zambia, 8 November 
2006. 
Mupuchi, S. (2006a) ‘Zambia Doesn't Owe China Anything- Sata’, The Post, 28 
August 2006. 
Mupuchi, S. (2006b) ‘Sata is Misleading the Nation over Taiwan- KK’, The Post, 29 
August 2006. 
Mvula, S. (2018) ‘Shiwang’andu projects delay worry Lungu’, Zambia Daily Mail, 
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delay-worry-lungu/. 
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Saluseki, B. (2005) ‘There Are Lessons to Learn From Asia's Economic Success – 
Levy’, The Post, 26 April 2005. 
Siame, S. (2006) ‘The MDGs', The Post, 24 September 2006. 
Simbeye, B. (2006) ‘You’re safe Levy assures investors’, Times of Zambia, 9 
September 2006 
Simwanza, O. (2006a) ‘Levy, Jintao Unveil New Economic Zone’, Times of Zambia, 
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Sunday Times of Zambia (2007) ‘China valid partner – Kaunda’, Sunday Times of 
Zambia, 4 November 2007 
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May 2006. 
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Times of Zambia (2006d) ‘China threatens to cut ties’, Times of Zambia, 5 
September 2006. 
231 
 
 
Times of Zambia (2007a) ‘We'll Continue Creating Stable Economic Environment – 
Veep’, Times of Zambia, 11 January 2007. 
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Times of Zambia (2007e) ‘Mwanawasa to Woo Investors’, The Times, 21 September 
2007. 
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December 2007. 
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13 June 2008. 
Times of Zambia (2008e) ‘Malaysians Keen to Invest’, Times of Zambia, 30 July 
2008. 
Times of Zambia (2009a) ‘RB Woos Chinese Investors’, Times of Zambia, 17 March 
2009. 
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Zambia, 12 June 2009. 
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Appendix 2: Sample Interview Templates 
A. Interview with members of RETT solar energy centre excellence PMU, 25 
September 2017 
1. What has been your role in the project? At what point in the project lifecycle 
did you get involved?  
2. Is this the first project this department has worked on with Denmark, UNDP 
or the Ministry of Energy? 
3. In a partnership, all sides should mutually benefit from a project. In your 
opinion, why did these partners support the project? 
4. What advice would you give to another research institution that wants to 
participate in a similar project? How have you ensured that your voice is heard 
in this project when they are many partners? 
5. Did you have input into the kind of training that you wanted during exchange 
trips in China? 
6. How did you handle cultural and linguistic differences with Chinese partners? 
7. What does country ownership mean to you in this project? 
8. How does your team intend to ensure that the solar energy centre is 
sustainable? 
9. Are there any plans to write and/or disseminate a report on the development of 
the solar energy centre and your participation in the project? 
 
B. Interview request sent to RETT Project Manager at ACCA21, 23 August 
2018 
1. What has been your role in the project? Were you involved in the planning 
stage? 
2. Why did China choose to support this project? 
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3. How did Chinese partners ensure that training provided to Zambian officials 
matches local needs and context? 
4. Are there any plans to support UNZA and Kafue Gorge Regional Training 
Centre to maintain the solar centre and small hydro demonstration plant after 
project completion? 
5. What are the main lessons you have learnt on managing South-South/trilateral 
cooperation partnerships with African countries? What advice would you give 
to other donor organisations that want to participate in a similar project? 
 
C. Interview with the ToH Project Coordinator, 17 January 2018        
1. How did the ToH project begin? Who initiated it? 
2. What was your role in the project?  
3. How were roles and responsibilities divided in the project?  
4. How was the project able to generate strong support and interest from senior 
government officials? 
5. Did you observe a difference in participation between senior government 
officials and line ministry officials? 
6. Do you think the outcomes of the project have been sustained?  
7. Has staff turnover affected the implementation/maintenance of project 
outcomes in any way?  
8. Did a change in government leadership in 2008 and 2011, have any impact on 
the implementation of project activities? 
9. In a partnership, all sides should mutually benefit from a project. In your 
opinion, why did Malaysia and Japan choose to support the ToH project?  
10. Were the recommendations from the Malaysian context suitable for Zambia? 
11. What are the main lessons you have learnt from the ToH project? What advice 
would you give to government institutions and/or cooperating partners that 
want to embark on a similar trilateral partnership model? 
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D. Interview with JICA Programme Officer, 5 February 2018 
1. How did the ToH project begin? Who initiated it? 
2. Did you participate in the project and if yes, what was your role? 
3. Does JICA consider the project a success? 
4. In your opinion, why did the project attract strong support and interest from 
senior government officials in Zambia? 
5. Did JICA find a difference in participation between senior government 
officials and line ministry officials? 
6. Did a change in government leadership in 2008 and 2011, have any impact on 
the implementation of project activities? 
7. In a partnership, all sides should benefit from a project. In your opinion, why 
did Japan and Malaysia choose to support the ToH project? 
8. What are the main lessons you have learnt from evaluating the ToH project? 
What advice would you give to government institutions and/or cooperating 
partners that want to embark on a similar trilateral partnership model? 
 
